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Training of Teachers
and
Methods of Instruction

Selected Papers

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By

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TO

L. S.

STRESA,
May, 1901.

PREFATORY NOTE.

DURING the last twenty years I have published three small volumes of Essays and Addresses on Educational topics. These having been for some time out of print[1], I hope I am not wrong in thinking that a selection of those papers which seem to me to treat of subjects of permanent interest may be acceptable to some. Two papers, one on Universities and the other on History in the school, have not before been published in book-form.

S. S. L.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,
1901.

[1] With the exception of one volume which has ceased to command a sale.

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I.

THE TEACHING PROFESSION AND CHAIRS OF EDUCATION.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

(*Bell Chair of the Theory, History, and Art of Education*[1].)

THE first occupant of a Chair new to the Universities of Great Britain is placed in a somewhat peculiar position. It may be fairly expected of him not merely to correlate the new subject with the other studies of a University, but to vindicate for it a right to the promotion which it has obtained, to explain its bearing on the educational interests of the country at large, and to satisfy the sceptical as to its direct utility. Were I, however, to undertake to maintain a thesis so large, I should weary even the well-disposed listener, and probably fail, after all, to convince or convert the unfriendly. A broad treatment of the subject would involve me in a range of argument, fact, and illustration, so wide and varied, that I think it better to assume very much on the general question. I am entitled indeed to make large assumptions, if the educational movement of the last thirty-five years has had any genuineness and honesty in it; if education has been anything more than a pretext for

[1] Inaugural Address, 1876.

political and ecclesiastical contention. It is not improbable, moreover, that by limiting my range of observation, and confining myself to the objections taken to the foundation of this particular Chair, while at the same time giving some indication of my own point of view with respect to the question of education, I may do more than could be accomplished by a general treatment, to reconcile the hostile and the sceptical to this new event in educational history. But, first, a few words as to the foundation.

Dr Andrew Bell was born in St Andrews, in 1753. At the ancient University of that town he was distinguished in most subjects of study, but especially in Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. After spending some years as a tutor in the Southern States of America, he returned to this country, took orders in the Church of England, and sailed for Madras. There, he was appointed to an army chaplaincy, and undertook, along with his other duties, the superintendence of the Military Male Orphan Asylum, which was instituted after his arrival in the Presidency. It was while devoting himself with singular earnestness and assiduity to the work of education in this hospital that he was driven, almost by the necessity of his position, to invent the system of mutual tuition with which his name will be ever associated. After Dr Bell's return to this country he devoted himself to the dissemination of his system, being sustained in his unceasing activity not a little by the rivalry of Joseph Lancaster. Out of the labours of the latter grew the British and Foreign School Society, and out of the labours of the former the National Society in connection with the Church of England.

The principle of mutual instruction of boys by boys was the discovery by which Dr Bell hoped to regenerate the world. But in truth the invention and application of this method was not his sole merit. He was a genuine teacher, having quick sympathy with the nature of boys, and great readiness of

resource in the schoolroom. Many of our established practices were first introduced by him, and some of his improvements are only now being adopted. My impression is that prior to his undertaking the charge of the Madras Orphan Asylum in 1789 it was not usual strictly to classify the pupils of a primary school; and we are all aware that it was only the other day that the leading schools of Scotland began to arrange their pupils in classes according to their progress, and that in some schools of high reputation (incredible as it may seem) classification on this basis has not even yet been attempted! I shall not on this occasion enter further into Dr Bell's educational reforms, but content myself with saying that at present, and until better informed, I am disposed to regard him as the founder of the Art of Primary Education in this country, *as a conscious art*[1].

Dr Bell destined his large fortune mainly for the foundation of specific Educational Institutions, the residue to be applied to educational purposes, according to the discretion of his Trustees, enjoining on them always to have due regard to the promotion of his system. The interest of this money was for many years paid away in small grants to various schools throughout the country in connection with the Church of Scotland; but after the passing of the Education (Scotland) Act, in 1872, which made universal provision for schools, the Trustees, who at present are the Earl of Leven and Melville, Lord Kirkcaldie, and Mr John Cook, W.S., resolved to employ a portion of the funds in their keeping for the purpose of instituting Chairs of Education in Edinburgh and St Andrews, to be called the "Bell Chairs of the Theory, History, and Art of Education," imposing on the occupants the duty of expounding, in the course of their prelections, Bell's principles and system. They thereby fulfilled in the most effectual way, under existing circumstances, the objects which Dr Bell had

[1] Anyone who doubts this will have his doubts removed by reading Southey's *Life of Bell*, and above all *Bell's Collected Works* in one vol., published by Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, in 1832—now a very rare book.

in view in originally constituting the trust. Certainly no one who has read the *Life of Dr Bell*, by Southey, will doubt that this resolution of the Trustees would have been in the highest degree pleasing to him. Almost with one voice the teaching profession have hailed the action of the Trustees as a great educational advance. It has been felt that the three gentlemen above named have conferred honour on a department of work which Dr Bell delighted to honour. They have unquestionably done very much to promote education in Scotland, not only by raising the work of the schoolmaster in public estimation, but also by attracting public attention to education as being not merely a question of national machinery for the planting of schools but a question of principles and methods—in brief, of the philosophy of man and of political constitutions.

I can do no more on this occasion than make a merely passing allusion to the zealous, but futile, efforts of the late Professor Pillans to do what the Bell Trustees have now accomplished.

A Chair of the Theory, History, and Art of Education having been instituted, we have now to ask what the objects of such a Chair are. There has been much misunderstanding with regard to these. Some are at a loss to know what there is to say on education within the walls of a University, and what the principles and history of that subject have to do with the schoolmaster's work. Others, who have not to be instructed on these points, dread the competition of an Education Chair with the existing Training Colleges. The latter class of objectors is the more important. They are at least aware that the necessity of training teachers in methods and in school organization is not a question to be now for the first time debated. They know that the question has been settled these thirty years by the combined intelligence of the Government of the country and of the Education Committees

of the various Churches. The former class of objectors has nothing to urge against the University training of teachers in the philosophy and methods of education, which they would not have been prepared with equal readiness and confidence to urge against the institution of the existing Training Colleges thirty years ago. Indeed, I am disposed to think that, had the desirableness of training teachers to their professional work been propounded thirty years ago for discussion on its own merits as a general question, it would not yet be settled in the affirmative. The Parliamentary Philistine, the "Church in danger" men, and above all (strange to say) a large proportion of those engaged in the work of teaching, would have been opposed to the introduction of any such novel idea in practical form. Many as are the evils of centralization, it is unquestionably to the centralizing action of the Committee of Privy Council that we owe the full recognition of the efforts which were being made thirty-five or forty years ago in London and Edinburgh to train teachers, and the consequent growth of the Training College system. The work was done *through* the Churches, and accordingly called forth no Church opposition, and as money was freely offered to all who desired training, the rest of the world readily acquiesced.

The effect of this action on the part of the Privy Council has been most beneficial. Almost all now recognize that there is an art of teaching and of school-keeping, and that primary teachers should be trained in that art. It is only among that class of teachers and professors who have never come into close contact with the existing system of training that doubts and objections survive. Quietly, and almost unnoticed, a great new Institution has established itself in the United Kingdom, and has overpowered every possible theoretical objection to its existence by the practical benefits it has conferred on the country. It is therefore too late now to discuss the general question. The practical result is before us, and the occupation of teacher has been finally raised into a profession by requiring,

as the condition of entering it, a professional discipline. If method in the work of the primary school is now regarded as indispensable, may we not conclude that Plato, Quintilian, and Ascham have something to say to the teacher of the secondary school which may be worthy of his attention?

Notwithstanding many defects—and defects are incident to all organizations—the Training College system has been a success. The kind of work done in these institutions, and the extent to which they have taken their place as seminaries second only to the Universities themselves, would, if inquired into, astonish the few who have hitherto ignored their existence. I am also satisfied that the improvements which have taken place even in secondary instruction have been due largely, if not chiefly, to the indirect influence of the Training Colleges, although these exist for the training of primary teachers alone. Every man connected with education must be so well informed on this the most important modern movement in educational history that to dwell longer on it would be superfluous. My purpose in referring to it at all is to limit the range of any argument which might naturally be expected from me on this occasion.

For, the necessity of training the future teacher not only in the subjects which he is afterwards to teach, but in the art which he is to profess, being once for all a settled matter, I am at liberty to confine my remarks to the narrower question of the training of those aspirants to the scholastic profession who pass through the Universities. Those aspirants are either self-supporting or partly dependent on small bursaries gained in open competition, and their purpose is to prepare themselves for the higher class of Public Schools (which, in their upper departments, are in truth lower secondary schools), and for purely Secondary or Grammar Schools either in Scotland or other parts of the Empire. As it is at once evident that attending university classes instead of the classes of a Training College has no such great virtue in it as to enable university

men to dispense with professional training any more than their fellow-teachers (of a so-called lower grade), it is superfluous to argue the point. It may be at once assumed that, as the schools for which they are preparing themselves, at least those in Scotland and the Colonies, comprehend within them at once primary and secondary instruction, the need of professional training, in the case of university students, is peculiarly great. Where are they to get this? They might be required to combine attendance at a Training College with attendance at a University for a degree; but this, though it might serve as a provisional arrangement, would not secure the end we seek. And it would not secure it because a specialist Training College does not answer the same purposes as a University. The broader culture, the freer air, the higher aims of the latter, give to it an educational influence which specialist Colleges can never exercise.

It is impossible within my present limits to elaborate this view of the question: it is familiar to all educated men. It would appear however that the moment we substitute a distinct practical purpose, such as the production of engineers, officers of the army, physicians, ministers of the Church, as the sole aim of education, and arrange the whole machinery of an institution to attain any one of these ends exclusively, the mental life of the student becomes at once narrowed, and education in the higher sense disappears altogether. We all acknowledge this truth when it is supported by our antipathies and we are called upon for an opinion on such seminaries as Jesuit Colleges. But the objections to be taken to these specialist seminaries are, from an educational point of view, substantially the same in kind as may be taken to Colleges which have other, and merely secular, aims. It is desirable, therefore, to maintain the position of the Universities as the legitimate trainers of all those aspirants to the teaching profession who are fitted by their previous education to enter on a university curriculum. This is all that is demanded by those who desire a university

training for schoolmasters. Is it an unreasonable demand? The preliminary training of all female student-teachers, and of the great majority of the other sex, makes, and will continue in perpetuity to make, Training Colleges a necessity; but there are some youths whose greater local advantages or greater native energy of mind is such as to have secured for them a better early training in languages and mathematics and to have inspired them with a higher ambition than these seminaries can satisfy. Those better trained intellects, those more ambitious natures, ought to have the University open to them not only, as at present, for instruction but for professional training.

It may be urged,—it is urged by some,—that the students of Training Colleges are welcome to the discipline which the University can give in classics, science, and philosophy, but that the Training Colleges themselves should furnish the purely professional instruction. But the answer to this is, that if the Training Colleges are competent to handle the question of education as a science and art equally well with the Universities, they are also competent to teach classics, science, and philosophy equally well with the Universities. Latin, I fancy, can be taught quite as well in one street of a town as another. What we want is that the student-teacher shall live in the university atmosphere, and enjoy all those subtle intellectual and moral advantages which belong to that serener air. If this be desirable as regards Latin, Literature and Mathematics, how much more is it desirable in the case of the principles of education! Here the student enters into the precincts of Philosophy itself: he has to find the psychological basis and relations of methods of instruction, he has to *think* about Education, and try to ascertain what Education precisely is, and what kind of public duty it is which he has before him as a schoolmaster. He has to investigate the principles of his art, and to expand his thought by studying its history. Is it not at once apparent that whatever advantage belongs

to the study of classics and science in a University belongs pre-eminently to studies which ally themselves to philosophy and history? Doubtless there are some minds whose education is so defective and whose imagination is so weak that they are unable to conceive in what respect a university curriculum should differ from a similar curriculum in a specialist College in which a practical limitation of aim vitiates the whole process of education in the higher sense of that term and makes it essentially illiberal. To such minds I do not address myself.

Far be it from me to say one word in depreciation of Training Colleges. I know them too well not to respect their work. I have already shown their importance as a part of the educational machinery of the country, their necessity as a permanent part of that machinery, and the debt the country owes to them. But they are not Universities—this is all I desire to say—any more than Sandhurst or Woolwich is a University. It is true that certain picked students are now sent from the Training Colleges to certain Universities to attend two of the classes there, and thus sniff the academic air; but this device can never supply the place of a university curriculum and of university life.

When, further, we consider that for two hundred years all the leading teachers of the parochial schools of Scotland have been supplied by the Universities, and have carried with them into the most remote parishes some university culture, is it too much to ask that a system which has been so beneficial in the past shall be continued and even more fully developed under the new Statute[1]? At this moment no man can be appointed to a Public School in Scotland—and the term "Public School" includes all schools, with about a dozen exceptions—who does not possess a Government certificate. A raw lad from the Hebrides is, after nine or ten months' training, and while yet barely able to write an ordinary letter, while wholly ignorant of Latin, and acquainted with the merest

[1] The Act of 1872.

elements of other subjects, technically qualified for any Public School, while a graduate of the Universities is disqualified until he undergoes a further examination. This seems hardly credible. I have taken opportunities of bringing this fact before authorities in the Universities from time to time since 1872, but it is difficult to believe that they have yet fairly realized the actual state of things. All the new machinery for education will fail to produce the effect expected of it if this evil be not quickly remedied[1]. The Education Department is quite entitled to hold that a university curriculum shall be incomplete, so far as the teacher is concerned, if it do not include a knowledge of the principles and practice of education, but to go further than this is an insult to the Universities of Scotland, which these bodies, however, seem slow to feel. The Universities are being gradually dissociated from the teaching profession. The evil might be faced, and we might reconcile ourselves to the infliction of this blow on the university system of Scotland, especially as the Universities themselves seem to accept their position with the silence which indicates acquiescence, were it not that the education of the country is imperilled, and all that has been distinctive of Scottish school-life is threatened. It is to be hoped that we shall have ere long a recognized university curriculum for teachers, and that the impending danger may thus far be obviated.

Do not imagine that the education of the country can be maintained by Codes, with an array of "specific subjects" to be paid for at so much a head. The higher instruction has been given in the past, not for money, but for love. Teachers, having formed their standard at the Universities, carried that standard down with them into the country, and were proud of the opportunity of forming classes in Mathematics and Latin. They felt that they kept themselves up to a higher level by connecting themselves with university work, and they saw that this higher instruction told on the

[1] The evil has now (1882) been substantially remedied.

intelligence, and above all on the *morale*, of the whole school. It is by sending out able and ambitious men, not by the manipulation of a Code (although this too has importance), that true education is promoted. Nor is it only for those who are competent to go direct from the school to the University that a curriculum is demanded, but also for those Training College students of one or two years' standing, who desire to carry their education further, and to qualify for the higher primary, and for secondary, schools.

In brief, a Faculty of Education is, in a restricted sense, already constituted in the Training Colleges of the Empire: we desire to lift this up, and to constitute such a Faculty in the Universities, because we believe that there is a national work to be done which the Universities are alone competent to do. It is true that, if the curriculum which we contemplate is carried out, a certain small proportion of Training College students will pass over the Training Colleges altogether. Is this a matter for regret or alarm? Are the Scottish Universities, which have always been institutions that maintained a close connection with the people, and endeavoured to supply the wants of the various professions, to be excluded now and permanently from all connection with the profession of education, because Training Colleges will lose a certain percentage of their students? The heads of the Training Colleges do not, I am satisfied, share the fear which some have expressed, and the finances of these institutions are placed far above the reach of injury by any such slight innovation. Those who imagine that Training Colleges will be materially affected, except for good, by this new movement, speak in ignorance of those seminaries, and the sources of their strength.

Further, the institution of this Chair, by providing professional instruction for teachers, not only directly benefits the schools of the country, but it increases the importance of the teaching profession. It gives it an academic standing. It makes it possible to institute for the first time in our

Universities a Faculty of Education, just as we may be said already to have a Faculty of Law, of Theology, and of Engineering. It thereby raises the whole question of the Theory and Art of Education, as such, to a higher level, and may, perchance, serve, more than almost any other external influence, to attract into the occupation of schoolmaster men who might otherwise pass it by for occupations which have hitherto ranked higher in the conventional estimate of the world. It promotes the movement, which has been steadily progressing for twenty years, for the recognition of the large body of teachers as a great national institution—an organized profession, looking, as other professions do, to the University as its source and head, and drawing strength and self-respect from that connection.

Difficulties have been thrown in the way by a few, who are at a loss to know what the movement precisely means. Timid and distrustful, and accustomed to follow precedent as the sole safe guide, they have been groping about to find what other people are thinking. What would they say at Oxford and Cambridge? What do they do at Paris and Berlin? Now, for myself, I should certainly be glad to find that any educational movement here was supported by the concurrent approval of other learned centres, but I venture to submit that it is to Scotland that other nations may fairly look for guidance on this question. We in Scotland have been the true pioneers in popular education: and do we now lag so far behind that we must be sending out scouts to see what they are doing in the front? The traditions and accumulated wisdom of three hundred years are behind us, and with all its defects our present educational system is, as a whole, still worthy of our past history. In this matter, as in others, we claim to lead Europe and America. Still I must so far consider the weak brother as to tell him that in England some of the most cultivated minds of the two Universities, being met together at Winchester in the Headmasters' Conference of 1873, discussed the question of

instituting Chairs of Education in Oxford and Cambridge. The mere fact that the question was seriously discussed by such a conclave, in a country whose whole training and habit of mind are alien to philosophy, is itself most significant. And although there was no very practical issue to the Conference, opinions of weight were recorded. While desiderating, as was to be expected, arrangements for practical training, as well as for theoretical and historical instruction, the Bishop of Exeter[1] wrote as follows:—

"...It would be well worth while to provide that men should have the opportunity of seeing something of their business, and of reflecting on what they have seen, before they begin to teach. For this purpose the ideal system would be this: to have a Professor of Education, either in London, or in Oxford, or in Cambridge, or to have one in each; to require the Professor or Professors to give certificates to such B.A. as attended their lectures and passed a good examination in them."

Then Dr Kennedy of Cambridge, the eminent (Emeritus) Headmaster of Shrewsbury, says:—

"...Professional lectures supported by examinations and certificates, which should be essential to the function of public-school teaching, though too much must not be expected from them, seem to promise some important good. Especially this, they would give to Education the status of a faculty and profession: they would oblige every master to regard his work as professional, as work to be done on definite principles and with high public responsibility. They would enhance the personal and social dignity of masters, and thereby promote their efficiency, their usefulness, and their happiness. Such professional lectures would, I suppose, be directed to the theory and history of Education, and also to the art and method of teaching: in all which moral and mental science without being directly taught would be assumed and used as principial and regulative." This is well said, and I willingly adopt the words as my own programme.

[1] Now Archbishop of Canterbury.

Having heard all this, do you think that I push my argument too far when I maintain that the subject of education, as such, demands, as of right, a place in the university curriculum, with a view to the constituting of a Faculty of Education? The philosophy of education is, in fact, now, in the world of letters, a distinct subject, and the importance and intimate relation of it to the future welfare of the nation require that it shall be held in academic honour, and provided with academic standing-room. Its relation to the Universities, moreover, as a means of bringing them, through some recognized functionary, a functionary controlled by the responsibilities of his position, into close connection with the whole scholastic machinery of the country, thereby extending their just influence, is sufficiently obvious.

We have, however, still other objections to the founding of an Education Chair to face, proceeding mainly from those who take what might be called a purely academic view of the question. Education (they say) is an important subject, we admit, but it is too closely allied with practice to be a fit subject for university teaching. It is a subject rather for the laboratory of the schoolmaster than for the theoretical and historical prelections of a Professor. Now it is to be at once admitted that this is a fair subject for debate; but I am entitled to insist that it shall be discussed as part of a larger question this question, namely, Is a University to train for professions at all? My answer to this is, that the business of a University is, mainly, to train for the professions, and that there ought to be within a University as many Faculties as there are recognized professions. It is not because of the claims which the Theory and History of Education can make to be regarded as a subject of general university discipline (though not a little might be said on this aspect of the question, beginning from Plato), that it seeks admission to a university curriculum. It is as a complement to the Faculties of Arts, and Science, as completing the preparation of the teachers of the country for their

profession, that it rests its claim. That future educators who are receiving their general instruction in a University should there also study the subject of education, is to my mind of the nature of a truism. Nor does it seem possible for any to hold another view without including in their condemnation all university studies which have a direct bearing on special professional preparation for active life.

That a University should close its doors to all save theoretical studies, or at least to all save those which have to do with the culture of a man without regard to his future occupation,- is an intelligible and perhaps tenable opinion; but in these days it is unnecessary to discuss it. One has naturally much sympathy with that conception of a University, according to which it is constituted of a body of learned men whose sole business it is to pursue science and abstract studies generally, while admitting to their workshop only the select few who desire to spend their lives far from the vulgar crowd. This is the dream of Bacon's *New Atlantis*: it never existed, and never will exist save on a small collegiate scale. Such an institution as that contemplated by Bacon would require only the collegiate life to make it a secular monastery. All monasteries have a certain sentimental charm, and this kind of nineteenth-century monastery might possibly gather sentiment round it. But our modern, especially our Scottish Universities, are far removed from such a conception. They are compromises between the theoretical and the practical. They aim at one end of their curriculum to meet and welcome the intelligence of the youth of the country, and at the other to connect themselves with the duties of active life. And if, in thus adapting themselves to the needs of the time, they have thought it wise to constitute or complete certain Faculties, is the equipping of the future teacher of the country with the principles, history, and methods of his special task of less moment than the equipping of the future engineer, physician, lawyer, or minister of religion?

There is yet another objection taken by a few,—an objection which is certainly specious. "We admit," they say, "the importance of the subject in itself; we recognize the desirableness of using the Universities to supply the professions of the country, because we think that we thereby contribute to the strength and dignity of those professions, and send out recruits who, along with their professional knowledge, carry with them a certain portion of university culture, and so contribute to maintain a high standard of social life. This culture we endeavour to give, regarding it as an essential part of the merely professional training, and that whereby we prevent the University from being converted into a mere aggregate of specialist schools. But, while admitting all this, we shall recognize no subject of instruction in any Faculty which cannot rank itself among the sciences, either in itself or by direct affiliation." There is much vagueness and half-thought about this objection. It seems to be forgotten that very many of the existing Chairs are divorced by their very nature from the category of sciences. All those Chairs which have to do with Humane Letters, not merely the Chairs of ancient tongues, but of Philosophy and Literature and History, have a place in the higher education of youth by virtue of qualities which are, it is not too much to say, antagonistic to the conception of pure science. The truth is that the objections urged on the scientific ground are a covert attack on the Humanities, and especially on the Philosophy of Mind in all its branches. The objectors start with the assumption that nothing is worthy of university study save science, and at the same moment they restrict the term "science" to aggregates and co-ordinations of physical facts that can be demonstrated in such a way as not to admit of question. There is, probably, no science in this, the strictest acceptance of the term, except Mathematics and those branches of knowledge which rest directly on Mathematics. Botany, for example, is not a science in the restricted sense of the term; it may be one day a science, but as yet it is

only a system of classification, and a record of interesting observations and reasonings on the physiology of vegetable organisms—so far as they go, correct and verifiable. I may be mistaken, but it seems to me that there is nothing to prevent a discovery in Biology being made, which would revolutionize the fundamental conception of Botany in one day. Botany may be held to represent other departments of knowledge to which the name of science is freely accorded. The objectors would not drive such studies as Botany out of the Universities, because they include them in their notion of science. The fact is that such objectors respect Botany and similar studies because they are at least possible sciences, inasmuch as they deal with what can be seen by the eye of sense, and handled and weighed and measured, and so forth. The same remark applies to Zoology. It is only the recent acceptance of the *theory* of Evolution which is converting these studies into sciences. The true objection to Education as a special branch of study is, when probed to its foundation, this, that it adds another to the list of Humane studies which already disturb the purely scientific intellect,—to wit, Classics, English Literature, Metaphysics, Logic, Ethics, History, and, we may add, Political Economy. To History, perhaps, they may condescend to give academic standing-room, because after all it has to do with things that *did* make their appearance as phenomena on the face of the planet, and probably admit of some sort of co-ordination. But as to those other departments of thought which I have named, and all such, the sooner they are despatched to the limbo of ineptitudes the better. It is naturally disturbing to such minds to find subjects, which do not admit of exact treatment, assuming rank and importance in determining the progress of civilization, and in the regulation of contemporary academical arrangements. The most recent improvement in the microscope does not enable them to see the so-called things of mind,—the most delicately adjusted scales will not weigh them; their genesis and their *modus*

operandi are invisible and impalpable, and their possible and actual results defy any calculus. It is not only disturbing, but distressing that such things should be—nay, that such things should, in truth, constitute the great forces which in all ages have moved the heart of humanity, and have made the history of man.

If a science be a synthetic and systematic body of truth regarding a department of knowledge, which starts from certain axiomatic statements, and, by help of a few postulates, builds up its fabric of verity so that each part rises out of another by necessary sequence, then it is well to say at once that Education is not a science; nay, that it never will be a science. But are we to measure its right to a place in a university system by such stringent requirements? If so, what department of study belonging to the *Litteræ Humaniores* will stand the test? Is Metaphysics a science? In one sense "No," in another it is the *scientia scientiarum*—the πρώτη φιλοσοφία. Even in the field of formal Logic do not men still occupy hostile camps? Of Ethics what shall we say? For 2400 years men have thought, spoken, taught, but with what *scientific* result? With this, that even now the ultimate criterion of the right and wrong in conduct, the nature of conscience, the very existence of the sentiment of duty as an inner power, are still matters of debate. And yet there is a philosophy, if not a science, of Ethics. Is History a science? Some vainly imagine that it is at least a possible science. Given certain conditions, they are prepared, by the help of the Registrar-General, to predict the history of nations. But it is at once evident that the social movements of the whole involve the equally necessary movement of each individual of that whole, and that a science of History demands for its possibility not only an unbending system of physical laws within which man is to work, but also that man himself shall be an automaton! And yet though there be no science, there is a philosophy of History. Is Political Economy a science? Even now the

fundamental principles of that department of knowledge are an arena for discussion. The question of supply and demand is still debated; the difficulties of the currency question are still open to further discussion; even the principle of Free-Trade *versus* Protection is still a moot point: not perhaps in this country; but we must not let our insular self-complacency shut our eyes to the fact that in the United States and our Colonies, and on the continent of Europe, the principle of Free-Trade is not merely set aside in practice, but impugned by argument. The very theory of Rent, which J. S. Mill considers to be the *pons asinorum* of Political Economy, and the discovery of which is held to be the crowning glory of Ricardo, is still unsettled. Is Jurisprudence a science? No; and yet is there no philosophy of Law? So with Education. I am quite willing to hand over the word "science" to those departments of knowledge which have to do with Mathematics, and with things seen and temporal, if only I am allowed to comprehend those other studies which truly constitute the life of man under the term Philosophy. As theory, Education allies itself to Psychology, Physiology, and Sociology. The materials of its teaching it chiefly draws from Philosophy, from the practice of the schoolroom, and from the rich domain of History.

Grant all this, but still those generally well affected to the new study have misgivings. The Chair of Education will be a mere platform for the airing of theoretical views or the enunciation of crotchets. Now I would allay such fears by pointing out, in the first place, that this Chair does not exist for the purpose of talking at large about Education, but of preparing teachers for their profession, and that this practical aim is inconsistent with windy talk. I have some sympathy with the cynical Love Peacock, who, in describing certain social bores in the shape of men of one idea who hold forth in season and out of season, says: "The worst of all bores was the third. His subject had no beginning, middle, nor

end. It was Education. Never was such a journey through the desert of mind, the great Sahara of intellect. The very recollection makes me thirsty." Such men are not educationalists in any sense in which that term is applicable within academic walls. They are men of excitable temperament who have restless minds, and if they have not one fixed idea or crotchet, will find another. An educationalist has no crotchets. That man has crotchets who, having seized on that particular corner of a large and many-sided subject which has some secret affinity with his own mind, or affords the quickest passage to notoriety, pursues it to the death. Now, an educationalist is, by virtue of his very name and vocation, inaccessible to all petty fanaticisms. He has to deal with a subject of infinite variety, and so variously related to life, that he is more apt to be lost in hesitations and scepticisms than to be the victim of a fixed idea. If you wish to meet with educational crotchets, you must go to the specialist in this or that department of knowledge, who is unfortunate enough to take up the question of Education, as you see he often in moments of aberration takes up other subjects which are outside his own range of intellectual experience. It is only in such cases that you will find the confidence and self-assurance which are born of limited knowledge, and the pertinacious insistence which flows from these habits of mind. To him whose subject is Education crotchets are prohibited, because his opinions on this or that point are related on the one side to rational and comprehensive theory, and on the other to the daily practice of the schoolroom and to the needs of life.

Having dealt thus far with what may be called the apologetics of my subject, and arrogated for it a place in our Academic system, whether we regard its inherent claims or its relation to the well-being of the country, I have, on the other hand, to avoid the error of magnifying too much its importance. The more abstract treatment of the theory of

Education is doubtless, if true in its philosophy, of universal application. It sweeps the whole field. But this will engage our attention only within carefully prescribed limits, and when we leave this portion of our subject, we have to restrict ourselves on all sides. The education of every human being is determined by potent influences which do not properly fall within the range of our consideration here. The breed of men to which the child belongs, the character of his parents, the human society into which he is born, the physical circumstances by which he is surrounded, are silently but irresistibly forming him. The traditions of his country, its popular literature, its very idioms of speech, its laws and customs, its religious life, its family life, constitute an aggregate of influence which chiefly make him what he is. With these things we have to do only by way of a passing reference; we have not to deal with them. By their constant presence they mould the future man. They are the atmosphere of the humanity of his particular time and place, and in breathing it he is essentially a *passive* agent. Our business is rather with the conscious and *active* elements of moral and intellectual growth. We have to make the passive and merely re-acting creature of circumstance a free, self-conscious, rational agent, endowed with purposes and ideals, and we have to find the means of best doing this. The passive activity of our nature is not to be ignored in our educational methods: it is to be turned to use as one of our most potent instruments, but it is mainly the self-conscious forces that we have to educe and direct. Even in doing this, we are bound by external conditions, and must take note not only of the almost irresistible forces around us, but of minor conditions of time, place, and circumstance.

Each successive century, and the traditions and circumstances of each country, nay, the genius of each people, present to us the educational problem in ever-changing aspects. Educational systems cannot be manufactured in the study.

Our theory of the end of all education and the means by which that end has to be attained may be, or rather ought to be, always the same: but the application of that theory must vary with varying external conditions. What present defects have we *here* and *now*, and to what dangers are we exposed? is the form which the practical question must take with us. To illustrate, I would say that one of our chief dangers in these days is the over-instruction of willing and ingenuous boys. We are in the very midst of what will afterwards be designated the information and examination epoch of Education. We are in danger of confounding the faculty for swallowing with the faculty for digesting. To borrow words from biological science, we sometimes proceed as if the mind of man grew by accretion and not by intussusception. The system of universal tests has encouraged this. Now a system whereby the teachers of the country are converted into "coaches," is, by its very nature, hostile to the true conception of Education. No school which converts itself into a coaching establishment is a place of education in the proper sense of that term. There is a repose, a calm, a stability in the steady march of all sound education, which is alien to the feverish spirit that animates the ante-chamber of an examination-room.

The aim of the educationalist is not the giving of information, nay, not even instruction, though this is essential, but mainly discipline; and the aim of discipline is the production of a sound mind in a sound body, the directing and cherishing of the growth of the whole nature, spiritual and physical, so as to make it possible for each man, within the limits of the capacity which God has given him, to realize in and for himself with more or less success, the type of humanity; and in his relation to others to exhibit a capability for wise and vigorous action. This result will not be attained by pressure. By anticipating the slow but sure growth of Nature, we destroy the organism. Many and subtle are the ways in which Nature

avenges itself on the delicate, complicated machinery of man; but avenge itself somehow it will and must.

It is difficult to say which is the more pernicious, that system which overstrains the active intelligence of the willing and ambitious boy, or that which fills his mind or rather, let us say, his memory, while as yet mainly passive, with the results of mature thought, and endows him with a kind of miniature omniscience. Those who survive such methods of training, may, doubtless, be very useful agents, very serviceable machines, but they will rarely initiate. With a few exceptions, their minds will be either exhausted or overlaid. That elasticity of spirit which enables a man always to rise to the level of the varying requirements of the day and hour in the Family and the State, that free movement of will which is ever ready to encounter more than half way the vicissitudes and exigencies of life, that vivacious intelligence which maintains throughout life an unceasing love of knowledge, that soundness of brain and muscle which reacts on the inner self by giving steadiness to moral purpose, will assuredly not be promoted by forcing more and more subjects into the school curriculum, and applying the pressure of constant examinations by outside authorities. We want men who will be ready for the crises of life as well as for its daily routine of duty, and who will, by their mere manner of encountering even their ordinary work, contribute to the advance of the commonwealth in vigour and virtue. Such men alone are fully competent for all the services which their country may demand from them. They may be slowly grown: they cannot be manufactured under a system of pressure. Great Britain has had many such; Scotland has been prolific of them. The intellect, the will, and the arm of Scotsmen, have done, we flatter ourselves, their full share in creating the British Empire, and it has been done by virtue mainly of the breed of men, and by such restricted education as Arithmetic, Latin, and the Shorter Catechism afforded. No superincumbent load

of impossible tasks oppressed their minds while yet immature.

Do not draw a hasty inference from what has now been said. The requirements of the time in which we live, the industrial competition of one nation with another, the revolution in the arts of war, all demand that the materials of Education should change with changing conditions of life. I am quite alive to this necessity—but the inner form must remain ever the same. For after all that can be said, the main object of our efforts must be the growth of moral power in the future man. If we would secure this object, the pursuit of it must control and regulate the instruction we give, and the method of giving it. Above all, we must not be in a hurry. Having faith in the quiet processes of Nature, we must, as educators, be calm, deliberate, and ever regard the end.

The power which we desire to foster is the product of Will and of natural force. It is difficult to separate these two elements in any act, but for purposes of thought they may be regarded as distinct. I shall refer again to the element of natural force: our present concern is with power in its intellectual and moral relations, which is Will. It operates in the region of intelligence and emotion alike. The ground and root of intellectual and moral activity is ultimately the same, and the end is the same—the Ethical life. If this can be shown analytically, we shall reduce to unity the whole idea of Education in its merely formal aspect, and supply a conception which, while helping us to estimate the value of educational instruments and methods, will, at the same time, exalt and guide our conceptions of duty as educators.

Power, however, cannot work on nothing, and we have next to consider it in its concrete relations, in order that we may discern and exhibit the content, as well as the form, of the educational idea. Our range of discussion is in a Chair

of Education limited by the practical object which we have immediately in view—the production of the good citizen; but this, though our primary, is not our ultimate aim. Citizenship is not the end of human life, but only a means to an end. For the ultimate reference of all thought and action of man is to himself as a personality. Christianity, which teaches the most thoroughgoing altruism, also teaches this; and in teaching this, it deepened the foundation of the modern doctrine of culture which had been laid by the Greeks. Speaking quite generally, Culture may, for want of a better word, be accepted as the end of all exercise of intellectual and moral power, and therefore in its ultimate result the "real" end of education, just as power is the "formal" end.

But in accepting "Culture" as a fit expression for the "real" end of education, we have to examine carefully the features of this god as they appear on the canvas of modern *littérateurs* and distinguish our own conception from theirs. No finality, no perfectness is possible for man, and culture therefore must be restricted, viewed educationally, to the idea rather of a process than of an attained and stable product. It is the harmonious and continuous growing of a man in all that pertains to humanity. Culture in the sphere of education is, I say, a continuous process—the harmonious balancing of all the varied forces that constitute the life of a human soul. Now such a balancing is impossible save round some centre. From this may be deduced two practical conclusions on education in respect of its content. *First*, that intellectual culture will be most thorough when a man has some leading subject or group as the centre of his intellectual activity; and *secondly*, that moral culture, the harmonious growth of the soul, is possible only where there is a centre round which all the moral and æsthetic elements of our nature turn. That centre is God Himself, round which great reality the sentiments, emotions, hopes, and aspirations of the moral life range themselves. In God alone the ethical life has true existence. If

for God we substitute Self, we substitute an empty and barren fact in the room of a pregnant and life-giving Idea.

When I say that it is an essential condition of vigorous intellectual growth that a man should have some prime subject of thought and study, I do not of course mean that every man must be a specialist. A specialist, in the strict sense of the term, is a man who has so used up both his powers and his mental interests in one specific direction as to weaken his capacity for all other objects, and to narrow his mental range. A study prosecuted so exclusively weakens the judgment for all else. A leading subject, but not an exclusive subject, is wanted, and this will be found to strengthen the judgment for all else. In the moral region, again, the permanent centre of all our thought and activity, which is God, so far from narrowing, expands the growing man. The central idea is like a sun, under which the whole being lives and grows, and from which each individual part draws warmth and strength. Culture without this centre is the depravation of a great idea, and has no object higher than self. Self can form no true centre to self.

Moral culture, further, must not only find its centre outside of self in God, but it must express itself in action if it is to live. It is a misuse of terms to call *that* culture which, labouring under the baleful influence of self-worship, has forgotten that power can fulfil itself only in action. With some minds of strong æsthetic proclivities, culture issues in a kind of paralysis of judgment. The soul floats in the dim and dreamy potentialities of sentiment and exhausts itself in literary appreciations. The man of this kind of culture indulges himself in the perpetual contemplation of himself and his surroundings, is frequently distinguished by a spurious amiability, not seldom nourishes feeling in a self-imposed retirement from the duties of citizenship, and occupies himself with the contemplation of his own refined sensibilities, ever repeating to himself the words which Cicero puts into the mouth of the god of Epicurus, "Mihi

pulchre est: ego beatus sum." This result indeed is the very Nemesis of a culture which has lost its way. It is the fate of the literary, no less than of the religious, recluse. Depend upon it, Nature, which is strong and virile, will have none of this: it demands the active manifestation of such power as we have, in expressed thought or living deed. Thus then only does moral culture reach its true aim, by first centering itself in God, and next by forgetting itself in action.

Culture, then, which we may accept as an expression for the sum of the end of education in respect of content, as distinguished from the end of education with respect to form (which end is Power), is the harmonious growing of all that is in man; as a harmonious growing of intellect it demands a prime intellectual study, but discourages specialism; as a harmonious growing of the moral life, it must have a centre round which it may balance itself, other than itself, and that centre of truth and reality is God, the source and sustainer of life, the beginning and the end of human endeavour: finally, as a living and wholesome as well as a harmonious growing, it has to seek the very conditions of its existence outside itself in action. It finds in the opportunities of life at once its nourishment, the conditions of its vitality, and the measure of its soundness. It lives neither from itself, in itself, nor to itself.

Culture thus interpreted is not, you will at once see, unpractical in its aims in the hands of the educationalist. For we find that it cannot be truly promoted save by ever keeping in view the practical issue of all training—the rearing of a religious people, and the preparation of youth for social duty and for the service of humanity, whereby alone they can truly serve and fulfil themselves. In its practical relations to the science and art of education, the term will be found pregnant with suggestion as regards method also. For in the intellectual sphere, as we have seen, it enjoins unity of purpose as opposed to fragmentary encyclopædism, and in the moral sphere the

need of the religious idea and the conception of social duty, without which all our moral sentiment and moral discipline would be jointless and invertebrate.

The educational sceptic will say, "These be brave words: what has this culture to do with the education of the masses?" I might reply that I deal *here* with education, and not merely with the education of those whose school-time ends at twelve or thirteen years of age; but I do not choose to take refuge in a reply which would involve me in the confession that the education of one class of the community is essentially unlike that of another, and has different aims. Were it so, there would be no unity in the idea of education—and this would be to say that there is no idea of education at all. The thread of intellectual discipline, of moral purpose, and of culture runs through all education alike. The end is the same and the processes are the same. The seed which we sow in the humblest village school, and the tender plant which there, through many obstacles, forces itself into the light by the help of the skilled hand of the village schoolmistress, are not different in kind from the seed and the plant which in more favourable soil, and by force of a higher organization, grow up into a Leibnitz or a Bacon. To some extent indeed we may say that education is at every stage complete in its idea and uniform in its methods. It is with a process, not a consummation, that the teacher has to do, and with an unfinished process that he has always to be content. With every individual soul he has to deal as with a being that lives for ever, and that may carry forward its growth and the impulse he gives it after this brief life is past. It is only when we commit the vulgar error of confounding growth of soul with intellectual acquisition that we depreciate the possible results of primary education. The experience of us all testifies to this and justifies and sustains our loftiest hopes. Have we not all seen the highest ends of education attained in lives

limited in their scope, brief in their duration, and barren of opportunity?

> "In small proportions we just beauty see,
> And in short measures life may perfect be."

Having thus set before you the two-fold end of education in respect of form and of content,—power and culture,—our next duty, in working out a theory of education, is to follow the secret inner movements of Mind whereby it reaches these ends.

It is precisely at this point in the process of our thought that a new consideration is forced on us. For we find that the formal processes that tend to discipline and power and the processes that tend to culture cross and recross each other. This is explained by the fact that while it is necessary, for purposes of exact thought, to distinguish the formal and the real, these two are in truth one in a concrete third notion. Culture without the presence of a dominant and regulative inner power is impossible; on the other hand, an inner regulative power, save as the centre of an abundant material of cognitions and emotions ranged and co-ordinated under supreme and governing principles, is an empty abstraction. The two unite together in the Ethical life. The more or less of knowledge or of faculty is a small matter; the Ethical life is all in all. It is because the formal and real are in truth one in their issue that we find it impossible, save in a very rough way, to separate the processes of the growth of power, which are disciplinal, and the steps of the growth of culture, which constitute the real in knowledge. By fixing their attention too much on one side or the other, men take a partial view of education, and partial opinions are apt to degenerate into partisan views. The true conception of education is a conciliation of both; but it is finally governed, it seems to me, by the formal, and not by the real, element; because the distinguishing characteristic of man is that, while he is *of* Nature, he is also above and outside Nature. By Will it is

that man is what he is. In my estimate, therefore, of the comparative claims of the disciplinal and the real in educating, priority is to be assigned to the former.

It will be at once evident that the side from which we regard the idea of education will determine the value which we attach to particular studies, and the methods of intellectual and moral training which we shall most affect. But when we pass from the general consideration of the formal and the real elements in education, and the part which each plays in the production of that unity "a completely fashioned Will," which is the goal of our labours, and descend to the mental processes themselves whereby intellectual and moral elements are taken into the structure of the life of a rational being and contribute to its organic growth, we are on ground common to all. In this field of inquiry, as in every other, we are but the ministers and interpreters of Nature. The subtle processes whereby the moral and intellectual life of man is built up are in truth processes of education. To trace these is a difficult task, and one in which we cannot hope wholly to succeed. But we may go on in full faith that there is a *way* in which Nature works by moral and intellectual discipline to the growth of power, and by knowledge to the growth of culture. The analysis which we institute to ascertain this *way* is not influenced by our philosophical theory: it is simply a question of fact. On this analysis rests the whole system of Methods of instruction and of school-keeping, which ought to constitute at least one-half of the course of instruction given from this place. In the sphere of the Understanding, for example, by what cunning process does intelligence take to itself the materials of its life? A matter this of great importance; for the determination of the different stages of the growth of the intellect determines at the same time the period at which the various subjects of instruction, and the diverse aspects of these, are to be presented to the child, the boy, and the youth respectively,

in such a way as to ensure assimilation. For it is by assimilation only that true growth is possible; all else is mere acquisition, and so far from being education, it is not even instruction. On this subject, as indeed on all questions of methodology, we shall learn most from infant schools. It is in the teaching of the elements of knowledge that the art of teaching chiefly reveals itself. The title which Sturm gives to one of his treatises ought to stand at the head of all books on Method, viz., "De ludis literarum recte aperiendis."

In the Moral sphere, again, we encounter difficulties of method much more grave. We have here to tread delicately and warily. The question of times and ways is a vital one. We readily perceive the folly of presenting the whole of *knowledge* in mass and at once to a child's understanding, and yet we do not hesitate to put at once before him the complex sum of moral and religious doctrine and precepts, in the hope of producing thereby a living result. The ideas of religion and the principles and precepts of morality must follow experience, accompany intellectual growth, and wait even on the activity of the imagination. The educator will approach this portion of his task with much earnestness and some fear. He has to shape and to inspire a human soul, full of sensibility, alive to the lightest touch, quickly responsive to every appeal of love and every word of hate. "A mother's scream," says Jean Paul, "will resound through the whole future life of a child"; and do we not know that the memory of a mother's tenderness lives for ever? Let not the instructor of youth imagine that he has no concern with what may be called the refinements and subtleties of moral training. If he does so, his psychology is fundamentally unsound. Even in little things the teacher must seek and find his opportunity. *Les petites morales* of good personal habits and of good manners are to him by no means trivial. They constitute frequently the only way in which he can apply to the ordinary acts of the schoolroom and the playground the deeper truths which inspire his teaching;

and they are, in the case of many childish natures, the only way in which those deeper truths can be brought into consciousness as living and governing forces. They are the outer expression of an inner state, and by the cultivation of the outer expression we always sustain the inner life; nay, we sometimes evoke it when otherwise it would not emerge. Manners seem to be of slight importance, but they are often of large import, and are not seldom convertible with morals, as the word itself was among the Romans. The Laureate speaks truly when he says:—

> "Manners are not idle, but the fruit
> Of loyal nature and of noble mind."

I have been speaking of intellectual and moral instruction and of intellectual and moral discipline; but I would repeat that beyond and above both these, constituting the unity in which the two meet, is the Ethical life. This proposition—that the intellectual and moral substance of education, and intellectual and moral discipline, the formal and the real, are fused in the unity of the Ethical life—it will be my business to explain and make good in the more philosophical portion of my course. You will then see, I trust, that the ethical function of the teacher cannot be pressed too far. It will appear also that it is the ethical element which is at the root of the manly and generous growth of boyhood, and the sole force which can permanently sustain even purely intellectual effort. All labour of the schoolmaster is of doubtful issue as regards the merely intellectual *resultant* in his pupils, but every act which is inspired by the ethical spirit has its sure intellectual as well as moral reward. It cannot possibly be wholly lost. Here the spiritual forces are on our side and continually make for us. Indeed, if we have not this faith, we had better give the whole business up.

Be it observed that the term "Ethical" is here used in the broad sense in which it comprehends Religion. It is

the ethics of a religion which justify a creed before the world, and it is the religion of ethics which gives moral teaching a hold on the heart of man and a sure foundation in human reason. The morality of secularism has for its foundation self-interest, and for its sanction coercion; it may preserve society; but it is only when ethics are in union with religious conceptions, either passing into these or rising out of them, that they promote the true life of humanity. It is religion which affords to ethical science a basis in the infinite, and presents to the ethical life issues in the infinite.

The question which next most presses for consideration is—What instruments or materials are most promotive of the end we propose to ourselves, viewed in the light of their ultimate unity in the ethical life? We cannot teach everything, and, accordingly, have to select those instruments which by their nature contribute most, and most surely, to the supreme end of all our endeavours. By this measure we must mete the instruments which the present state of knowledge offers us. It is impossible, and were it possible it would be undesirable, and destructive of all sound discipline, to teach even the beginnings of every subject. But it ought not to be difficult to adjust the rival claims of Literature (including under this head Languages, Ancient and Modern), Science, and Æsthetics. The philosophy of education is a poor affair if it cannot, out of the materials which are clamant for attention in the school-room because of their immediate use in the work of life and as essential prerequisites of ethical activity, find apt instruments for its purpose. Such questions are of great importance to the well-being of society. If primary instruction, for example, must exclude from its curriculum science, in any strict sense of the term, can there be any doubt that our daily instruction should be so contrived as to place a child in intelligent relations with the world in which he lives, and to enable him to look with the eye of reason, and not of the brute, on the phenomena of

the physical universe? Still less is there room for doubt, it seems to me, that the elements and applications of the laws of health and of social economy should enter into every scheme of instruction. It is through these subjects indeed that we shall at once rectify the conceptions of the pupil as to the sphere of duty in which God has placed him, and give direction, significance, and practical force to our moral teaching.

In the secondary stage of education, again—that which immediately precedes University discipline,—the place to be assigned to Latin and Greek must be largely determined by what we mean when we name these studies. If such instruction resolves itself into mere memory-work and gerund-grinding, it is even then not without educative uses, but it must make way and that quickly, for other and better disciplines. If, however, it is so employed as to be an exercise of the inductive and deductive processes of mind; if the study of words and sentences be an unconscious study of thought, and if they become, as boys advance, a study of form and an introduction to the pregnant and elevating idea of literary Art; if the embalmed thoughts be truly made to breathe and the dead words to burn, then indeed we have here an instrument of unsurpassed and unsurpassable excellence. It is true that the rich records of modern life and literature now yield us much of the culture we seek in antiquity, but we cannot afford to dispel the halo which gathers round the remote past, and the deeds of the men who have gone before us. Imagination here, by idealizing, sustains morality, and is also the spur of the intellect. Still less can we afford to part with the impersonal and objective character of the teachings of Judæa, Greece, and Rome, and to substitute for them the subjective and partisan lessons of modern life. On the whole, I feel with Jean Paul, who says, "The present ranks of humanity would sink irrecoverably if youth did not take its way through the silent temple of the mighty past, into the

busy market-place of life." But even after all this is said, and more than this, it is an anachronism to give such studies exclusive possession of the field. In the present state of knowledge, not more than half the school-time should, it seems to me, be given to ancient studies, even in the upper classes of professedly classical schools; and not all boys should be even thus far restricted. It is a discredit to our great Educational Institutions that any boy of seventeen should be in ignorance of such things as the elements of Physics and Physiology.

As yet, except when alluding briefly to the conditions of power, I have been talking of the education of man as if I were speaking of spirits in a world of spirits. From birth to death, however, Man is subject to external circumstances which are for the most part too mighty for him. He seems to rise out of a physical organization: it is the outer which at first evokes his slumbering consciousness at birth, and the outer conquers him in death. With these physical conditions of existence he has to effect a compromise. All his receptivity and all his activity is in and through mortal brain and muscle. All his moral and intellectual activity must therefore be carried on with due regard to the external instrument which he must employ. In the treatment of the subject of education it is not necessary to profess any theory of the relation between mind and body. But this we know, that the former, both in its sensibilities and activities, is bound up with the natural laws of the latter, and to those laws it must conform, or fail itself to live.

The theoretical question of the identification of thought and emotion with nerve-processes is simply one part of a much larger question, the relation of Nature itself to Mind. Evade it as we may, encumber it as we may with irrelevant and side issues, the question is really this: Are thought and personality the product of natural force, or are natural forces

themselves the product of thought and personality? Spenser says: —

> "Of the soul the body form doth take,
> For soul is form and doth the body make."

Now this, as other cognate questions, cannot, of course, be from this Chair treated critically. The critical and historical investigation of all such subjects is otherwise provided for. A professor of Education must in all such matters assume a purely dogmatic position, and with dogma you must be here content. The advance of Physiology into the sphere of Psychology has been viewed by many of the older and purely introspective school with unnecessary alarm. It is a mistake to suppose that the Physiology of Mind necessarily teaches a materialistic theory of intelligence. This is often assumed; but there is no necessary connection between the two. The Physiology of Mind is merely the study of those material processes in which sensation and intelligence and even moral emotion are involved, and which at once condition consciousness and are conditioned by it. It is an important auxiliary to the study of Mind, but can never occupy the ground of the older Psychology. In every step of its processes it demands a reflection on consciousness, and an analysis of the life and phenomena of consciousness, to give it significance—nay, even to render its results intelligible. If, again, we entirely change our point of departure in self, and look at self and all that we call Mind from an outside position as a mere product of physical forces, as a function of matter, we are then no longer dealing with a merely psychological question, but, as I have already indicated, with a part of the larger cosmical question—the origination of all things; and by our conclusions as to this larger inquiry, the subordinate, yet to us all-important subject, must be determined. We shall probably find that the only effectual answer to the proposition "All is Nature," is the counter-proposition "All is Mind." He alone can entertain

the thought of Mindless man who has first taken to his bosom the withering thought of Godless Nature.

However this may be, we may, as students of education, assume that Mind works under physical conditions. Every sensation, every emotion, every act of memory, every act of thought, is effected through brain, and involves a certain process and a certain exhaustion of substance. The proper nutrition of brain, consequently, with a view to the repair of waste, must ever be with educationalists a matter of prime consideration. The effects of early overstraining or of defective nutritive process are in their practical relations vital. I am sufficiently well aware of the necessity of fresh air and clean skins, and spacious well-drained schoolrooms; but these and other physical questions are all subsidiary to the consideration of the demands which the life of sensibility, emotion, will, and thought make on the brain. Here Physiology holds up the finger of warning. But instructive as the negative teachings of Physiology are, the positive contributions which it has to make to the philosophy of education are even more valuable. The intimate connection subsisting between states of consciousness and cerebral changes, and the relation of these, when repeated, to what may be called the "set" of the nerve-apparatus, bring to view with a vividness which is beyond the reach of the ordinary psychology, the manner of the formation of habits of feeling, thought, and action. Indeed there is nothing more encouraging to the earnest teacher than the study of the Physiology of Habit.

It will now be more clearly apparent why I selected the word "Power" to denote the formal end of Education. It is preferable to Will, because this has to do rather with moral and intellectual relations regarded purely as such. When an active and free, self-determining, ever-ready will is aided by those physical conditions which determine the healthful activity of all the bodily organs, so that they respond willingly to the demands made on them, we have a complex state before us.

There is a natural volition, the issue of mere life and health in our physical frame, which bounds forward to ally itself with the movement of Rational Will, and gives to the latter a certain steadiness and self-assurance. To this combination of free will with the gladly co-operating volition of the bodily organization we assign the name of *Power*.

It would appear, from what has been said, that in dealing with Education we touch various departments of knowledge, but there is little danger of our wandering: for the fixing of the ends of education will at once impose a limit on our studies, and give stability to them. It will protect us both from vague speculation and from tedious detail. To enter into questions of philosophy, is so far from being incumbent on us that to do so would be to defeat the specific objects for which this Chair has been founded. The consideration of these questions has been already provided for in the University curriculum. But while the professor must here, as representing a practical subject, avoid all speculation, he must yet find some dogmatic philosophic basis as a support for his thought, if his teaching is not to be an aggregate of disjointed essays. In Psychology and Physiology he must lay his foundations; but from these departments of knowledge he will select only such materials as have a direct bearing on education, and give significance and the force of law to educational ends, processes, and methods.

This portion of our course has to be treated in detail as belonging to the Art of Teaching, and will necessarily occupy much of our attention. It will be illustrated by model lessons, and by observation of the procedure of the best schools. The means of obtaining practice in teaching will also, it is hoped, be provided.

Thus informed as to the ends and philosophy of Education and the rational grounds of pedagogic methods, we shall then

find ourselves in a good position for surveying History. As we read the records of the past we shall see that education by and in the family, was early overpowered by the education of the tribe, and finally of the State. In the earliest stages of society, while man was yet struggling for subsistence, education could only mean the fitting of a man to secure for himself the necessary protection and food; nor is this primary necessity ever to be lost sight of as the basis of all educational systems, even among the most cultivated nations. As society advances, division of labour and the rudiments of professions extend the sphere of human life and the conception which the more thoughtful form of man's capabilities, needs, duties, and destiny. Religion, Law, and Medicine become gateways of speculation; and through speculation it is that humanity has been enabled to rise. Speculation may be said to begin when knowledge for its own sake becomes an object of pure desire, and man becomes an object of interest and wonder to man. As soon as men surmise their own greatness, apprehend that each is valuable not only for what he can do, but for what he is, and that man does not live by bread alone, the idea of Culture enters—which contemplates the growth of man to the full stature of his race. In the educational history of ancient nations, especially of Greece and of Rome, we shall see these ideas take form. The process of historical evolution will thus furnish a continual illustration of the Philosophy of education, and while guarding us against the errors of other times, recall to us great ideas which we are apt to push rudely aside with the vulgar self-assurance that distinguishes a mechanical age, oblivious of the debts it owes to the past, and ignoring its moral inheritance.

We shall find, too, much instruction from the study of the educational organization of other countries, and much encouragement from the study, in their historical connection, of the systems of those who have been eminent as educational reformers. Those systems are generally full of suggestive

material, even when their leading ideas must be pronounced partial and inadequate.

I have now endeavoured to vindicate, as fully as our limits permit, the position of this Chair in an academic curriculum, and also to indicate the nature of the instruction which it proposes to give to those fitting themselves for the work of the school. It seems to me that if the future teacher of the higher class of public schools be carried through such a course, he will not merely be better fitted for his professional work than now, but be personally benefited by the mental discipline which the curriculum will afford. Going forth to the duties of active life instructed in the ends, processes, and history of Education, he will not work blindly, but, connecting his daily duties with the philosophy of man and the needs of life, he will see all methods of instruction in their rational grounds; and allying himself with the long history of his profession, he will regard with that self-respect, which is alien to self-conceit, his position as the responsible distributor, within his sphere, of the accumulated knowledge and civilization of his time. Going forth, too, with an inspiring motive suggested by the ethical end towards which all his labour tends, he will carry with him the moral fervour which we demand of a minister of sacred things. All instruction, all discipline will be truly valuable in his eyes only in so far as they subserve that ultimate ethical purpose in which the form and content of education finally unite. Set apart to educate children for the State—whatever instruments he may use, whatever methods he may pursue—this purpose will ever be present to his thought, exalting his life and sustaining his activity. It is only by labouring towards this end that he can fitly discharge his special function in society, find a sure reward even in partial success, and, in the words of Milton, "store up for himself the good provision of peaceful hours." What is it to him that he should teach this or that particular subject if he fail to build up and elevate the whole humanity

of his pupils! And should he pursue any other purpose than this, and pursue it even with apparent success, what will be the result in the generations that are to follow? A mere sharpening of the wits of men, but no wit to find the true way. "What an infinite mock is this," says Shakespeare, "that a man should have the best use of his eyes to see the way of blindness!"

In conclusion, let me say that if the teacher can be led to rise to the full conception of his task, and to understand that he is in truth one of the great moral forces of society, one of the conservators of civilization, he will be among the first to resist all attempts to divorce his daily work from the ethical and religious life of his time. This follows from the idea of education and of the educator's function, which I have endeavoured to set forth. He will at once see that so to divorce him is to throw him out of all relation to the true humanity of the past and of the future, and to abrogate that which is at once his highest duty and greatest privilege. He will also feel that if he accept restriction to the secular, he must be content to forego the full measure of the social respect and State-consideration which are rightfully his due. Ordained to the priesthood of the school, and held by society to be so ordained, he will not find it necessary to clamour for a social recognition which will be freely accorded to him whose office it is, in the words of Tennyson,

> "... to rear, to teach;
> Becoming as is meet and fit,
> A link among the days to knit
> The generations each with each."

If men can be sent forth from the University for the service of their country, so equipped and so inspired, the Chair of Education will have made good its claim to a place in the academic curriculum, and the objects of the Founders will be attained.

II.

ON PROFESSORSHIPS AND LECTURESHIPS ON EDUCATION[1].

WHEN I was invited to read a paper on "Professorships and Lectureships on Education," I concluded that my thesis was not so much the desirableness of such Professorships and Lectureships generally, as the propriety of instituting them in our Universities. I certainly was entitled to presume that a subject which had engaged the thoughts of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Lucian, Montaigne, Locke, Milton, Rousseau and Kant was in itself worthy of investigation, and of being followed as a special department of study by those who proposed to devote their lives to educational work.

Let me remind my audience that professional training in the sphere of primary instruction is already an accomplished fact in the State (Denominational) Training Colleges; and, though doubtless susceptible of improvement, it is a universally recognized success. Education as a Philosophy and History is now professed in many German and American Universities. The question which we here and now have to consider—a question in my opinion ripe for settlement—is the philosophic

[1] Delivered at the Educational Conference of the International Health Exhibition, London, 1884.

and historical study of education in the Universities of Great Britain, and the need of such a course of study for all who intend to become middle and upper schoolmasters.

It is true now, as it has been in the past and will be in the future, that some of the best teachers have never read or heard a word of educational philosophy or method. These men possess that happy combination of powers fitting them for the doing of a specific work in the world, which we call genius. Such natural endowment and aptitude we find in every department of human activity. In the arts of painting and sculpture this gift of genius is conspicuous. None the less have we schools of art, because we believe that even the greatest genius is bettered by being placed, when young, in possession of the inheritance of tradition. No man, however great his powers, should be allowed to waste them in finding out anew for himself the mere commonplaces of his art.

Teaching or instructing is also an art. All admit this. In instructing, the individual teacher is supreme over his pupils. Nine-tenths are wholly dependent on him for what they may know, while the remaining one-tenth—the select few—are very largely his debtors. All again depend on him for guidance and for the *manner* of their knowing, that is to say, whether acquisition be mainly through memory, their memory becoming a storehouse of unorganized facts and of conventional ready-made opinions (which through mere mental habit finally harden into irrational convictions), or whether it be through the living activity of their own reason. It is in the evoking of this living activity, that the great art of instruction consists. Is it possible to do this? If so, what is the way of doing it? Even the most unthinking of the teaching profession will grant that there is *some* way, and that in this, as in all else, Nature has a process. If any still hold that there is no process, they condemn themselves to the ignoble and unworthy occupation of making boys learn things by rote, and inflicting some sort of physical suffering if they fail to do so. The man who with such views becomes a

teacher when he might enlist as a soldier or sailor, must, it seems to me, be a very poor creature.

I think we may now-a-days assume that even the most sceptical among schoolmasters repudiate the unphilosophical conception of their work; and, were it only to save their self-respect, they will claim that it is their privilege, as well as their duty, to open and strengthen the intelligence of their pupils through instruction in the various subjects of a school curriculum. Now, the most elementary condition of this kind of instruction, it will be admitted, is, that boys shall understand what they are learning, and be intellectually interested. Grant this, and we grant all; for the human mind has a *way* whereby alone it can understand anything, a way as certain and as exclusive of other possible ways as its way of seeing, which is with the bodily eyes alone, and not with the elbows. It is not necessary, fortunately, that we should be conscious of our way of seeing in order that we may see, or our way of understanding in order that we may understand. But if our bodily seeing could be improved by another, and depended largely on lessons given us in seeing, it would, I presume, be desirable at least, if not necessary, that the eye-trainer should be aware of the conditions of seeing and the way in which we see. If there be, then, a way of understanding, instruction *must* proceed according to that way, if it is to be instruction and not mere mechanical memory-work. Doubtless, a boy may be brought to learn by rote what he does not understand. This is the Chinese plan, and is also, I fear, not unknown in some of our public schools in Great Britain. The expectation is that he will some day or other understand what he commits to memory. But if the ultimate object be the understanding of what is learnt, why should we not begin with this and make sure of it? I do not contend for the opinion that a boy need fully comprehend all that he is taught, but I hold that he is competent to comprehend all that he *ought* to be taught sufficiently well to make it fit into his reasoning processes and into the already acquired furniture of

his mind. There is understanding and understanding. A boy of fifteen may learn and, in a sense, understand Wordsworth's "Poet's Epitaph," but he does so in a different sense from that in which Mr Browning understands it. Understanding, then, being the end we, as instructors, have in view, and there being a *way* whereby a human being understands, we truly instruct only if we follow that way. Now, a statement of that way is a statement of method; and as it is further a statement of the process of intelligizing, it is psychology in its most interesting and suggestive form, for it is an account of the intellectual powers as living and acting, and not merely as dissected and tabulated.

The instructor, then, ought to know the general process by which we know—in other words he must know the psychology of the intelligence. This, I think, may be conceded.

But not only is there a general method: there are particular methods. Method, in the large sense, is essentially the same for all subjects, but its application to the various subjects of instruction is not always obvious. I have seen a teacher teach arithmetic in accordance with sound method, and make the most glaring mistakes when he gave a lesson in grammar; and again, I have seen geography well taught, and language taught by the same man in a hopelessly ignorant and unfruitful way. And why? Because the teacher—I refer now specially to those trained in Normal schools, where methods form an essential part of the course—had understood for himself the method which he had been taught to follow in one subject, but had not comprehended the application of the method to another subject; or, it might be that he had seen lessons well given in the one subject, and not in the other. And why did he make this blunder? Because he had not the key to all methods, which is to be found in general Method alone. He had, in short, no psychology, and he was, consequently, a mere mechanical method-monger, having no living source of method in himself; wanting, therefore, in elasticity, in confidence, in thought, in

the liberty wherewith philosophy makes the teacher free. Particular methods, then, have to be taught, but they are dead and barren if we have not breathed into them the spirit of philosophy.

But not only is there a way of instruction, there is also an order in time—an order in which each subject of instruction is to be begun—each part of each subject—each lesson of each part. All this depends ultimately on the order of the growth of mind, and here the instructor is brought face to face with physiological, as well as psychological, conditions. Accordingly, the instructor must study the elements of physiology as well as psychology, especially in their relation to the nervous system, by which we feel, and think, and do.

Then come considerations as to the manner of the teacher in instructing, the quantity of instruction, and the circumstances favourable and unfavourable to instruction. Here, again, we touch physiological as well as mental conditions.

Still further, we have to consider the end we have in view in instructing, and, as determined by this, the materials of instruction. How, I would ask, can such supreme questions be rationally approached save in relation to a philosophy of life? Here, indeed, all *must* philosophize, either consciously or unconsciously.

And just at this point, where we begin to consider Ends, we perceive that we are as yet only at the threshold of the subject; for we are now passing from the work of the mere instructor to that of the educator. The whole moral and spiritual field opens out before us. Were there no schools and no teachers, we might be content to look on passively while a boy's hereditary predispositions and natural environment moulded him. But we are not at liberty as educators to do this without committing professional suicide. If the delicate and complex task of giving a character and tendency to the inner life of the soul be truly ours (and if it be not, then what *is* our task?), surely it is our duty to study the conditions of

the growth of the moral and spiritual life. This, again, is psychology in its deepest philosophical relations.

Those who concur with what has been said, hold also, as a matter of course, that the future teacher and educator should be prepared for his task on the lines I have indicated; and that for this preparation professors of the subject are needed. Those who deny that there are principles in education, who think that "rule of thumb" governs all, will, of course, fight shy of professors. The question, accordingly, of professorships of education depends entirely on the view we take of education itself, and hence my way of approaching the subject prescribed to me on this occasion. Is education a subject for inquiry? Is it a subject at all in an academic sense? If it be a subject at all, it is manifestly a department of philosophy. As such it claims a place in the Faculties of Philosophy in our Universities.

And just as philosophy itself is enriched by the history of opinion, so is the subject of education enriched by the history of theories, of national systems, of scholastic experiments. Thus are many errors marked out for avoidance, and many truths illustrated and confirmed.

Again, I do not see how many of the vexed questions of education are to be settled except scientifically. Look at the programme of this Conference and you will see how many subjects are still under debate throughout Europe and America; and there are a hundred others. How am I honestly to settle the question, say, of Latin *versus* elementary Science in secondary schools, unless I can show how the one acts on the human mind and how the other acts? Are language and literature the supreme subjects? If so, why? Must Greek give way to French and German in the *general* curriculum of secondary schools? And so with numerous other questions which are now put, and which must arise in the future before the day is reached when the State will recognize education as its primary and supreme function, next to that of national defence and the administration of justice.

Professors of the Philosophy, Art, and History of Education, then are, I hold, needed, and all aspirants to the office of schoolmaster should be required to study under them for a time. There are, however, three objections commonly urged which are worthy of consideration, and to which I shall briefly advert.

First. The study of education in its philosophy and history will, some fear, convert our future teachers into theorists. Now the very reverse of this is the result of the study of a subject scientifically. The untrained teacher of active mind and philanthropic impulses will always become a theorist of some sort—a theorist in the sense of a faddist. But the youth who has been led to think out the grounds of his professional activity scientifically, and has been brought face to face with the history of his subject, is proof against the tendency to "theorize" in the vulgar sense of this word. He has, on the contrary, acquired a scientific "habit of mind" with reference to the subject of education. Surely the most conservative of headmasters prefer men under them who think, and who think their work worth thinking about. If they think wisely, they are pursuing education as a science; and is it not better that in this department of professional activity, as well as in that of medicine, a scientific basis should be laid during the period of professional preparation? Did the organization of medical education produce "theorists" in the vulgar sense, or extinguish them?

Secondly. I have seen it objected that there can be no guarantee that the system of philosophy which furnishes a basis of principle and an educational aim will be sound. It may be Sensationalism at one time, Kantianism at another, and again Hegelianism. But are not the same objections to be urged against academic prelections in all subjects that interest and cultivate the human mind, and endeavour to answer its never-ceasing questions? Take moral philosophy for example, or metaphysics, or even logic. And what shall we say of

professorial academic instruction in political economy or history? We believe that these subjects afford a discipline, and train to thought, if taught by able men; and we take our chance of the rest.

Thirdly. We are told that teaching is so much a mere art that practice for a few months in a good school under a competent headmaster is more beneficial than any possible course of lectures. I concur with this objection so far that I think practical instruction in a model school an indispensable part of a course of study for the teaching profession. But practice alone can never make anything but a mechanic. The element of thought, of knowledge, of principle, of science, is wanting, unless, indeed, the youth provides all this for himself. I have said above that practice, even when accompanied with the study of particular methods of instruction, fails to produce the educator: how much less can mere practice without any study of method or methods do so? We have again an analogy in the medical profession. Clinical instruction is an essential part of a surgeon's preparation, but who nowadays would maintain that this would suffice without a knowledge of the sciences which give to practice a scientific basis? And yet there can be no doubt that surgeons could be turned out, after clinical study only, fit for all the *ordinary* work of the profession. So much for current objections.

Further, we are told that our Public Schools have such admirable methods, and so noble a tradition in teaching, that young men who enter them as assistants, and who have themselves been public-school boys, are "to the manor born," and, if they have anything to learn will soon learn it by watching the headmaster, and submitting themselves to his advice. That the young assistant will by these means acquire the habit of his school, whatever that may be, I do not doubt. But is that habit a good one? Has the headmaster himself studied philosophy and method? Is he not simply repeating his predecessors? Or, is he perchance inspired? No one will be

found at this time of day to defend Keatism as it flourished at Eton, fagging in the forms it assumed at certain public schools, and other brutalities which brought shame on the name of Christian, not to speak of educator. I do not suppose that any one, save a withered survival in some endowed grammar-school situated in some region "remote, melancholy and slow," will now defend the method of acquiring the Latin grammar by the learning of rules in the Latin tongue. I do not suppose that any competent headmaster now maintains that the sole engine of moral discipline is the constant rod. I do not suppose that ignorance of geography, of history, of English, of the facts and laws of a man's natural environment, will now be regarded as an essential characteristic of the best English education and the mark of an English gentleman. These things are mostly of the past, in opinion at least if not in practice. But why? To what is this fact due? To writers on education, to the progress of society generally, and to one or two distinguished practical educators, such as Arnold. Were Arnold alive now, and were he to initiate a course of lectures on education at Oxford, would our present headmasters not think it desirable that their future assistants should sit at his feet for a couple of terms? There is no Arnold now, but nature repeats a type, though it never repeats an individual. The optical law, whereby an object seems smaller the further it is removed from the eye, is inverted in the case of men. The distance to which death removes them makes them larger, not smaller. You may have confidence that the Almighty did not exhaust Himself in the pedagogic field when He made Arnold. There was still some cosmic energy left for the production of men who could teach others to teach, and inspire them with the noble aims of true educators of youth. Grant that, through the influences to which I have alluded, we are now better than in the past, yet surely it is the insanity of self-satisfaction to conclude that now at this time of speaking, in August 1884, our Public Schools and Middle

Schools, and Primary Schools, are at last perfect in their aims, methods, and discipline. Even if they were, would it not be desirable that the young aspirant should be introduced to the principles which underlie and explain and vindicate that perfection, and to the instructive history whereby that perfection has been happily reached, that so he may be guarded against degeneracy? Would it not be desirable that a "school" of education should preserve for the future all that is good in the present?

Had Roger Ascham's College at Cambridge founded a lectureship on the first two books of Quintilian, and on Ascham's own work, and done nothing more, the whole character of English public-school education would have been revolutionized 300 years ago. We should have been as great a nation measured by the standards of imperial power and wealth, and in addition to this, our citizens would have had a better use of their brains, greater love of truth, more open minds, more kindly hearts, more of wisdom, justice, and righteousness. If I did not believe this, I should give up the whole question of "how to educate" as vain and empty talk: but I should have at the same time to give up my hope in humanity and in the possibility of a true civilization.

Finally, "we admit (I understand one headmaster to say) that it is desirable that young teachers should study books on education—nay, that even the *élite* of the pedagogic world, the young master who has been a 'public-school' boy and is consequently already by that fact not far from perfection, should read; but as a matter of fact he *does* read." My answer is that he does *not* read. A return of the books on education, not looked into, but carefully read by the masters of public schools, who are, according to this gentleman, *supra educationem*, as the emperor Sigismund was *supra grammaticam*, would surprise him. Ask the publishers of books on education how many sell among the 50,000 teachers of England? But if it be so desirable that the said young masters should read, and if it be necessary, as

a mere matter of professional decency, to claim for them that they *do* read, it is not surely too much to ask that their reading should be put beyond all question, by requiring them to read under the direction of a professor, and to listen to his prelections before they plunge into their life-work. In other subjects we do not leave such things to chance. A clergyman should know Moral Philosophy and Church History; but cognate as these subjects are to his clerical functions, we do not leave him free *not* to read them, in any course of preparation for the ministry which even affects to be adequate.

Grant, then, that the schoolmaster is an educator, and that an educator should study education; the further question remains where should the professors of education be placed? I answer where the future teachers of all schools except the primary receive, or ought to receive, the rest of their preparation—viz. in our universities. This I might advocate on grounds of mere convenience and economy. But apart from this consideration, I hold that our universities, as the homes of science and philosophy, claim this highest of all applied sciences—itself indeed a science as well as an art—as part of their work. It is their duty, as well as their privilege, to guide the thought of the nation. I shall not surely be told that the question of the growth and life of the human mind and the way in which character is built up, are subjects unworthy to stand side by side on the academic platform with inquiries into the growth and life of molluscs, mosses, and crayfish, or the making of bridges and engines! Schoolmasters at least will not tell me so! They will not thus flaunt in the face of the public their self-contempt! Let me add that the influence of such philosophic and historical studies as bear on education, in making effectual for its great ends the school-system of the country, gives them, on mere grounds of utility, the strongest of claims on our universities and on the Government. In our present educational system we have a very costly instrument.

The study of education at our universities would teach us how best to use that instrument for the moral and spiritual advancement of the nation.

The *élite* of our Training College primary schoolmasters also should be required, or at least encouraged, to attend a professorial or academic course before entering on the duties of the school. This is already partially the case in Scotland.

The practical question remains: Suppose we had such chairs at all our university seats, and in connection with them revived the ancient *licentia docendi*, or Lincentiateship in education[1], how are we to secure students, and so make these chairs of practical utility and not mere endowments of research? Here many difficulties present themselves; but there is only one way of finally overcoming them all. And that is by a Teachers' Registration Act which will virtually[2] limit the profession to two classes of teachers—those who hold a Government certificate, and those who hold a university licentiateship. A licentiateship granted by certain corporate bodies, such as the College of Preceptors in England, might also be recognized. Were such a law passed, the cause of education—middle and upper-class education—would receive as powerful a stimulus as primary instruction received from the Acts of 1870 and 1872. Meanwhile, and as a provisional measure, the headmasters of the great public schools should let it be understood that, in making appointments, they will allow due weight to educational diplomas.

[1] A Diploma in education is now instituted in the University of Edinburgh and in London University; and in Cambridge a Certificate.

[2] I say "virtually," because, for this generation, at least, a Registration Act should perhaps restrict itself to the qualifications of teachers of State-aided, Foundation, and Grammar Schools. The rest would soon follow. One clause affirming this, and another clause declaring the conditions of registration, and a third recognizing existing teachers (within certain limits), would make a brief but adequate Bill. There might be two classes in the register—those who held an academic degree, and those who did not.

In conclusion, I would ask the teachers of Great Britain to say in what sense their occupation is a profession if it does not demand professional preparation. The dignity and status of the scholastic occupation have hitherto been borrowed entirely from the clerical profession. But in proportion as laymen obtain scholastic appointments, to that extent must education find a philosophical basis for itself, if it is to hold its own among liberal professions. I would also point out that as that philosophical basis is the same for infant-school teaching and university teaching, its universal recognition would weld together the whole body of schoolmasters in one vast organization having common aims and engaged in a common national work. The primary schoolmaster and the primary school would thus be raised to a higher level; lines of demarcation would be less strongly marked, for the work of one grade of the profession would then be seen to pass insensibly into that of the others, and the humblest pupil in the humblest infant-school would find himself, through his teacher, a part of a great moral and intellectual organization. At present, *subjects of instruction* mark off teachers into castes: the recognition of a professional basis would reveal that when a primary schoolmistress teaches the alphabet, and a "senior classic" teaches Sophocles, they have both, if they rightly understand their work, the same aims, the difference between them consisting mainly in the age of their pupils, and the material which they use to attain a common educational end. None of our institutions would benefit more largely by recognizing this fact than the great English Public Schools.

I have been restricting myself in the preceding remarks chiefly to the answering of objections, and thereby, indirectly suggesting the functions of a Professor of Education. Were I to enter further into the question of the bearing of instruction in the philosophy of education on the aims and methods and personal life of the teacher, I should much exceed the limits

within which I am restricted by the regulations of this Congress. But I cannot conclude without emphasizing the fact that even the young man who becomes a schoolmaster, with the most laudable intentions and genuine interest, not only needs a philosophy, which points the way to method, but will himself be the first to demand, some solid basis for his life-work. What then shall we say of the others? We cannot afford to close the ranks of the teaching profession against all save those whose true vocation it is. The ministry of the school, like the ministry of the Church, must be content often to use weapons of inferior temper. For every three millions of the population we need about five thousand teachers, excluding those in the higher seats of learning and private governesses and tutors. To expect to find so large a number of devout, zealous, sympathetic men and women ready to hand, is a fond imagination. All the more difficult is it to command an adequate supply of men of this kind, that the Church attracts into its ranks, by a prior claim, so large a proportion of the men of enthusiastic temper and ideal aims. Luther's dictum, that had he not been a preacher he would have been a teacher, is still the most that any will say. It showed Luther's penetration that he said even so much, at a time when the school was misunderstood and misprized. "I know," he says, "that this work, next to the office of preacher, is the most profitable, the greatest, and the best. Nay, I know not even which is the better of the two. For it is hard to make old dogs tame and old rogues upright; at which task, nevertheless, the preacher's office labours and often labours in vain. For young trees be more easily bent and trained howbeit some should break in the effort. Beloved, count it one of the highest virtues upon earth to educate faithfully the children of others, which so few, and scarcely any, do by their own." Ideas, however, are slow of transforming themselves into practical facts, and the day is probably still distant when the words of Luther will be reversed, and men who feel called to labour for the moral and spiritual good of

their fellow-men will say, "If I must relinquish the office of teacher, I would be a preacher"; and yet this is, after all, only the logical conclusion of Luther's own argument. As things actually are, however, it is vain, we repeat, to think that we can recruit the ranks of the teaching profession with men and women who are conscious that they have a "message" to children and youths—men and women to whom the school is a vocation not a trade; and the question accordingly becomes an urgent one,—How can we *create* zeal tempered with judgment, judgment moved by zeal? how can the ideal aims and the skilled methods of the few be conveyed into the rank and file of the profession—the multitude of uninspired, but we may presume conscientious, workers who, from various causes, find themselves engaged in the duties of the schoolroom? Even second-hand inspiration is a great gain to the community. If we could fill all the teachers of our children with a lofty motive and supply them with a sound method of procedure, we should certainly do more to dignify their lives, and to sustain the moral vigour and soundness of the whole nation through their agency, than by any other means. This is truly a great question—a question for States and for Councils, and one which it is especially incumbent on Universities, as the teachers of teachers, to take up and carry to an issue.

Let it not be supposed that I imagine that the education of the educator will of itself make a man a true teacher. A certain type of character and temperament is needed, if through the teacher the boy is to be moulded. The true teacher must exhibit the authority of law; and this is never arbitrary, but always calm, equable, just. Rigid as maintainer of law, his judgments, and still more his penalties, must yet lean to mercy's side. He must possess that humility of mind which makes him reverence the spirits of children, as purer than his own, and as being full of spiritual possibilities, which for himself, it may be, are already exhausted. He must be endowed with a sympathetic power allied to genius, whereby he may be able daily to be

himself a child, to understand the failures and perversities of unformed wills, and the efforts and blunderings of evolving intelligence. His manner must be direct, candid, sincere, and friendly; yet, withal, suggestive of high purpose. He must dominate his school as its presiding genius, its spiritual standard, its type of culture; and yet he must be a child among children, a boy among boys, a youth among youths. Where are we to find teachers in whom opposites are thus reconciled, and whose hearts at the same time are alive with a love of humanity and glow with a religious zeal—men "moulded by God," as Thomas Fuller says—for a schoolmaster's life? It is precisely because we cannot hope to find them in any large numbers that there is imposed on us the duty of devising some means of bringing young men and women, whose habit of mind or tendency of nature leads them to devote themselves to the education of others, under the guiding influence of older men who can inspire them with the true aims of the educator and the methods by which these can best be attained. Aspirants of the finer temper will quickly perceive under such guidance the truly spiritual task of the teacher; and the duller minds will, by the exhibition of the philosophy or rationale of education, be at least intellectually guided, if not also morally inspired, to form an adequate conception of their function in the community. They will go forth furnished with ideals and methods which cannot fail to bear fruit in their daily work to the great benefit of the nation and of mankind.

III.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND THE TRAINING OF TEACHERS[1].

SOUND practice is sound theory unconscious of itself; sound theory is merely sound practice conscious of itself. My thesis is simply this—that a teacher should be conscious of the art he practises, conscious of its rational basis, its process and its end: and *that* for his own sake, for the sake of his pupils, and for the sake of the dignity, usefulness, and influence of the profession to which he belongs.

There is not time in one lecture to discuss the question fully, and what I have now to say is, in truth, more of the nature of an apologia preparing the way for an argument, than itself an argument.

There is a conviction abroad—which, though it does not obtrude itself so often as it used to do, still influences opinion—that a teacher, like a poet, is born, not made. This opinion is due, I suppose, to the fact that they both practise arts: but it is scarcely necessary to point out that the arts are of different kinds; nay, that in some essential respects they are to be contrasted rather than compared.

[1] Annual Address to the Teachers' Guild.

Like most opinions which have a trick of persistently turning up when one thinks them dead, the dictum as to the divine origin of the teacher, as of the poet, has an element of truth in it: for it is certainly possible for a man to be born a teacher; and the greatest teachers of the world have been *born* teachers. But this is simply to say that there is such a thing as educational genius, just as there is genius in other departments of human activity. If we could command the fountains of Nature and Providence, we should certainly take care to have none but born teachers. As we cannot do this, and as not more than one teacher in a thousand is a born teacher, and of the remainder, not probably more than twenty per cent. even half-born, we must have some way of making teachers out of men who desire to practise the art, and of making them in the image of him who is born to it.

We cannot define genius in any department of human activity. After we have given such account of it as we can, there remains a "something" which escapes us. In art we recognize the fact that while genius accepts tradition, it is yet essentially outside rule: it makes rule. It is a subtle, complex, and wholly mysterious combination of faculty, which by a native impulse gives a new form of beauty to the products of the mind. We may call it feeling or inspiration. For this inspiration a man has to wait, and to wait in vain if he has not been born to receive it. By the grace of God, Raphael and Shakespeare were artists. So, by the grace of God, the builder of Westminster Abbey was an artist; and the builders of many a simple church-tower that gives charm to the rural parishes of England, making a poem of even the most prosaic landscape, were also, in their degree, artists.

The difficulty of definition, however, is not so great in the field of education as it is in the æsthetic arts. Were we asked to explain more closely wherein educational genius consists, I doubt if we could find any word more suitable than the old familiar word, Sympathy. All that a teacher needs, it has been

held, is knowledge of the subject he teaches, and sympathy; and I am quite willing to accept this word as a fair enough approximation to what we mean when we speak of the genius of the teacher. But I would ask you to consider with me what Sympathy itself means, because I think that by starting from what is an educational commonplace, I shall more effectively convince you that all teachers should study the Philosophy of Mind, as containing the theory of their art.

Now, we shall find three senses in which this word "sympathy" is used in its scholastic reference: in the first, it is the essential qualification of every teacher; in the second, it borders on a vice; in the third, it may be accepted as a fair enough equivalent for educational genius.

In its first sense, it means little more in a young teacher than a genuine interest in the young, and a strong desire to help them on their way. This is not only a good thing, but the first and indispensable qualification of every man who teaches with a view to educate. If he has it not, he ought to find some other occupation; for, without it, he will not only do no good, but much harm, and be himself of all men most miserable as he hopelessly fulfils the drudgery of a daily routine. But sympathy in this sense is nothing more than the ordinary impulse of good will towards our fellow-men, taking a specific line in the direction of those who are as yet young and weak. It is a manly quality, and is bred generally of a deep sense of the spiritual responsibility of the elder for the younger brother. But this simple virtue is not what many, in these days, mean by "sympathy" in the teacher.

The second sense in which the word is used, is to mark a quality of mind which many admire and cultivate—viz. a sentimental affection for boys which shows itself in a constant effort to gain their regard by stooping to their level, and involves a good deal of attitudinizing on the part of the man.

The object is to influence children for good and to make them (I presume) like one's self. This kind of sympathy is, I think, the excess, and therefore the vice of what, in moderation, is a virtue. Aristotle, the apostle of the "mean," would not have approved of it. Does it not too often characterize minds which combine with a certain essential vanity a feeble fumbling after power? They are not strong enough, or virile enough, in themselves to exercise power without scheming to do it, and taking advantage—often undue advantage—of their superior age and position; always, of course, with the best intentions. But good intentions are a bad plea in a court of Ethics. A teacher must question his good intentions and the moral sympathy with boys out of which they are supposed to spring. The kind of sympathy of which we now speak impresses me as unwholesome, and much in need of guidance and correction. Is it not a kind of Protestant Jesuitry in education? The sympathetic sentimentalist among teachers ought, above all men, to be put through a stiff course of educational methods and science. There are many good instincts in him running to seed. He requires bracing up. Genuine power never needs to assert itself. The sympathy which some cherish as a special virtue of their own, leads to a constant manipulating of the mind of a pupil—a constant lying in wait in order to guide, shape, and influence. Such devotedness on the part of an adult to a boy necessarily conveys to the immature subject of the process a silent conviction that he is an interesting object, and so tends to engender in him a weak and narrow conceit rather than to foster a strong personality. The result is a prig. Common rumour and certain "Boys' books" tell us that there has been, since Arnold's time, a good deal of this sort of coddling—a kind of pawing of the tender mind, by well-meaning pedagogic moralists. Now, neither plants nor kittens will grow if you are constantly handling them, and even water takes an unconscionable time to boil if you keep looking at the kettle. Indeed, it is a matter of common

observation that if our much-tended plant in our æsthetic flower-pot sprouts at all, it always takes advantage of our absence to do so.

Far be it from me to say that a teacher is not consciously to endeavour to exercise "influence"; but he must respect individuality, and be on his guard against sympathy of the spurious kind I have been describing: otherwise he will overdo his part as educator. Even a father must respect the individuality of his son. If he does not, he will most certainly be beaten in the end. Let boys alone; but take care that they live under law, that they have good moral and spiritual food, that they do their work from a sense of duty as well as pleasure, and above all that they have in you, their master, a good strong example. To the schoolroom we may apply the words of Bacon: "Adest quoque ipse vultus, et aspectus virorum gravium qui facit ad verecundiam, et teneros animos etiam a principiis conformat ad exemplar[1]." Let there be no moral analysis, no unmanly and unmanning sentimentalism, no shedding of sympathetic tears over interesting boy-penitents.

I fear I shall be thought to be very much (to use a colloquial expression) out of the swim; for I look with aversion even on masters "sympathetically" taking a part in boys' games. By all means see that the boys have all necessary facilities and time for games, but then leave them to themselves, paying only such visits to the field as may seem natural and friendly; for boys are boys, and men are men. It is a false etymology, which interprets education as a drawing-out: it is a drawing-*up*. A boy grows in intelligence by leaning on the stronger intelligence of his master; in moral perception by imbibing his master's deeper moral convictions; in conduct by forming himself on his master's formed and disciplined will. If, then, he is to be truly educated, he must be always looking up. To require masters—men in so exalted a position of intellectual and moral authority—to run at "hare

[1] This I quote from some other writer. It has not been verified.

and hounds" with little boys, is, to my mind, ridiculous, and is one of the results of a false "sympathy." It is no mark of manhood, this kind of thing—this affectation of simple-mindedness, this condescension of unbending. Remember that, as Britons, we have to deal with boys who have a great history behind them, and a great imperial task before them—boys whose "blood is fet from fathers of war-proof." We have to "stiffen the sinews" of their minds if they are to bear their part nobly before God and man. The kind of sympathetic condescension against which I would protest weakens, and then flatters the weakness it has created.

But let us come now to the third sense in which the word "sympathy," as applied to the schoolmaster, may be used—the true sense—the sense in which "sympathy" is another word for "educational genius." What does it mean now? It denotes that subtle and complex combination of faculty which makes a teacher, at one bound, master of his art, just as an analogous combination marks the true artist in the sphere of the beautiful. Let us look at this more closely. We cannot analyse the art of the artist; but we can analyse the art of the educator, and the analysis shows the fallacy that underlies the confounding of the two arts. I should say that sympathy is an intuitive perception of the mental condition and processes of others, so vivid as to enable a man, without effort, to live in and with other minds, and to help them on their way to knowledge and to character, by moving with them step by step. In every lesson which a man so endowed gives to the young, in every conversation he holds with them, this sympathetic intuition is unobtrusively active without any one being specially conscious of it. Now, this is a rare gift. I don't know how many teachers there are in Great Britain; let us say, fifty thousand. How many of these, do you think, are so endowed by the grace of God? Shall we say fifty? Partially so endowed, there are thousands.

Observe, now, what this sympathy is—the sympathy which

characterizes the teacher of whom we may say *nascitur non fit*. It is simply a profound psychological knowledge, which yet is not knowledge at all, in any strict sense, because it is unconscious: it is rather to be called feeling or intuition. Were such a man suddenly gifted with the power and love of analytic and abstract thinking, he would, by his revelations, put our psychologists to shame. They would all go to school to him.

Since such men are few and teachers are many, the question is, How are the many to rise to the level of the few? I answer, In no way can they rise to it; but, by the conscious study of those very mental processes which the born teacher intuitively feels and instinctively practises, the vast majority may approach it. It is possible, in short, to become conscious of the art of education; in other words, to know and apply to the work of education the philosophy or science of the mind of man: it is not possible to become a poet or a painter by studying the principles and philosophy of the arts of poetry or painting.

Were I to ask you to analyse with me the inner processes of mind as it grows from childhood to manhood—those processes in and with which the educational genius instinctively lives—and then to formulate these, by what name would you call these formulated results? The "Philosophy of Mind," of course. Now, inasmuch as this philosophy of mind can be taught and learned, the secret of the sympathy of the educational genius can so far be unveiled and learnt. Such study cannot make a man a genius, but it can put him on the next level to it, especially when supported by that strong desire to educate others which we assume to exist in all who choose the profession of schoolmaster. In this sense it is that, while I say of the rare schoolmaster-genius, *nascitur*, I say of all others, provided they have the humane prerequisite, *they* can be *made*—made in the likeness, and after the image, of him who is "born."

What we desire, then, is that all young teachers should

be helped to stand on the vantage-ground of wise and manly sympathy, by the study of the Philosophy of Mind. By this study, sympathetic teachers, in the strong virile sense, can be "made." And, *once they are set on the right scientific road*, every year will add to their knowledge, their skill, their wisdom; in brief, their "sympathy," in the virile sense of the word.

Now, let no young schoolmaster, freshly crowned with tripos laurels, think that, by posing as an opponent of philosophy in education and its consequent methods, he thereby makes good his own claim to the rare gift of genius. The world will not accept him at his own estimate, and will shrewdly conclude that, as the pretension to genius in a youth is often a claim to shirk hard work and do whatever the said youth pleases to do, the youthful schoolmaster who makes such pretensions must be watched. But if it should so happen that you, the young teacher, really have genius, depend on it, your genius will be strengthened and virilized by philosophy. In truth, it will be found that the man who is endowed with educational genius is always the last to oppose philosophy as part of the teacher's preparatory training. His very genius tells him that he has much to learn. Though conscious of his own strength, he yet cannot look behind him on the past abuse of young minds and bodies, around him on prevalent errors, and before him on the vast national interests involved, without feeling the necessity there is for that class of professional men and women who are set apart to work at the very foundations of the social fabric, studying their work in its principles, aims, and methods. The δόξα and individualism of pretentious minds must, he feels, be made to give way to the ἐπιστήμη of rational and reasoned system.

Why should a young teacher not study philosophy as ground of his art? What are we afraid of? In other professions men study science and dwell with principles. It is possible in chemistry to be a very facile practical analyst with little knowledge of science, and yet you say to every

young chemist, "Study the science of your art"; and you know that the genius-analysts have studied, and constantly do study, the science of the analytic art. So with engineers—especially genius-engineers. So with physicians, especially genius-physicians. The preacher, too, studies the science and history of theology; why should he not be left to his mother-wit and the spasmodic visitations of spiritual inflation? It would appear that the onus of showing that a teacher should not, like other people, study the science of his special art lies with those who deny the necessity. Nowadays the cry is—Give technical instruction to our plumbers, and dyers, and weavers, and telegraphists, and mechanics of all sorts: and what does technical instruction mean? It does not mean methods only, but the principles and history *i.e.* the science—of the methods. Are teachers—the practisers of the art of forming the mind of the young—to be left out in the cold? Are they not to aspire even to the technical preparation of a plumber? In the case of schoolmasters alone, are we to reverse the thought of the poet, spoil the scanning, and say

Magister
Infelix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas?

Let us look, for a little, at some of the current objections:—

"Will the student of philosophy be a better teacher," some say, "by virtue of his study?" I answer, *more Scotico*, by asking another question: "Will a plumber be a better plumber, a chemical analyst a better analyst, by studying the science of their respective arts?" This, at least, all must allow to be absolutely certain: the teacher himself will be placed on a higher plane of professional life by the study of philosophy. By *being* more, and *thinking* more, as a man, he will *be* more and *think* more in his daily work. It is a truism, "As is the teacher, so is the school": I would add, "As is the man, so is the teacher."

But, again, some say: "By making him study the science

of mind as it bears on the educating of mind, you will destroy a teacher's originality!" Now, if there be a philosophy or science underlying all educational procedure, that youth must indeed have a weakling and rickety originality who cannot bear to look at this philosophy without being turned to stone, as if he gazed on a Medusa's head. Had such originality not better die at once and have done with it?

Again, I have found that some fear that the study of the philosophy of education, and the consequent art, may make young men pedants before their time. Now, I can easily understand how the study of methods alone—dogmatic rules of procedure—may make a man a pedant who is by nature already pedantically disposed; but, even then, his pedantry, like Hamlet's (so-called) madness, will have method in it, which will be something gained. But the philosophy of mind, which determines all methods, and gives them truth, meaning, vitality, is the enemy and destroyer of pedantry. For what is it, after all, save thinking? Can a teacher be converted into a pedant by thinking about the foundations and ultimate significance of what he holds to be an Art—*his* Art? Those headmasters who are, by the grace of God, themselves the whole art of education incarnate, need not surely fear a young assistant because he thinks. It is only despots to whom "such men are dangerous": it is only they that love the "sleek smooth head."

"Well, but after all, in a schoolmaster, if you have not genius, then experience is everything," we are further told. On the contrary, experience is nothing—often less than nothing: it is a mere opportunity for further confirming bad habits of mind. Experience is the great indurator, the crust-former, of the human soul. I wish some clever fellow would write a paper "On the Futility of Experience, especially among Schoolmasters." "Days *should* speak, and multitude of years *should* teach wisdom," we are told in Job. You notice the "should"—a wisely chosen mood; for experience no more gives wisdom than facts make history. There is no department

of life in which experience is of value, except to him whose prior philosophic or scientific discipline enables him to put the right questions to experience and interpret the answers.

It was only the other day—I hope we may regard the day as past—that secondary schoolmasters looked with suspicion, even contempt, on the study of methods, and regarded every man who talked of methods as a "mere theorist." There may be survivals; but it must be difficult now, I hope, to find the headmaster who would think it a disqualification in a young teacher of language to have studied Quintilian and Ascham. The battle of methods is now won in the whole field of primary education, and in every department of science-teaching; and it is only among secondary schoolmasters, literary, linguistic, and classical, that the heresy still prevails, that every graduate, when he puts on his hood, puts on with it the whole art of education; that when we endue a raw youth with an academic gown, we endow him with method. But even with this class of teacher great progress has been made. He recognizes at least that there is such a thing as method. The primary school has taught this to the secondary school. Comenius and Pestalozzi have also taken possession of the science chairs of our universities. It is otherwise, however, with the philosophy of mind as the basis of all methods and as alone vindicating the truth of methods, and furnishing aim and inspiration as well as plan. This is still fighting its way up. Surely, if there be methods—rules, ways of procedure in teaching and training—there must be a philosophy of them, and that philosophy must be the philosophy of mind. Not psychology alone in its narrower and more empirical sense; but the philosophy of mind, and, therefore, the philosophy of man. As with methods, so with philosophic principles; the movement to give the latter a place has begun in primary schools. The Government of the country already examines in principles (in a fashion)—a great victory for the once abused "theorist." The Department now writes instructions to inspectors with all the unction of a Professor of

the Theory and Art of Education. Are secondary schoolmasters alone *supra philosophiam*? Are they all born philosophers as well as born artists? What elixir of educational genius do Greek iambics or the mathematics of the fourth dimension distil?

In speaking of method, I have said that I presume no headmaster would nowadays object to a young graduate who had been sufficiently in earnest about his profession to study Quintilian and Ascham. So now, may I be so daring as to say, that no headmaster (under forty) would think the worse of a young graduate if he had studied such a book in the philosophy of education as, for example, Mr R. L. Nettleship's "Exposition of the Republic of Plato"? That most admirable of all modern treatises on the philosophy of education—modern, but resting deep on ancient foundations—is buried in the volume called *Hellenica*[1]. But I would warn the rule-of-thumb empiricists—the would-be born educators—the artists by the grace of God—to put it on an *Index Expurgatorius*; for it will make a youth think, it will make him "theorize." But in a classical school, at least, a young master who engages himself with Plato can hardly be treated as a suspect. I say with confidence, that if a clever young graduate who has been teaching for a year or two without thinking much about the great question of education, will shut himself up for a week with Nettleship's essay, he will come out into his school afterwards (to use the phraseology in which our Scottish Calvinistic fathers brought us up) convicted, converted, regenerate, sanctified. A new sun will be shining by day, and a new moon by night. As a teacher, he will live henceforth in the atmosphere breathed by the minor gods.

But a more serious objection has to be encountered. There is an art: there is method: there are methods, all now admit; but some would foreclose all further discussion by saying there is no *science* of the art, no accepted philosophy

[1] Since reprinted in Nettleship's *Remains*.

of mind in its relation to education as a whole; and, accordingly, we must adjourn till we have settled this.

Let me admit that there is no one philosophy of education which is above suspicion—no recognized philosophic educational system or theory: what then? Is there any philosophy of which it can be said that it is recognized and final? and yet we pursue philosophy as a part of general academic education. It is not necessary to have a philosophy of education as unquestionable as Euclid before we can, as teachers, be asked to study it. Sir Frederick Pollock, in his "Introduction to Political Science" (by-the-by, I might ask students of Politics, and of Political Economy too, who doubt the science of education, where *their* "science" is to be found), says: "It is better to have a theory of education not exactly in the right place, than to have none at all: which last is about the condition in which we moderns have been since the tradition of the Renaissance sank into an unintelligent routine." To discuss actual or possible educational philosophies here would be impossible, and I will content myself with saying that Aristotle's "Ethics," though wanting in direct guidance for the trainer of youth, is a science of the art of moral education from the Hellenic standpoint; Plato's "Republic," again, is a philosophy or science of education in a much larger and wider and profounder national sense. Does anyone who has studied these books doubt this? I avoid modern instances, lest I should arouse the jealousies of the "Schools." The philosophy of education is simply the groundwork of the art, as that groundwork is to be found in the nature of the mind of man, the ends of man's existence, and his relations to other men. It is, in short, what we mean by philosophy—philosophy in its grand historical sense, "musical as is Apollo's lute"; but it is, also and chiefly, this philosophy in its special relation to the growth of the man-child to manhood. The philosophy or science of education is, moreover, the philosophy of mind and of man as a *growing* mind and a *growing* man: it is dynamical, not a barren

analysis and formulation of the statical facts of the human mind abstracted from life and the conditions of life. And yet, though this way of looking at mind does not appear in the "Ethics" of Aristotle, and only partially in the "Republic" of Plato, I confidently ask any young teacher who has studied these books, especially Nettleship's exposition of the latter, "Have they anything to do with you and the social function to which you have devoted your life?" I know the answer will be: "They have everything to do with me; just as much as Greek accidence and syntax have to do with the teaching of Greek." Taste, then, and eat; it is not the fruit of the forbidden tree, though it does teach the knowledge of good and evil.

Now, those who allow me to name the two books which I have called to witness as philosophies of the art of education, and make no protest, are in my net of argument. This is all I want. I suppose they will scarcely say philosophy ended with Plato and Aristotle; that thought on the supreme subjects of human concern—man's life, man's destiny, and man's education for his life and destiny—was arrested about 322 years B.C. The philosophy of education, then, exists, and by your own admission should be studied as a preparation for your professional work.

So much for philosophy in general, and its bearing on the great art of education; but, it may be urged (for there is no end to the objections to the existence of colour which a man born blind may urge), "such philosophy, though always instructive and stimulating, cannot give birth, by necessary, or even probable, deduction, to methods of instruction and methods of moral training—to the 'rules' of the teacher's art, in short; and so it becomes part of a man's liberal culture merely, as *opposed* to his professional preparation for the work of life." This depends very much on what is meant by the objector: such philosophies give you end and aim; the principles which you have imbibed from them are translated into practice by you, spite of yourself; and they cannot be

translated into practice without going through the intermediate stage of rules or methods—the *axiomata media* which govern practical life. As principial they determine rules. These rules and methods you may (it is true) be only vaguely conscious of, because of your idle habit of not thinking things out; but they are always *there* in your mind, always operative, always potent. To the extent to which a man might formulate them, to that extent would he at once see that the rules and methods were deductions from principles. As Wordsworth says in the "Prelude"—

> "General truths which are themselves a sort
> Of elements and agents, under-powers,
> Subordinate helpers of the living mind."

—But I would meet the objection more in the face.

I have been speaking of philosophy in its larger sense as a philosophy of life, and, as such, supremely practical. The claim of philosophy on the teacher becomes irresistible when we see that, within the philosophy of life and mind, there falls not only the analysis of the processes of Intelligence, but the successive movements involved in building up Conscience and disciplining to Duty. This is a chapter of the larger Bible of philosophy. Omitting the moral aspects of psychology and confining myself to the intelligence alone, whereby it is mainly that a man differs from the beasts of the field, I would sum up, in a brief paragraph, much that might be said more convincingly perhaps if dealt with at greater length, hoping that, in being concise, I do not become obscure, viz.: The process whereby intelligence intelligizes is the process by which a man knows and can alone know. He cannot *know* anything through his fingers or toes, or in any other way than by a movement within him which is as definite and determined in its character as are the laws of the physical world. Knowing is only another word for learning; and does it not follow, by necessary consequence, that the way of learning must be the way of teaching?

This question answers itself. Now, what is the meaning of the word "method"? It simply means Way—neither more nor less. The way of learning, then, is the method of teaching. Let any man escape from that brief argument if he can.

The general method (or methodick or methodology) yielded by psychology applies to all subjects equally—to English, Science, Greek, Music, etc., to the extent to which the subject permits. An analysis of it breaks it up into many sub-processes which we call methods in the plural number—in other words, rules of the art of instruction and of moral education.

Now, you cannot, by any device, escape method. Admit that method is a way and that methods are ways, and I defy any man to teach without them. No man ever did so. As Aristotle says, there is no question as to philosophizing or not; a man, simply because he is a man, *must* philosophize. So we educationalists say, it is not at all a question whether a teacher is to teach by method or not: he *must* teach, by the very nature of things, according to some way or method. The questions are: Do we philosophize wisely? Do we instruct according to a wise method? Do not imagine that you can ever escape method of some sort. When you teach *amo, amavi*, or chemical processes, or Sophocles, or the *pons asinorum*, you are always following a *way*; you *must* follow a way. You are devotees of method without knowing it. But what method? What way?

Let me assume here, however, that you have deliberately studied methods. My point is that the student of methods should carry his studies a step further back, and see method growing out of psychology as part of the larger and presiding philosophy. Still, I can imagine a young teacher of ingenuous mind hesitating. Methods he may frankly recognize; and he may admit also that as part of general culture, quite apart from scholastic duty, a man should study philosophy in the large Platonic sense, because philosophy, so understood, is after all only an explanation of the meaning of man and his cosmic function—an inquiry into the ends of human existence. An

educator, above all men, he may admit, should think of these things. But when it comes to the connecting together of philosophy, psychology, and methods by a rational link, he shrinks back lest he should become a bond-slave of law and rule. "I fear I should no longer be a free man," he may say; "I should be a mere instrument of science,—a walking formula." Well, it is so far true. You would not be free to do many things you now do; your will—which is not will at all, as philosophy would teach you, but arbitrary caprice would be under the restraint of law. To the extent to which any of us is educated we part with our freedom in the *banal* sense of the word. As sons of God we are under law, which alone is the true freedom of the human spirit. The law against which you, as an individual, rebel, has been called "the glorious liberty of the children of God." Does any man quarrel with this? Does he desire to throw off the restraint of the law which alone is true freedom? So with the educator when he studies the science of his art, therein to find law.

Let me console you, however, with the assurance, that it is a complete misconception to suppose that, when you have studied either methods or their scientific bases, you are constantly thinking of these things and squaring your mode of instruction with them. A practical engineer, when he is doing his daily task, is not revolving in his mind the whole theory of mechanics; a chemist who is engaged on a particular investigation is not reproducing in imagination the whole theory of chemistry from hour to hour; a clergyman, when he is addressing an audience hungry for spiritual food, is not conning in his inner consciousness a whole scheme of scientific theology. So with the teacher: methods and philosophy he has studied and is always thinking about, more or less, with the larger thought of cultivated men everywhere; but, in his converse with his pupils, these things do not obtrude themselves. They have already shaped his mind to his work at the first; they have given the primary impulse, and from day to day continue

to give body and substance to an enthusiasm which would be otherwise thin and effervescent; they have deepened his professional mind and enriched it: the *fruits* of his study are alone in evidence. The higher aim, the deepened conviction, the richer professional endowment, are all there. A large and virile conception of his work ennobles both the work and himself. Philosophy is not a stagnant pool, but a well of living water. Even of methods we say with confidence that a teacher who has wisely studied them is the master of methods; methods are not his master. But if there be a real danger here in the sphere of method or rule, I provide the remedy when I say, "Study philosophy, which gives rational freedom." As to the teacher who trusts to the externalities of tradition or to the wilful individualism which he flatters himself is originality and genius, is not he a slave—the slave of past dead forms and of his own unreasoned opinions? The student of method, going farther, and seeing his instruction-methods in the light of psychology, and his whole educational function in the light of philosophy, becomes objective and universal, thus entering into the whole kingdom of liberty. He is a servant, not a slave. He is an academic gentleman. He moves with an easy confidence in the discharge of his daily duties—a confidence which thought on the fundamental principles of an art always gives to the practical worker. He, last and least of all men, is a mere walking formula. It is among the unthinking and opinionative that you must look for the formulated man—the scholastic pedant, the prig, and the dominie.

Before I conclude, I should like, by way of illustration, to take an example of one or two philosophic utterances in the sphere of moral education of a very simple and obvious kind: "What we have to aim at is the happiness of each citizen, and happiness consists in a complete activity and practice of virtue." Again: "The soul consists of two parts—Reason in itself, and the lower nature which is capable of receiving the rule of

Reason." From these pregnant words of Aristotle one could deduce a good deal of the moral philosophy of education. Does it not become the young teacher to read such utterances and to study what may help him to solve the problem which Aristotle little more than states?

"Again," says Aristotle, "education should be regulated by the State for the ends of the State, and each citizen should understand that he is not his own master, but a part of the State." Large and complex educational questions, ethical and practical, are suggested here. Are they not questions for the educational profession? To what extent, now, do you consciously educate your boys to be "part of the State"? What, I ask you, is the modern meaning, the social significance, of this phrase? Does it not concern educators, above all other men, to think about these things? Let me assure you that, without the habit of thinking on the general *philosophy* of education, your thought on this particular question will be worthless—utterly worthless.

Now, does it not become the secondary teachers of the country to put themselves in evidence on this subject, and to claim for the philosophy of education a place in the academic system, so that all young teachers should have in the universities an opportunity (at least) of studying the meaning of their future life-work? So long ago as 1865 Mark Pattison wrote, "The first condition of a good teacher is that he shall be a teacher and nothing else, that he shall be *trained* as a teacher and not brought up to serve other professions." Is the teacher's profession the only one that has no principles, no history—in brief, no scientific basis, no method resting on principles? If this be truly so, why do teachers talk, and sometimes grumble, about status and social position? They have no claim to either one or the other. What value has the teaching of a little Latin and less Greek in the estimate of sensible men of affairs? These subjects ought to be regarded as merely the raw material whereby the teacher discharges his educational and ethical

functions; and for these functions he has to be trained. A teacher is a practical philosopher, or he is of little account

Why is it, then, that the great body of secondary schoolmasters are yet unconvinced that a part of their necessary preparation for their work should be the study of philosophy—at least in so far as it bears on education? I have already indicated why, and I will say it more explicitly now. It is because they have not yet risen to the level of their work; they have not yet discovered their true function in the community. They insist, in accordance with a bad tradition, on regarding themselves simply as teachers of this or that subject—English or Mathematics or Latin, as the case may be. For this a totally different idea of their function has to be substituted and firmly grasped; and that idea is that they are not teachers of subjects primarily at all, but teachers of minds by means of subjects. When they fully realize that they teach minds, they will at once see that they are bound to study Mind.

I end as I began—Sound theory is sound practice become conscious of itself; and every schoolmaster who would also be an educator should be conscious of the art he practises, so that he who is not born, or only, it may be, half-born, may, through that scientific consciousness, be *made*, and that he who is born may have his consciousness enlightened and fortified.

In conclusion, it is scarcely necessary to remind an audience such as this, that the art of the teacher, properly understood as the art of the educator, is a great art, the greatest and most difficult of all arts—mind fashioning mind. Is there any art like it—any which can so attract the finer spirits among men, any which can so engage in its service that enthusiasm which fills the moral atmosphere to-day? Is there any, the wise practice of which brings such personal reward, strengthening from day to day the spirit of him who gives and him who takes, laying up for a man a store of peaceful days when, the struggle of life being past, he comes to cast the inevitable retrospect—

not wholly satisfactory, I imagine, for even the best of us? Surely an art so great, so full of great issues for the individual and for society, is worth thinking about—is worth thinking about in its principles, its rules, its history, its aims in brief, its philosophy. After all, what is it I demand? Merely that the young teacher, before he has hardened down, should read, observe, and think about his vocation, and that all universities should provide the necessary aid in this as in other matters – merely this and no more. Plato thought the subject worth thinking about. So did Aristotle, and Cato, and Quintilian, and Comenius, and Kant, and Locke, and Rousseau, and Herbart. Do not leave education as a philosophy to the philosophers alone. Claim it as, in a special sense, your subject, at once the inspirer of your lives and the science of your art.

IV.

THE SCHOOLMASTER AND UNIVERSITY (DAY) TRAINING COLLEGES IN ENGLAND[1].

WHEN, owing to very numerous occupations, I was about to decline the honour of your invitation to address you on this occasion, Professor MacCunn recalled to my mind the fact that I had a good deal to do with originating the idea of Day Training Colleges in connection with universities—that I had been, as we say in Scotland, "at the biggin o't." Accordingly, I put aside other engagements, and resolved to put on paper a few observations which might pass, in the lenient judgment of friends, as an inauguration address.

First, let me say that it was from no feeling of hostility to residential training colleges that university day training colleges were advocated. That, I think, is now distinctly understood. The simple fact was that a large percentage of teachers in England were untrained, and more facilities for training were wanted.

We have now a great organization of the resources of the country in the interests of the education of the people. Money and time are given to the work to an extent which would have been considered, forty years ago, an impossibility. The very conception of such a system as we now have would have been

[1] Inaugural Address delivered at the Liverpool University College, on the occasion of starting the "Day Training College."

ridiculed as the dream of a "theorist." Many of us here can remember the day when two millions of children of school age in England, out of a total population of about twenty millions, were "neither at school nor at work." Add those at work who had received no schooling, and you can then imagine the educational destitution of the country. Now all is changed; and, with the change, the education question, always with us, and always to be with us, alters its form. Two questions are now, I think, to the front—local autonomy, and the higher training of the teacher. Centralization has done its work, and decentralization (subject, of course, to central control of a general kind) is now necessary, if we are to engage the intellect and moral energy of the country more fully in the work of education. This point, however, I shall for the present pass by, for there is a more vital question than decentralization that demands our attention here and now; and this question concerns the inner agencies by which we are to work the organization we at last, after a long contest, happily possess.

The central motive power of the whole scholastic machine is, by general consent, the teacher; on him, his ideals, his character, his method, his living activity, all depends. Where he is weak the organization is worthless, and precisely as he is effective, so is the organization effective. Hence the necessity for more, and more highly trained, men and women. It was quite natural that attention should be directed to the university colleges springing up over England as the best available agency for adding to the number and the quality of the trained, especially as Board schools were as undenominational in their character as these colleges themselves. It was essential, moreover, in their own interests, that these young colleges should educate for the professions if they were to succeed in attracting pupils. The medical profession was open to them, and it was also open to them so to organize their scheme of studies as to give business men a more liberal education than was common in commercial circles. It still, however, remained for them to

constitute themselves professional schools for teachers; and, doubtless, we shall one day find them attracting apprentice solicitors by organizing a law faculty, and perhaps also apprentice clergymen by organizing a faculty of theology embracing those subjects which the Churches can leave to independent teaching. The immediate and pressing work ready to their hand was, however, unquestionably training for the teaching profession; and this, thanks to the liberal views of Sir W. Hart Dyke and Mr Kekewich, they are now trying to do.

It would be ungracious on this occasion not to name the vice-president and the permanent secretary. I have had a long experience of Government officials, and I know that much depends on the mental attitude of the central authority as represented by them. If they have in view merely the working of "articles" in a legal and bureaucratic spirit instead of using the code as an instrument to promote the local efforts being made by earnest men in every part of the kingdom to advance education, they may obstruct all progress and stamp out the most fruitful ideas. Codes may be so constructed and administered as to help forward education, and they may also be so constructed and administered that every article is a trap for the unwary and an obstacle to the zealous. The institutions, whether university colleges like this or residential training colleges, which are doing the work of the State in preparing schoolmasters, specially merit, I think, not only the recognition which they have already secured from the Department, but the most generous consideration and the most liberal treatment. Every article in the code should be strained in their favour, not against them. The question for the Department should not be how *little* can we give, but rather how *much* can we give to promote the better education of the men and women who are to work the national system. Its chief duty is to see that the training given is liberal and generous in the spiritual sense, as justification for their being liberal and generous in the material sense.

The two reasons we have assigned for the university training college are the reasons we give to the politician, and they are true and sufficient reasons; but there is a large idea in the movement which, though not purposely concealed, it is not always expedient to blazon on its front. It is difficult to get even academic men to take action in service of an idea. Ideas are suspects. The practical politician and the routine administrator would gladly arrest them as vagrants having no visible means of subsistence, and put them in gaol to be reduced by spare diet till they died of inanition. And there is, after all, some justification for their line of action. An idea must be shown to be practicable before it can be allowed to enter into an administrative system; and we are well content, accordingly, to have the official mind open to accept ideas when their practicability can be shown. In England, however, it is always wise to put some purely practical purpose in the front, and keep the idea and larger meaning of a movement in the background. The most important movement in our time, for example, next to the training of the teacher, is the more advanced instruction of members of trade unions—the aristocracy of the wage-earning class. What the educationalist chiefly aims at is elevating the plane of the mental life of the operative class, giving occupation for their leisure, and a higher aim to their politics. If we wish to succeed, we must demand the "technical instruction" of the working-man. That is the phrase to conjure with; and there is enough of reality and substance in the demand to justify us in joining in it. If the desire be to educate the lower middle class, and provide good secondary commercial schools, the educationalist, while, to save his honesty, not committing himself, will yet not exert himself to check the panic about the German invasion of clerks, although he knows very well that the German can afford to take a salary which an Englishman, who has been trained to write a foreign language, would certainly despise. The German is here to be trained in English commerce. He is, in truth, attending the great mercantile university

called "Great Britain," and, like other students of universities, he takes his reward out, not in salary but in knowledge, and in growing familiarity with the world-language—the Volapuk —of trade.

In like manner, while there are solid practical reasons, such as I have given above, for the institution of university training colleges—solid and practical enough to justify the action taken by the Education Department—it is a purely educational purpose which can alone engage professional interest in the new movement. Let me put before you briefly what I conceive this purpose to be.

1. The university colleges are at present confessedly training for primary schools. This is a work which, with slight adaptations of their academic machinery, they are well fitted to do; but, ere many years have elapsed, their principal work will be, I believe, the preparation of teachers for higher-grade elementary schools and for secondary schools. We prefer university institutions for the training of every grade of teacher to specialized training colleges, simply because they are not specialized[1]. It is only in exceptional circumstances, and under men of exceptional ability, that a seminary restricted to one profession can do the best work for that profession. There is, in truth, a radical error in the conception of an exclusive seminary for the education of members of a profession. Teachers, least of all, should be set apart from their fellow-citizens prematurely. They should breathe the invigorating air of an institution where all manner of men meet. There they come in daily contact with a larger life and with more varied intellectual interests than can possibly exist in a specialist school that limits its scope by the horizon of examination papers imposed by outside authority, and subordinates everything to a practical aim which prescribes "thus far and no farther."

[1] We have overcome the educational difficulty in Scotland by utilizing the universities for all training college students who are fit to attend them.

Contact with other men pursuing diverse studies, even when unaided by any other influence, counteracts the tendency to narrowness and pedantry, by giving breadth to the student's mind: this is itself an education. The scholastic pedant will not, I am aware, concur, for he can see no gain to the human mind except in precise and exact knowledge of this or that subject: he ignores the educational influence of the imagination and of the indefinite.

2. Again, in universities young teachers are brought into relation with experts in all departments of knowledge, and this raises their standard of what it is to *know* any subject. They leave with their *testamur* in their pockets, but well aware that it is a *testamur* of ignorance and not of learning. They have learned the lesson of humility. In the ordinary seminarist students we too commonly find that they cease studying after they leave college; their knowledge is rounded off: their ignorance is their bliss. In the university-trained man his ignorance is his misery, and stimulates to further effort. He has a want which can never be satisfied. Thus, living and progressive minds are sent into our schools, to the great gain of the community; for the teacher who is not always learning is a bad teacher, however skilfully he may produce certain "results." He fails to give stimulus, and the intellectual outlook and imagination of the pupil lie dead under him.

3. Further, the university-trained schoolmaster imbibes some of the scientific spirit of the university, and goes forth as a scientific worker, and not as a mere craftsman. He has presumably studied the philosophy of his art, and works always with a dignified consciousness of his scientific function. He goes out to teach, that by teaching he may, in the largest sense, educate.

4. Finally, if he stays long enough to graduate, the young teacher goes forth as a member of an academic brotherhood. This gives him his standard of life and his code of manners and intercourse, by making him a conscious sharer in a

corporate self-respect. He thus, by his academic standing, strengthens the body of teachers, as a guild having rights to exact from the community as well as owing duties to it.

These characteristics of the university man are, it is to be confessed, not always present in the youths whom universities turn out; but it is only universities that produce them. When they are present in a schoolmaster, he cannot keep them out of the influence he exercises, for they constitute him; and as is the man so is the teacher. It is the influence of the universities and the Church on the culture and status of the schoolmaster which has kept our great public schools up to their present level as educational institutions; and if only the scholarly men who work in these schools were also professionally trained, we should see great things.

There are many initial difficulties, financial and other, which beset a new departure such as the University Training College, and it is precisely to those most closely connected with it that the results will often seem most disappointing. But, in truth, the new idea is itself accomplishing much more than appears on the surface. In all university work the teachers have a tendency to feel despondent because of the small apparent output as represented by the new-fledged graduates who leave their hands. This is as if a gardener were to feel hopeless about the crop the day after he had sown the seed. The flower and fruit will come in due time. In contact with the duties of life the raw graduate develops with amazing rapidity.

While trusting thus largely to the general influences of a liberal education and of academic life, the university training colleges have, generously and of set purpose, to do their part; they have to remember that they are training *to a profession.* The broad and various university interests are necessary to the growth of the student; but there must also be the definite aim. So far from weakening, unity of aim strengthens and deepens the impression which studies make, because unity of aim gives

moral purpose. It is a vulgar error to suppose that knowledge which is pursued for its own sake is alone liberalizing. Is it not rather the case that what is studied with a view to its being turned to use among our fellow-men exalts pursuits otherwise abstract and unattractive, and throws over them a certain emotional glow? Use, and the purpose of use, alone give life and meaning to the abstract. It is the ultimate use to which they are to be applied that gives unity as well as life to the diverse studies and influences of the university. Nay, may we not say that, of all knowledge, use is at once the consecration and the criticism?

In the case of the schoolmaster, then, all the knowledge acquired in college must contemplate one issue—the qualification to teach and to educate. For this, as all admit, a practising school and a master of method are essential; but, over and above, there is needed the scientific study of education under a master who has graduated in the philosophy of the human mind. If there be not this, then assuredly the specific *university* training of the teacher is non-existent. It is scientific or philosophic preparation for a profession that can alone liberalize it. It is an historical blunder to suppose that "liberal" education ever meant the pursuit of subjects divorced from the needs of practical life. *Artes liberales* were first so called by way of contrast to the mechanical and industrial arts. The study of philosophy and history in their educational relations should, accordingly, take its place as one of the subjects qualifying for an Arts degree.

It is only by calling to mind a few great individuals that we can be proud of our profession. Isocrates, Quintilian, Vittorino da Feltre, Neander, Sturm, Comenius, Pestalozzi, Arnold, and so forth, soon exhaust our list. On the whole, we can look back on a past mainly ignoble, and on generations of boys who have learned what they have learned spite of their masters. The Orbilius plagosus, the pedant, the dominie, the brutal despot, fill the eye. The classical epithets are *sævus*,

acerbus, sceleratus; and Martial speaks of the schoolmaster as *invisum pueris virginibusque caput.* If we are now to reconstitute the profession by giving to each member all that is best in the past, as illuminated and organized by modern thought, we must, I say, lay our foundations in history and philosophy. A Chair of Education, then, is to my mind an essential part of the university training college. A mere practical master of method will not suffice, nor even a Lecturer holding a subordinate place in the academic organization. The Arts faculty must be augmented by the addition of a Professor whose subjects shall be mind *as a growth* and the history of attempts to educate mind. In brief, education as a science or philosophy must be taught. Without philosophy, the best teacher is merely a clever craftsman. If the universities are unable to appoint a Professor of Education for want of money, why should not the Education Department extend a liberal hand? Failing the Department, why should not the County Councils of Liverpool and Lancashire step in and pay the salaries both of masters of method and professors of education, as I suggested at Manchester last September? The work in which these men are to be engaged is the highest kind of "technical" work, and seems to be covered by the English Technical School Acts; or, at least, not prohibited by them. If the County Council of Cambridgeshire can offer money to the university to teach agriculture and teachers of agriculture, why not to teach teaching and teachers generally?

Again, to attain the results which we hope for from our university training colleges, the authorities must be careful in selecting the material which they undertake to train. I think that you may (as, indeed, some colleges are now doing) supervise and direct the training of those who are fit to benefit only partially by an academic course, and be content to carry them forward to the "intermediate" examination; but work of this kind must always, to a large extent, lie outside an academic organization. Your main object should be to attract those among pupil-teachers and the rest of the community who, having passed a university preliminary examination, can be

carried forward to their full degree, the philosophy, history, and art of education being included (as I have already indicated) as one of the subjects qualifying for that degree. These graduate-teachers would naturally aim at higher-grade elementary institutions; and the day would soon arrive when none save a graduate would be considered eligible to a head-mastership in all the more important State-aided schools. This surely would be to render a great public service to England; and it is this which university colleges and universities are alone qualified to render.

Whatever may be the difficulties, financial and other, that attend the new movement, a good time is at hand. Secondary schoolmasters, as well as primary, will have to be trained. A Teachers' Registration Act will quickly fill your halls. When I was examined on this subject last spring by the Parliamentary Committee, it was evident that the vice-president of the Council and others were concerned about the means of getting professional training for the large numbers of young men and women who would have to seek it after the passing of an Act. I pointed to the universities and their colleges. These institutions now provide all our legitimate secondary school teachers. If they can do this, they can also give them their professional training, drawing into their net, moreover, those who now open schools at their own venture, often with dubious qualification. It would be a great mistake to have separate training colleges for secondary schoolmasters. It would be hurtful in itself and a waste of existing resources. There are now already in England and Wales some thirteen or fourteen institutions ready to do the work which the State, by passing a Registration Act, would demand to have done somehow. The State, by thus utilizing the higher educational institutions which it already recognizes, would get its secondary schoolmasters at a very cheap rate, while contributing by the increased number of students to the financial prosperity and the national importance of all the provincial colleges. The passing of a Registration Act, then, is your opportunity.

As there are some vague ideas abroad as to the course of instruction for secondary schoolmasters, I should like to take this opportunity of giving some indication of the lines on which it would naturally proceed. *During their graduation course* they should, if possible, take a term of logic and elementary psychology, and then attend for two terms (followed by examination) the lectures of the professor of education, whose instruction would cover the field of the philosophy of mind, history, and methodology. After graduating in the department of knowledge which they intended to profess as teachers (the psychological and educational studies being included in these degree qualifications), they would then spend one term under the general superintendence of the professor and the special direction of the master of method in a practising school—some good higher-grade elementary school in the university town. In that school they would see teaching and themselves teach. Demonstration lessons would be given in their presence, and they would also be carried through a course of criticism lessons. A second term would be spent in some good secondary school—the criticism lessons still continuing. If distributed, these student-teachers would not injure the work of the schools in which they taught, but, on the contrary, stimulate it. Having already passed an examination in principles, history, and methods when taking their degree, they would conclude their course by teaching a class before the professor and some other examiner, and so finally qualify for a license or diploma which the Registration Council and the State would, of course, recognize. All this could be carried on under a university syndicate for the training of teachers—such as already exists at Cambridge and here. The licensed graduates would then—and only then—be entitled to say that they were members not only of an academic body (as at present), but also of a great profession. Certain public schools in various parts of the country should be thrown open to these licentiates for visitation, and they would do well to spend a couple of

months in thus laying a broad basis of experience for their future.

The most important agency in training the teacher, whether primary or secondary, in the practice of his art as distinct from the theory and history of education, is the criticism lesson to which I have adverted above. As the criticism lesson is not fully understood outside training colleges, I may say a word or two about it:—The student is required to prepare a lesson to be taught by him to a certain class at a certain stage of progress. This he does in the presence of his fellow-students, who take notes, and after he has finished, criticise. But it is not desirable to give them license in criticism, and, with a view to point and relevancy, they should have guidance. A very good specimen of the rules which ought to regulate the remarks of the critic are those in use at the *Seminarium Præceptorium*, at Halle:—

I. *Choice and arrangement of material by the student giving the lesson.* 1. Was the amount of material in fair proportion to the allotted time? 2. Was the material duly sifted, properly divided, and appropriately brought to a unity? 3. Was the plan of the lesson clear?

II. *Manner of treatment.* 1. Did the teaching follow a systematic and appropriate order? 2. Was the lesson clearly presented, logically developed, and firmly impressed on the minds of the pupils, and so forth? 3. How was the questioning managed, and were the questions fairly divided among the pupils?

III. *The personality of the teacher.* What was the teacher's bearing? Was he fresh, stimulating, and alive? Did he master the class by look and voice? Was his language correct, concentrated, clear, concise? Was his reading worthy of being taken as a model? Was his personal manner commendable?

IV. *Discipline.* Did the teacher keep the whole class busy all the time? Did he secure the attention of the pupils and make them all share in the work in equal

degree? Did he give them recreation by pauses, opportunity to stand, recitation in concert, and the like? Did he have his eyes and ears open for misdemeanours, or did many things happen which he did not notice or did not consider?

V. *The general importance and success of the lesson.*

The "practical master of method" would, of course, preside at these lessons; but the professor should be generally present and take part in the criticism, summing up, and sometimes even testing the success of the lesson given by an extempore examination of the class, when the subject admitted of it.

Let me repeat, because I think it a vital point, that I do not consider that the universities are equipped for the work of training teachers—either elementary or secondary—until they have, in addition to a master of method and a practising school, a professor of education, who will be the head or dean of the education faculty, so to speak. They should also have an education library containing some dozen copies of each of all the more important books, besides two or three copies of many others. There should also be an educational museum, fostered and managed by the local guild, and in connection with it a hall, in which educational questions might be discussed, and of which every student of education should be a member.

I have presumed that the State would recognize the university license or diploma; music and drawing being separately attested—the latter by the local School of Art.

The State would thus, it may be said, be delegating its work to universities. But why not? The universities are already privileged State institutions for the professions. The Education Department need never part with the right of inquiry from time to time—a right which I suppose the Medical Council exercises as regards the medical Schools. If closer supervision were needed, with a view to prevent one university

underselling another by lowering its standard, a Senior Inspector of schools might be attached as an assessor to the examining bodies in the universities. By granting this independence to the universities, excessive centralization of educational administration would be got rid of in a very vital matter. Different types of higher-grade and secondary schoolmasters would be sent out. All government, of course, is centralization more or less. In some things it is indispensable; in warlike defence, for example, and in certain public services which have to do with the mechanical and industrial parts of the social organism; but State centralization of the moral forces of society is always questionable—too often fatal.

Professional qualification, theoretical and practical (such as I have sketched), can alone, let me repeat, make the teaching body truly a profession. Without this, it is not even a guild. From time immemorial, guilds have demanded specific qualifications for "mastership," as, indeed, our university guilds do at this day. The qualification of a master in the teaching guild can, it is evident, alone ultimately rest on the study of the mind of man as a growing mind, for so only can be ascertained the ends, ways, and means of growth. We confidently aim at constituting such a guild—an incorporated body of educated men with a great educational tradition, which it would be their business to pass on to their successors. How else can the fires, from time to time lighted by an educational genius here and there, be kept burning? They go out, and have to be lighted again and again. We are thus, from age to age, too much at the mercy of individuals.

The academic professional training of teachers would, I am certain, infuse a new spirit into all our schools, and raise the character and aim of every subject of instruction. The study of the philosophy of mind, for example, would, itself alone, compel the recognition of the ethical purpose of all schoolwork. It would thus tend to animate the teacher with a

religious zeal, for the philosophy of mind in its educational bearing necessarily includes the study of the moral and religious instincts of man. It reveals the religious idea as the highest expression of the life of mind, intellectual and ethical, and as the intimate support and sanction of right conduct. Religion is thus seen to be a necessary and inner, and not an arbitrary and external, element in the education of the young. Without it all education is barren. The whole method of education contemplates the end and aim as dominant and first; and that end is the spiritual life. When religion, in its broader aspects and essential meaning, is thus recognized by the student-teacher on scientific grounds, as something interwoven with every act of the school and as the summit and crown of the school-work, it will occupy a very different place in his estimate of his daily function to that which it now does, when regarded, as it too often is, as a system of doctrine and belief which is to be somehow *added on* to other attainments—as something to be learned, and not as something to be lived. The tendency among teachers and taught alike is to look on religion as a "subject" to be "got up" alongside of other things, and not as the *unum necessarium* which is to give purpose and stimulus to the teacher, and daily sustenance to the pupil. When I said above that the philosophy of mind gives inspiration to the schoolmaster, I meant chiefly this, that it gives him an ideal of the education of the human spirit, and enlists him in the spiritual army as a conscious and willing militant. It is this that exalts, and this which, under the difficulties and vexations of school-work, can alone sustain. Whatever system of belief a teacher may accept and inculcate, he is compelled by his philosophy ever to subordinate all to the one thing needful—the spiritual ideal of life. The teaching and bearing of such a master convey their influence into every department of his work and give it dignity. This is what is meant by the old Catholic dictum that religion should permeate the school.

There is such a thing, as I have often said, as teaching genius, which is independent of tradition and training, whether university or any other. There are teachers also who, though destitute of anything which can be called genius, are yet thoughtful and earnest men, endowed with a fair share of imagination and humour, in whom the routine methods of the school are vivified into living principles; but, in the great majority of cases, the inherited and unrationalized methods of the school-workshop govern successive generations of teachers. The consequence is that the schoolmaster stands, in relation to his profession, precisely where the unscientific mechanic stands in relation to his particular trade. Save in a few exceptional cases of great native endowment, I am persuaded that it is only the study into philosophical principles that can give insight and continuous ethical stimulus to the teacher: it is the apprehension of educational ideals that can alone sustain and inspire him; it is contact with the history of past efforts to educate the race that can alone give to him breadth and humanity. *Without* the sustaining energy and ideal impulse which flow from these studies, the teacher's vocation is, it seems to me, dreary enough: *with* them, there is a renewal of moral purpose and educational faith every morning.

It is a beneficent arrangement of nature, doubtless, that enables so many men to work by rule and routine, "circling like a gin-horse," as Carlyle says, "for whom partial or total blindness is no evil, round and round, still fancying that it is forward and forward, and realize much—for himself victuals, for the world an additional horse's power in the grand corn-mill or hemp-mill of economic society." But it is not such men we want for the spiritual work of a community—the building up of the intellectual and moral fabric of mind. We cannot command the services of genius, but we can at least, through a spiritual philosophy, give to all, save those whom nature has destined to be hodmen, a certain inspiration and a certain method; and inspiration is the fount of enthusiasm, while

method regulates it. We want ethical fervour in the teacher; but not at all that kind of enthusiasm which is the mere effervescence of aerated water. "How," to quote Carlyle again, "can an inanimate, mechanical gerund-grinder, the like of whom will, in a subsequent century, be manufactured at Nürnberg out of wood and leather, foster the growth of anything; much more of Mind, which grows, not like a vegetable (by having its roots littered with etymological compost), but like a Spirit, by mysterious contact of Spirit; Thought kindling itself at the fire of Living Thought? How should *he* give kindling, in whose inward man there is no live coal, but all is burnt out to a dead grammatical cinder? The Hinterschlag professors knew syntax enough, and of the human soul thus much: that it had a faculty called Memory, and could be acted on through the muscular integument by appliance of birch-rods. Alas! so it is everywhere; so will it ever; till the hodman is discharged, or reduced to hod-bearing; and an architect is hired, and on all hands fitly encouraged; till communities and individuals discover, not without surprise, that fashioning the souls of a generation by knowledge can rank on a level with blowing their bodies to pieces by gunpowder." Things are not so bad now as when Carlyle wrote these words; but, in so far as they are better, it is due to the gradual and insensible recognition of philosophy and method, even by those who affect to despise both. Give us the university training of teachers, and Carlyle's graphic words will ere long have only the antiquarian interest of an inscription on an Egyptian mummy-case.

NOTE.—Richard Mulcaster, the author of "The Positions," born in 1530, and Head Master of Merchant Taylors' School, London, was the first man in England to advocate the training of teachers. Mr Quick, in his *Educational Biographies*, gives the following extract from Mulcaster's book, which is of so great interest as to merit reproduction here along with Mr Quick's introductory remarks.

"Of all the educational reforms of the nineteenth century, by far the most fruitful and most expansive is, in my opinion, the training of teachers. In this, as in most educational matters, the English, though advancing, are in the rear. Far more is made of 'training' on the Continent and in the United States than in England. And yet we made a good start. Our early writers on education saw that the teacher has immense influence, and that to turn this influence to good account he must have made a study of his profession and have learnt 'the best that has been thought and done' in it. Every occupation in life has a traditional capital of knowledge and experience, and those who intend to follow the business, whatever it may be, are required to go through some kind of training or apprenticeship before they earn wages. To this rule there is but one exception. In English elementary schools children are paid to 'teach' children, and in the higher schools the beginner is allowed to blunder at the expense of his first pupils into whatever skill he may in the end manage to pick up. But our English practice received no encouragement from the early English writers, Mulcaster, Brinsley[1], and Hoole.

[1] John Brinsley (the elder), who married a sister of Bishop Hall's, and kept school at Ashby-de-la-Zouch (was it the *Grammar School?*), was one of the best English writers on education. In his *Consolation for our Grammar Schooles*, published early in the sixteen hundreds, he says: "Amongst others myself having first had long experience of the manifold evils which grow from the ignorance of a right order of teaching, and afterwards some gracious taste of the sweetness that is to be found in the better courses truly known and practised, I have betaken me almost wholly, for many years, unto this weighty work, and that not without much comfort, through the goodness of our blessed God" (p. 1). "And for the most part wherein any good is done, it is ordinarily effected by the endless vexation of the painful master, the extreme labour and terror of the poor children with enduring far overmuch and long severity. Now, whence proceedeth all this but because so few of those who undertake this function are acquainted with any good method or right order of instruction fit for a grammar school?" (p. 2). It is sad to think how many generations have since suffered from teachers "unacquainted with any good method or right order of instruction." And it seems to justify Goethe's dictum, "*Der Engländer ist eigentlich ohne Intelligenz*," that for several generations to come this evil will be but partially abated.

"As far as I am aware, the first suggestion of a training college for teachers came from Mulcaster. He schemed seven special colleges at the University; and of these one is for teachers. Some of his suggestions, *e.g.*, about 'University Readers' have lately been adopted, though without acknowledgment; and as the University of Cambridge has since 1879 acknowledged the existence of teachers, and appointed a 'Teachers' Training Syndicate,' we may perhaps in a few centuries more carry out his scheme, and have training colleges at Oxford and Cambridge[1]. Some of the reasons he gives us have not gone out of date with his English. They are as follows:—

"'And why should not these men (the teachers) have both this sufficiency in learning, and such room to rest in, thence to be chosen and set forth for the common service? Be either children or schools so small a portion of our multitude? or is the framing of young minds and the training of their bodies so mean a point of cunning? Be schoolmasters in this Realm such a paucity, as they are not even in good sadness to be soundly thought on? If the chancel have a minister, the belfry hath a master: and where youth is, as it is eachwhere, there must be trainers, or there will be worse. He that will not allow of this careful provision for such a seminary of masters, is most unworthy either to have had a good master himself, or hereafter to have a good one for his. Why should not teachers be well provided for, to continue their whole life in the school, as *Divines*, *Lawyers*, *Physicians* do in their several professions? Thereby judgment, cunning, and discretion will grow in them: and masters would prove old men, and such as *Xenophon* setteth over children in the schooling of *Cyrus*. Whereas now, the school being used but for a shift, afterward to pass thence to the other professions, though it send out very sufficient men to them, itself remaineth too too naked, considering the necessity of the thing. I conclude, therefore, that this trade

[1] At Cambridge (as also in London and Edinburgh) there is already a Training College for Women Teachers in Secondary Schools, and the Universities of Edinburgh and St Andrews also train and grant Diplomas. Education is also a subject for ordinary Arts Graduation in all the Universities. There are Lectureships and a course of training at Oxford and Cambridge and the University Colleges of England and Wales (1901).

requireth a particular college, for these four causes. 1. First, for the subject being the mean to make or mar the whole fry of our State. 2. Secondly, for the number, whether of them that are to learn, or of them that are to teach. 3. Thirdly, for the necessity of the profession, which may not be spared. 4. Fourthly, for the matter of their study, which is comparable to the greatest professions, for language, for judgment, for skill how to train, for variety in all points of learning, wherein the framing of the mind and the exercising of the body craveth exquisite consideration, beside the staidness of the person.'"

V.

THE RESPECTIVE FUNCTIONS IN EDUCATION OF PRIMARY, SECONDARY, AND UNIVERSITY SCHOOLS[1].

EDUCATION is a great word. It is a truism to say that it comprehends every influence that goes to the formation of a mind. No man can give an account of it. A genuine autobiography is an attempt to do so. But in this even a Goethe or a Ruskin will fail. These men, like all others, owed as much to those subtle influences that pass unnoticed as to the more self-conscious experiences which it is easy to record and estimate. We who have to do with education professionally are apt to forget this, and to exaggerate the influence of the school. We forget that the ancient Persian presented to the eye of the world a fine type of manhood, with no schooling at all, in our sense of the word; that the Greek leapt by one bound into the van of humanity, and knew little but his Homer, a few moral apophthegms, and his simple lyre; that the Roman had unfolded all his greatest qualities, and had proclaimed himself the coming master of the world in arms and laws, with little or no literary instruction. It cannot, then, be by

[1] Delivered to the Edinburgh Educational Conference of 1886.

the Latin or mathematics we teach the boy that we make him a true or capable man. It is by the life we present for his admiration and acceptance in literature and history, and, above all, by the life which we ourselves live before his eyes. Our own lives, and the very movements and gestures and exclamations that reveal our lives, are probably the most potent of all influences in the education of the young.

I may seem to you to have fallen suddenly in love with the trite and the obvious, and, to have come to this, that I would substitute for the philosophy of education a few well-worn truisms and platitudes. But the fact is that as one grows older, and has wandered far and wide over the fields of educational controversy, dwelt on the history of the education of the race, and pondered the philosophy of the schools, one finds oneself in happy company with the crystallised wisdom of the ages. Even the function of much-vaunted science in the school can only be to enable the young to see truly what is already there before us to be seen, though obscured with a veil; while the supreme task of all education is to teach the young to see the ancient facts of our moral relations to each other, and the truth of the ancient truisms—to see truly what is often concealed by the veil of unconsidered words.

Accordingly, I am not ashamed to utter truisms, and to reiterate that the formative power of the teacher is not in what he teaches, but in what he is—what he is, first, consciously or unconsciously, in himself, as a living and advancing mind, known of all men, and especially of all boys, and what he is consciously to his pupils in respect of educational aim, method, and manner.

These certainly are very general reflections, and yet of very close and particular application. For if the end of all our school-striving be not what our pupils ultimately *have*, but what they finally *are*—are, as receptive beings in harmonious relation with the simplicity, strength, and truth of nature, and as active helpful beings endowed with sympathy, given to sacrifice, loyal

to duty, courteous in bearing—I say, if this be so, what a multitude of practical lessons for the teacher are implicit in such a conception!

And let me, in this connection, be strictly practical for a moment, and ask the headmaster of an English school, "Do you believe this that I have indicated to be the true outcome of school work? Do you *really* believe? You are a Hellenic and Roman scholar, and you are probably a theologian, and know your Bible. Well, then, if you believe it, is there any reason in the nature of things why, for example, your boys should be kept away from a knowledge of other nations and their commercial and industrial relations with ourselves, and those far-reaching lessons of humanity which such knowledge suggests? Is there any reason why the insular pride, insolence and self-centred individualism of our British boys—sources these of much evil—should not be modified by a knowledge of other nations of men and their claims to our regard? Can you truly promote what you ostensibly accept as the true end, the civic life you admit to be the true life, if you do not, by means of the facts of human relations, lead the boys of wealthy parents to understand their dependence on the poor, and the true significance of the co-operation of capital and labour? Can any good reason, again, be given why you should not protect the boy's future life by giving him some knowledge of his own physical organism? Do you not call it on Sundays, when you preach, the 'Temple of the Spirit'?" I am speaking of geography, economics and hygiene, as subjects of a sound curriculum; but on these a fifth or sixth form boy would be held to waste his time! And so on I might go for pages, criticising existing practice, in the light of general principles universally admitted, and suggesting the materials to be used for the making of a true man in so far as he can be made. So potent are general truths, so keenly practical is a principle, so penetrating are truisms. It is life that truly educates us; it is the revelation to the young mind of moral and spiritual ideas

in their prosaic, but fruitful, relations to the hard facts and stern duties of common day; it is the adapting boys to their environment which, we may presume, is the main purpose of the great English public school, as of all schools. Can any one who has looked at the records of our Law Courts for the past seven or eight years believe that this instruction is not needed? Can any one believe that it is continuously given?

I shall now pass on to consider the bearing of this, by no means, I hope, inapt or inept introduction, to the special question which heads this address.

By the common consent of all nations, as well as of physiologists, the life of the body and the mind of man falls into three periods—the period up to 7, that of the infant school; the period to 14, that of the primary school; and the period from 14 to 21, that of the secondary school and the university. These, I think, may again be subdivided thus—to the age of 5, the age of 5 to 7, from 7 to 11, from 11 to 14, from 14 to 18, from 18 to 21. But I do not propose to deal here with these various subdivisions, but to confine myself to the larger divisions which we have agreed to call the primary, secondary, and university periods.

Now, let us get hold of some leading idea which shall give us at once guidance and a criterion of judgment at all these stages. That idea I believe to be contained chiefly in the word NUTRITION. In the primary stage nutrition of Feeling, inner and outer; that is to say, of the emotions within and the realities of sense without. And through these, Training; but *not without a certain amount of hard discipline.*

In the secondary stage, Nutrition is again the governing idea, now by means of the hard facts of life and the presentation of concrete ideals; and through these, *a maximum of discipline.*

In the university stage the idea is still Nutrition; but now through ideas, with *self-discipline* as the necessary condition of the living apprehension of ideas.

And here it is necessary to distinguish between training and discipline, terms often confounded. If I carry a child through the explanation of any object of knowledge, step by step, in the true logical order of that explanation, and, repeating this again and again, finally cause him to reproduce the process, I am calling into activity his intellectual powers in the order in which they alone can truly comprehend. I am thus training him. If, on the other hand, I call upon him to apply past knowledge to the explanation of some *new* thing, I discipline him. Let us take an illustration: the geologist may explain to me a section of the earth's surface by exhibiting in logical sequence the causes whose operation have made it what it is. As often as I follow him through this explanation my faculties are at work in their natural order, and I am thereby trained. But if the same geologist, knowing that he has conveyed to me through his past instructions, principles, and causal forces, takes me to a new section of country and calls on *me* to map it and explain it, he disciplines me. Again, in the moral sphere, which concerns doing under the stimulus of motives, when I lead a child by the hand and guide him to the feeling of the right motive and to action in accordance with it, I train him. When I throw him on his own resources, and, withdrawing my helping hand, call on him to do his duty, which means to sacrifice inclination to the moral "ought"—to offer up self to virtue—I discipline him. In intellectual and moral training there is the following of a stronger on whom the weaker leans; in discipline there is the self-exertion of will in the face of difficulties—this Will being the root of our distinctive humanity. Training may make a well-disposed youth, but it is discipline alone that makes him strong, virile—a will, a man. Training is the peculiar function of the primary school. Discipline, again, is the peculiar function of the secondary school.

When the primary and secondary schools have attained their end, we have a great result; but after all, our pupil is, as yet, only a man among men, a capable, upright citizen, it may

be. That is all, though much. He is fit for more than this, however. He can rise above mere world-citizenship, and become a citizen of a city not made with hands. The divine in him—his spirit-hood as distinguished from his mere manhood—claims fellowship and kindred with the Universal. He can rise to the contemplation of ideas and regard them face to face. The True is an idea—it is the motive inspiration of scientific inquiry; the Beautiful is an idea—it is the subtle perception of the harmony and ideal of the concrete world; the Good is an idea—it is the comprehension of the Divine purpose of the universal movement. When man attains to his full stature and to communion with ideas, he raises his head above the vaporous clouds of earth and breathes an "ampler ether, a diviner air." He now begins to see the cosmic order as truly a spiritual order, and returning to the ordinary life of the citizen, he descends from his Sinai—not to despise the mean things of daily life, but now rather to see the God of the mountain-top in them, and to illumine all with the light that comes from within. He no longer sees with the eye of sense. For him Nature is now bathed in "the light that never was on sea or land," the glory of setting suns with all its splendour is now to him a revelation of the universal Spirit, the infinite variety of Nature only the "garment we see Him by." The living thought which is all, and in all, now finds in the spirit of man a responsive pulse. It is to promote this larger life of mind that the university exists:—to give food, the nutrition of ideas, to supply the spiritual manna which will never fail us as each morning we rise to a new day. The discipline intellectual and moral peculiar to this stage of education is essentially, however, *self*-discipline.

Such I conceive to be the three stages of education. These be brave words, some of you may say, but what guidance do they afford? By what cunning application can they be made to bear on the business of the teacher's prosaic life? The application will be apparent enough to others.

Depend on it, principles are the most practical, the most potent, of all things. They are inexhaustible fountains of every-day detail.

To pass on to the further elucidation of my text in the order above indicated:—

I. I have said that the chief aim of the primary school is the nutrition of Feeling, inner and outer. The child is receptive and his will is weak. This receptivity is a wise provision of Nature for future growth. To all the primary sentiments which distinguish man, the child is more open than the youth. You may play what tune you please on his sensitive chords. Let us take care that it is always a melody and not a discord of jarring notes. No educational enthusiast has ever yet exaggerated the impressionability of the child, his capacity for the emotions which lie at the basis of all our moral life. Love, tenderness, sympathy, the desire of the approbation of others, veneration, nay, even the spirit of sacrifice, and even a certain dim presentiment of the harmonious play of the nobler feelings of human nature are all ready, nay, longing, to be evoked into activity. Response is eager. It almost anticipates appeals. What, after all, do our greatest heroes show to the admiring crowd but simply these primary sentiments gathered into a unity of life in them, directed to some great purpose, furnishing the motive-forces of their greatest deeds? You have in these primary feelings the source of all spiritual life. Do not distrust them. Believe in them. The child before you is not an incarnation of depravity. That is an old-world fable. He is nearer God than you are. Heaven lies about him. Christ did not say "of such is the kingdom of heaven" to furnish a text for the glosses and distortions of theologians in their bilious moments. Depend upon it, He meant it. It is by the watchful guidance and gentle admonition of the child that you lead him to the right and good. You do not *supply* motives for his daily acts, you evoke them

out of himself. They are there waiting to be turned to use. It is your privilege to touch his spirit to fine issues. Your business is to be watchful, but not meddlesome and suspicious. The loving hand pointing the right way, the upraised finger warning from the wrong path, the supporting of the weak will with your strength,—these are your methods. To preach is futile; food so offered will be rejected. It is by the presentation to the open mind of individual instances, the direction and encouragement of individual acts in the common things of life that you give the sustenance the child needs; above all by making *yourself* a particular instance, always present to him, of kindliness, of justice, of mercy, though not without the occasional anger that "sins not." In such teaching, severity and harshness are surely out of place. I often smile in schools at the solemn exaggeration by the teacher of children's offences, when I compare their young untried souls with the tarnished conscience of their reprover, the aggregation of iniquities which are incarnated in the dominating and indignant master. He, forsooth, is virtue, the child is vice. Look on this picture and on that! Does it not ever occur to him how gladly even he—magister, dominus, scholasticus—would change places with those young souls!

> "Not poppy, nor mandragora,
> Nor all the drowsy syrups of the world
> Shall ever medicine *us* to that sweet sleep
> Which we owed yesterday."

The aim of the primary school, I repeat, is nutrition of inner feeling, of the emotions and sentiments through particular instances. The soil is thereby enriched and prepared for the harvest—virtue.

But nutrition of inner feeling is not all; there must be nutrition of outer feeling. The real of nature, as well as the real of emotion, is the material of primary education. Outside the schoolroom the child lives in an ever-changing moral atmosphere of emotion chaotic and perplexing; inside

the schoolroom, the same life is to be found, but regulated, controlled, explained, enriched by the teacher. So with the real of outer sense. Outside the schoolroom the child lives his life under sense conditions. He is feeling his way to the understanding of the objects around him. Nature and the products of the hand of man working on the crude stuff of nature, press on him. He has to establish relations with all these that he may use them for life and work and enjoyment. They are in truth the raw material which he has to shape to moral and spiritual ends. This outside life is also to be the inside life of the school. The teacher has to help the child to see, and understand, and to organize the impressions which he brings into it. Thus, when he goes out of the school, he goes out not to a novel world, but to a world with which he has been always familiar and which is now to some extent explained and illumined by the teacher's better knowledge. He carries with him an increase of the power of seeing and knowing and correlating.

Such is the function of the primary school as the nurse of feeling and the home of training; but not, as I have said, wholly without discipline. The voice of authority must always be heard. The child must learn that he lives and must live under Law and that the characteristic of true life is always effort. The merely intellectual discipline is sufficiently ensured by the acquisition of the subsidiary attainments of reading, writing, drawing, arithmetic, &c. according to right methods.

II. At the age of approaching puberty (about 14) we pass into a new sphere. At this age the boy tends to become boisterous, and the girl frivolous. Our work now is mainly governed by the purpose of discipline. Law now meets and controls the turbulence of the phase through which the human spirit is passing. Nutrition, it is true, is never to be absent—nutrition which is possible through the real of inner feeling alone, and the real of outer nature, as in the primary stage; but if the foundations of this nutrition have not been laid in

the primary period, I doubt our success now. Opportunity is offered once to all. It may never be offered a second time. The teacher, at least, must assume this. The chief lesson to be taught now is the lesson of law and duty and of personal effort.

Nature seems at this age to yearn for activity. The boy is no longer so ready to receive impressions as to make them. His will, or what he mistakes for his will, comes to the front, and in bodily and mental matters alike, he loves to *do*. He cannot bear being talked *to* or talked *at*. He has opinions now. He judges with imbecile self-complacency things and men. He wants to show what *he* is, and what he can *do*. How are we to meet this? Really a difficult question. For we have, above all things, to let him grow, and growth is not possible with repression—nay, repression at this stage enslaves and converts the less bold into skulks and sneaks, the more bold into evasive dodgers paltering with the truth; and both into contemners of the pure and good. Here the boy himself points the way to the teacher. Work is what he needs, and wants. Let him have it. Let him be brought to face difficulties in learning; and though some of the subjects he studies want the attraction of the "real," let him learn to master them by sheer force. It is labour that forms ingenuous minds. Formal studies—languages and mathematics—with the rudiments of which he has been conversant in the latter portion of his primary stage, must now occupy more than one-half of his time. His specific moral life, again, can now no longer be stimulated or fostered by sentiment, as when he was a child, but only indirectly, and by intercourse with moral ideals in conduct. This is the age which can appreciate heroism, and understand the sterner and heroic virtues. So with ideals in the things of intellect and literary imagination. Art in literature will unconsciously impress him and mould him. We must not always improve upon the lessons; we must let him draw his own inferences. I believe much in literature at this stage

as the chief real or nutritive element, and in its silent influence on character, much more than I believe in the real of nature as presented in elementary science. This last too, however, must have its due and daily place. The order observable in the external world may even possibly help to bring order into the internal chaos, which at present constitutes the boy, spite of all his pretentiousness and conceit.

But not only is his rampant will to be brought in contact with the hardships of intellectual work that it may encounter and overpower; his body also must be allowed its full activity. In gymnastic, and, above all, in organized games he should find an outlet, and also a discipline—the discipline of difficulties overcome, and of self-imposed law obeyed.

Thus between 14 and 18 we gradually subject the boy to Law, and give him the priceless possession of concrete ideals in conduct—great personalities; and also of art in literature. He is thus tamed, if not subjugated; and when he approaches the gates of the university, his brave show of self-importance, were he dissected thoroughly, would be found to be hollow at the heart, and to mean little more than the walking-canes, neckties, and general masherdom and bravado, by means of which he harmlessly works it off to the admiration of that other half of humanity, which, formerly despised with all a boy's contempt, he now desires above all to attract. Desires to attract, I say; for it is not the fairer half of creation he is yet thinking of, but of himself alone as an irresistible object of admiration to that fairer half. An excellent arrangement of nature, for thus he forms an ideal of what he ought to be by seeing himself through the rapt eyes of imaginary admirers. Nor does even the grave and serious youth escape the crisis of self-importance in its inner and more dangerous form.

III. He is within the Academic gates, and we have now to ask what is the function of the university in regard of him. I may be wrong, but I do not believe that the university forms character. Character in all its essential features is already

formed in the young matriculant. The home and the school have done this. The university may supplement their work; it cannot do it.

The function of the university has, in truth, more close relation to that of the primary school than to that of the secondary school; for the mind at this stage demands realities, not forms alone: it seeks a rationalizing of knowledge in its principles. Speaking generally, the secondary school is concerned chiefly with the instruments of knowledge, the university with knowledge itself as science and philosophy. Its aim, accordingly, is chiefly *Nutrition*; but no longer nutrition of mere feeling as in the primary school, but of Ideas. Training and discipline are, it is true, involved in the true grasp of ideas, but they are not the specific university aim. The nutrition of ideas—this is the great academic function, it seems to me. Nor are discipline and training to be given by the university, but by the student to himself. The youth has now escaped from the bondage of law, and must work from his own centre. The university does its work when it unfolds the domain of knowledge to the opening adolescent mind, and invites it to enter in and take possession, and when it provides the material apparatus of self-instruction. The Professor is only a guide and an example. The essence of university life is freedom for the student and freedom for the Professor. It is simply because the university has become a certifying and graduating body that even the calling of class rolls is justifiable. Even as a graduating body I doubt, after all, if it is justified in calling them. The Professor offers to show the student the way to knowledge, and to teach him how to use the instruments of knowledge whether they be books or microscopes; and there his function ends. If any parent fears to send his son to the unfettered life of an university, let him keep him at home and call in a trained nurse or a paternal tutor.

Self-discipline, *self*-training, through the free pursuit of ideas which attract by their eternal and inherent charm all ingenuous

spirits—this is the purpose of an university. There can be no self-discipline without freedom. This is of the essence of mind; God has ordered it so. True, freedom may lead to the tasting of the tree that is forbidden, and in expulsion for a time from Paradise. Be it so. Such is the universal condition of adolescent and adult life. By bringing to bear the schoolmaster—the Law—on the university student, we make the unworthy less worthy, and the worthy we irritate and repress in their onward striving.

What follows from this general view? Certain very practical results. Boys in years, and boys in mind, though they be physically grown up, have no business within academic walls. Their place is the secondary school, where they may receive the intellectual and moral discipline which may fit them to breathe the pure air of freedom and the rare ether of ideas. If the secondary school fail, well then freedom of study also, not compulsory curricula, is alone in place in the university.

And what are ideas? I shall not venture on a definition where Plato failed and Aristotle did not succeed. And yet I know what I mean. For is not "The True" an idea? And is not the pursuit of science and philosophy the pursuit of the True? At these academic gates the student is to cast aside the idols of the den and of the market-place and, unencumbered, to question and to investigate in loyal obedience to the divine summons, to *know*. In philology, in philosophy, in the study of Nature in its many forms, in Art, he is called upon to look face to face at the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. Even when the student himself is unconscious of the divine presence, nay may deny it in his ardent pursuit of material science, it is yet with him, for his aim is the True. Step by step he is putting himself in harmony with the scheme of the universe, and preparing for the final vision. The truth of this and of that he seeks for, but these separate truths are but the fragments of the whole, and lead him to the whole. The conception of the unity of the whole, as seen in the wisdom and working of the

eternal Reason teaching him by the things which He has made, awaits him. The student-spirit is thus brought into relation with the universal Spirit, which effects in him the fruits of the Spirit—above all, harmony of soul and all the virtues. From having been a reasoning being he now becomes a being of Reason.

It is philosophy, and history treated in a philosophical spirit, that holds the key of the temple of Reason. But if philosophy should fail him, literature will be found to be an universal solvent; for it is the creative thought of man on man cast in beautiful forms. It is a striving after the inner truth of life and a direct and informal penetration into the heart of things; it lives *in* the idea and *by* the ideal. Harmony of thought and life—a tie between all special knowledges may be found even here.

It is scarcely necessary to say that when I speak of science and philosophy, I speak of 'arts' in the mediæval sense—the whole circle of rationalized knowledge. The merely professional studies which fit to be physician, theologian, lawyer, teacher, are only dependences on the university properly conceived, mere accidents of the substance. The university itself was founded in arts and still truly lives only by arts. An aggregate of professional colleges can never constitute an university. The idea is not there; it cannot live as purely professional. In professional schools, at least if they are part of an university organization, no man is a fit Professor who is not alive to the university idea, who does not suggest to his students the intimate relations of all knowledge, the large philosophy which permeates and gives significance to every subject. If the student does not attain to this, he has fallen short of the academic aim.

But how can the student breathe the purely scientific atmosphere of the university if he does not come prepared? If he spends the years of his 'arts' course in acquiring the mere instruments, linguistic and mathematical, he can never enter the temple of science at all. At best he can take but a

cursory glance. I am well aware that the world gets along by compromise, and there can be no objection to a year or so being devoted to the mere instruments within the walls of a university; but let it be understood that even when we accept this, we must yet demand a much higher qualification in the matriculant than we do now. After a year spent among the instruments, the student at the age of about 19 should be in a position to throw himself into real studies—philology, philosophy, history, literature, economics, art, physical science. To take the encyclopædic round would be impossible now-a-days, but by the thorough investigation of a department he gains admission to "the idea" and thereby becomes a scientific thinker. Discipline in one department, if his teacher be alive to the correlation of all departments, is, if properly understood and properly pursued, discipline in all. He thereby attains to that reverence for all knowledge, that patient waiting for truth, and that philosophical comprehension which is the consummation of all true education of the intelligence. This indeed is what intellectual culture means, and that the outcome of the whole is ethical in the true sense it would not be difficult, in fitting place and at fitting time, to show.

It is by the exercise of this its distinctive function, as above indicated, that the university liberalizes the professions and raises them above the level of skilled trades. The graduate it sends out to the various professions, if worthy, can never forget, even in the pressure of practical life, that he has once for all enrolled himself a *civis* of the city of Reason, of which he is a freeman.

VI.

THE GENERAL FUNCTION OF THE PRIMARY SCHOOL[1].

THE debate in the House of Lords[2] on the Education Code which ended in a majority of forty-eight, virtually condemning the action of the Education Department since 1870 in so far as it had encouraged anything beyond the most elementary instruction, was an event interesting in itself, and significant in the history of education in England. Had the promoters of what was virtually a vote of censure belonged to the Tory party only, the result might have been accepted as little more than a survival of a spirit supposed to have been extinct. It was not so, however. The Bishop of Exeter and Lord Sherbrooke ably represented the other side, and were in themselves evidence that there is a considerable feeling of discontent with the action of the Department, and a still wider suspicion of its tendencies, if not of its aims. It is worth while to inquire whether there are any grounds for this dissatisfaction.

It would be absurd in our country to suppose that any abstract educational theories have had anything to do, in the

[1] *Fraser's Magazine*, Art. entitled, "The House of Lords and Popular Education," 1880.

[2] Debate of the 18th of June in which the following motion by Lord Norton was carried: "That a humble address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that Her Majesty would be graciously pleased to direct that the Fourth Schedule be omitted from the New Code of Regulations issued by the Committee of Privy Council on Education."

first instance at least, with the wide-spread doubts and dissatisfaction that ultimately found confused expression in the House of Lords. The money question is the real starting point of the malcontents. It is the large vote that stirs into activity the educational intelligence of the English people, and leads them to ask the question, What are we paying for, and whither are we tending? Three millions per annum is a large sum, and might build more than one ironclad. The uneasiness with which many see this expenditure, which, after all, is only a portion of the total that the country pays for educating its poorer citizens, leads them to fasten blindly on a certain class of payments that seem to be superfluous. In addition to money grants calculated on the average attendance at a school, and the grants for passes in the "three R's," the Department pays for a class of subjects denominated "specific," which in the opinion of the House of Lords are not necessary to the child of the working man—nay, more, in their general effect and social tendency, are positively hurtful. These subjects certainly strike one, at the first blush, as out of place in a primary school: they are to be found in the Fourth Schedule attached to the main body of the Code, and include mathematics, English literature, Latin (in Scotland, Greek and Physics), French, German, mechanics, physiology, physical geography, botany, and domestic economy! It may be possible to urge a good educational argument against giving instruction in such subjects in a primary school, but it must be conceded that the purely financial objection breaks down; for the total sum spent on such subjects (excluding domestic economy for girls, to which we presume no objection will be taken), is comparatively a mere trifle.

As part of an argument, however, against the alleged tendencies of the Department gradually and insensibly to draw into itself the whole work of secondary education, the financial objection may have weight. Is there any such

tendency? Is it credible that in men depressed by routine the love of power should still survive? Is it conceivable that fervour in a "cause" should stir the official mind? It is only on the assumption that such things are possible that we can imagine any ground for imputing to the Department a disposition to transgress its limits; for whatever may be said of other departments of the State, it is in the minds of the permanent officials that we must seek for the motives and aims that determine successive Education Codes; and this, because the subject is one of such infinite detail that the master of the details must, as pilot, navigate the vessel, whoever may be nominally its captain. For our own part, we do not for a moment think the Department open to any such imputation. That the love of power can exist in the official mind, and in certain cases can even flourish under folds of red tape, we might be induced to believe; but we do not think that any case has been made out of a deliberate disposition on the part of the English Education Office to exceed its powers. And, indeed, why should they? They have enough to do. A large and intricate machine is worked with surprising efficiency, and we are satisfied that to work it demands all the energy and ability in the service of the Minister of Education. Since the days of Sir J. P. Kay-Shuttleworth the Department has been gradually absorbing the whole primary education of the country, and it is scarcely any exaggeration to say that it is now (alas!) cognizant of what is going on in every primary school in the country at every successive minute of the school day. By some this may be regarded as a proud position. To have conquered so great an intellectual empire by means of money, aided by the jealousies and mutual distrusts of Churches, is no small triumph. But it is only in a limited and conventional sense, a success; for, with the advantages, come all the evils of over-centralization, and these are more to be deprecated in the educational than in other spheres of State administration.

The life of education is the freedom of the teacher and the school, within certain general restrictions; and where this does not exist, the intellectual and moral evils of centralization far more than counterbalance the gain. Every teacher in the country takes his orders from the Code, studies the Code, and devotes his energies to satisfy or to circumvent it. The power that resides in the Permanent Secretary's pen is probably greater than that wielded by any other official in the empire. Still this centralization has been an unpurposed, though an inevitable, growth; and there seems no way out of it except by delegating some of the powers to the county governing bodies which we are now promised. County autonomy, controlled by a central official Council consisting partly of experts, is not inconsistent with the State's obtaining all the best ends of a national system—nay, it is probably the only way of best attaining those ends[1].

We say that the power already exercised by the Department, and the many burdens that it has even now to bear, must subject it to a great strain; and this, among other things, forbids our suspecting it of designs on the secondary education of the country. Were there any indications of such a design, the proposed inroad into this new domain would certainly have to be resisted. For, while admitting that secondary instruction is a subject clamantly calling for State organization, the work would have to be set about under very different auspices from that of the present Department, and would have to be controlled by a larger and more liberal spirit through a Council constituted by Parliament. We believe the fact simply to be, that impatient professors of all the "ologies" have been struck with admiration of the mighty instrument which the Queen in Council had put into their hands, and have pressed their various pet educational crotchets on the patient and perplexed Permanent Secretary. The result

[1] This is what Government is now contemplating (1901).

has been, that round the dry and meagre Code introduced by Mr Lowe in 1861, there has grown, by inevitable accretion, the list of "specific subjects" which now call forth so much adverse comment. We cannot believe the Department to be insensible to the humour of the situation, and we half suspect that they have with a certain wilful glee given the "modern spirit" full rein just to see what the issue would be.

We not only acquit the Department of any such ambition as that attributed to them, but we believe that they are only acting on the line of the true Liberal tradition in education, viz. that it is the duty of the State in its own interest to see that all its citizens have at least an opportunity afforded them of being educated, not only up to the level of their existing position in the social scale, but up to the level of their possible position. Nor are we inconsistent in supporting, at the same time, both the House of Lords and "the Department": the apparent inconsistency is reconciled by a proper understanding of the aims and the social restrictions of popular education. We believe that the more education a man has, if the substance and method of that education be first wisely settled, the better citizen he will be—nay, the better will he do even the humblest work assigned to him. If any discontent arises, it will be due not to the fact of the man's education, but to the fact that he is educated beyond the level of his neighbours, and that, while raised by his ability and acquirements out of sympathy with the life of his fellow-labourers, he is nevertheless debarred from finding occupation more suited to an intellectual life, which he yet sees to be easily within the reach of men socially more fortunate than himself, while in respect of education they are his inferiors.

The question put before the country by the House of Lords is not at all whether the Department is trenching on the sphere of secondary education and spending money illegitimately. The Lords do not understand their own difficulty. The term "secondary" education is loosely and inaccurately

used. The real point is—and some of the speakers seemed to be vaguely conscious of it—Up to what age is imperial revenue to be burdened with the cost of education for the operative classes: and having determined this, how shall the time at the disposal of the child be used? Are we at present using the time profitably and getting our money's worth? As a matter of fact, the school education of the masses of the population ends in the twelfth year; nor is it likely, while social necessities are what they are, that it will ever be otherwise. But surely it is the function of the State, always presuming that it has any educational function at all, to encourage the continuance of school life as long as the pressing physical needs of the poorer classes permit. The House of Lords (we refer to the reactionary members) may rest assured that in the present, or indeed any, constitution of society, the prolongation beyond the twelfth year will not be great. The age of fifteen is not likely in any one case to be exceeded. The longer the period of school life, the more fruitful is the result of the earlier years of training, and the more certainly will the level of intelligence of the operative classes be raised—not only of those individuals who benefit by the prolonged instruction, but (and this is the important point) of the whole social class to which they belong. Is it necessary at this time of day to argue that this is a matter of State concern? Nations are now industrial communities competing with each other, and the weapon with which they now compete, and must for the future compete, is intelligence. It is no longer an open question whether we are to rely on the intelligence, as well as on the moral and religious upbringing of the skilled mechanic: we *must* do so. Technical training in the various manufacturing industries can reach only the few; and, moreover, we believe that infinitely more important than any amount of technical training is the general intelligence of the workman as that has been developed in the public school. Given a well-exercised, open mind, and

the requisite technical knowledge and aptitude will be very easily acquired under the guidance of trained masters of industry sent out by Technical Colleges when we have them.

A leading aim of the primary school, then, is the cultivation of the human intelligence, and we sincerely believe that this is not attainable under the restrictions which Mr Lowe devised in the Revised Code of 1861, or those which Lord Sherbrooke would now reimpose. The meagre requirements of Mr Lowe would probably cost as much to the State as a more liberal demand, and would bring back to society little or no return. It might with truth be maintained that the bare technical arts of reading, writing, and arithmetic are of less moment to the individual and the community than the assiduous cultivation of the intelligence, even to the comparative neglect of these arts. It is fortunately true that a certain amount of discipline is indirectly given in the course of learning to read and write, especially if good methods are employed; but would not more of these accomplishments themselves be acquired were the daily instruction made subordinate to the training of the spiritual instrument by which they are acquired? Lord Sherbrooke attempts to strengthen his position by giving us his experience of boys who had passed the sixth standard, and who could not act as his private readers in such a way as to make listening on his part an occupation either pleasing or profitable. So then we are to understand, by Lord Sherbrooke's own confession, that his policy has been a failure. We should have expected nothing else. Mr Lowe instructs boys in the deciphering of printed characters, and then complains that, when all is done, they cannot read to him satisfactorily blue-books or the *Fortnightly*. Why should they? Reading aloud in any sense other than the mere naming of vocables is an act of intelligence, and an act requiring an ever higher intelligence as the subject-matter of what is read grows in subtlety and complexity. Even with the help of more disciplined and better-informed minds, very few of the middle and

upper classes can read in a way that satisfies at once the understanding and the ear of a cultivated listener. Probably, no accomplishment is more conclusive evidence that a boy has been well-educated than the power of reading well. We are quite ready to agree with Lord Sherbrooke: good reading is more important than a knowledge of the elements of Latin or of electricity and magnetism; and until the former is done, the latter may be left out of the curriculum of the people's schools. But how is reading, such as Lord Sherbrooke desiderates, to be obtained? Only by familiarizing the mind with the subject-matter of books, and giving it command over the words of literature, and the ideas which those words denote. The House of Lords would not, we believe, object to this being done; but they are probably not aware that in accepting this as the standard of education, they aim very much higher than the promoters of a smattering of the specific or so-called "secondary" subjects do. Such a result is not to be attained except by a curriculum of instruction, carefully adapted to the age of the pupils, *in the realities of sense and of thought.* The Education Code should aim at this, and not at the beggarly knowledge of the vocables of a reading-book which has been carefully restricted in its scope to secure for the pupil a Government "pass" and Government pence.

If we ask next on what materials the intelligence of the young is to be led to exercise itself, we answer again, on the realities of sense and of thought. By the former we mean nature and man's relation to it, without any pretence to science and its (to children) barren terms and empty formulated expressions; by the latter we mean the ideas and language of moral and religious truth, and of imaginative literature. It is only in this way that we bring the young mind in direct contact with the substance of the mental life of all who have emerged above barbarism, and thereby prepare them for the future teachings of the lecture-room, the village library, and the church. By such instruction alone we awaken the intelli-

gence and engage the moral affections of the young, and so best fit them for their future lives. Reading must accompany, or, at least, closely follow, the movements of the active opening mind; and then, at whatever stage we have to part with the child, society will be the better for what we have done, and the child himself will have received a start in a truly rational life, and have such consolations in the toils and vicissitudes of his humble career as an awakened spirit can give. To imagine that a boy so educated will be a worse ploughman or a worse man than if he had been left in the condition of dumb driven cattle, is to suppose a contradiction in thought and to despair of the future of humanity. To imagine, on the other hand, that we attain the human and humane ends of popular education by sprinkling the misunderstood terms of all the sciences through our schoolrooms is the very folly and perversity of educational fanaticism. All that such misapprehension of the relations of science to the work of the people's school can effect is the pretence of knowledge—a pretence as hurtful to the teacher as to the pupil, and certain to bring discredit on the very name of education.

The training of the intelligence by presenting it with the food suited to its period of growth and which it can readily assimilate, is, however, after all, only a means to a higher end—the moral and religious education of the pupil. This, surely, is the supreme consideration in the case of each individual, and therefore also in the people's school. The moral element in the mechanic will accomplish more for industry than the technique of his trade. We say moral *and* religious, for though we are far from denying that a certain moral education can be given without religion, we are satisfied that, deprived of the inspiration of religion and of the motives and aspirations of the spiritual life, the morality will be meagre, attenuated, and lifeless. The result, apart from all theological and ecclesiastical considerations, will not be satisfactory so far as the mere humanity of the child is concerned. It is melan-

choly to think that our religious strifes are to shut out the child of the poor man (who is profoundly indifferent to them) from all that most deeply touches the heart and awakens the sentiment of mankind. Is it reasonable that the children of operatives should be debarred from all that most surely furnishes consolation and hope in the chances and changes of this mortal life, because a few of the dogmas that have been erected on the broad human basis of our common Christianity are distasteful to the illuminated and fanatical few? The poor man and the struggling woman among the poor cannot be expected to find a substitute for religion in that self-complacent sense of superiority which suffices to sustain the heart of the intellectual Agnostic, although as a matter of fact many, alas, are trying to do so. The moral and religious influence which should pervade the life of the school, and which is quite compatible with the relegation of dogmatic teaching to a fixed hour, is, we regretfully admit, beyond the power of the State to produce at command. Moral teaching it can, however, in any case require; and for the rest it must rely on the general purport of its instructions to teachers and inspectors, but above all on the *training which it gives to the teachers whom it rears for the public service*, and to the inspectors whom it appoints to supervise them. It may be possible to inspire both these agents.

We have indicated the true work of the people's school. It does not change its character at any stage of the school curriculum. Whether the child leaves at the age of ten, twelve, or fourteen, the instruction he receives is still substantially the same as at the age of six. We believe that, so far, we carry with us Lord Norton, the Bishop of Exeter, and the majority of those who voted with them; and we are quite certain that we have the assent of the few who have given time and study to the science and art of education. "Educational enthusiasts," where they have any knowledge of the

repressive conditions under which the common school is worked, desire no more than has been here sketched, and they will be content with no less. For *such* results our millions would indeed be well expended.

But it is evident that to attain such results the Code of the Department must begin and end differently. It ought to lay down the material of instruction, and the course of intellectual discipline, through which the child is to be carried from year to year. Infants—that is to say, all under seven years of age—have to be trained to the use of their observing powers, in ways which we need not here specify in detail, but which are quite well understood. In the course of this training, their minds would be brought into healthful contact with sensible objects, and a broad foundation laid for subsequent *real* studies. Satisfaction should also be given to the cravings of imagination and sentiment by means of child-literature and with the help of music. The moral and religious impressions made on the heart at this early stage would never in future years be obliterated—*would* never, because they *could* never. Musical drill should be universal. The rudiments of reading, writing, and ciphering would not, of course, be omitted, but they would, we maintain, be more successfully taught if kept in subordination to the higher ends of intellectual and moral training. The successive years of school life simply repeat and expand and confirm the teachings of the infant school in ascending forms. The gradual additions to real knowledge made from year to year would, by the time the child had reached the sixth standard and the age of thirteen, have brought him into intelligent relations with Nature. Science in any form would be eschewed, but the more practical results of science would be intelligently apprehended. The Nature-knowledge to which we point would find its final expression in the primary school (at the age of thirteen or fourteen) in such admirable statements of what is now covered by the term "physical geography," as that of Professor Geikie, in his little

shilling book on the subject; while the laws of healthy living and the rudiments of an understanding of social and economic conditions would also find their place. Moral training, conducted in a religious spirit and with a religious aim more or less explicit, arises daily, nay hourly, in connection with such teaching: it also finds its opportunity in every act of school-life, when the master is competent for his important and delicate task. All this is quite practicable. Were it not practicable, popular education would be doomed to failure. With such a curriculum "specific" subjects, which bear the illusory appearance of being "secondary" subjects, would disappear, and the minds of the Lords would be tranquillized. There are indeed no *specific* subjects in education. Whatever it is impossible to work into the ordinary life of a primary or secondary school belongs to some other kind of institution. Specific subjects are for specific schools. Can anyone doubt that a scheme of education such as that sketched above would result in a far more wide-spread intelligence, a far deeper interest in scientific truth and literary expression, and a far finer moral spirit, than labouring against the grain in the dry teaching of words and technical details based on text-books constructed so as to teach the minimum which will earn a Government grant? And how much more acceptable to the true teacher would a code conceived in so liberal a spirit be!

If it be said that there is not time for all this, the answer is that it can all be accomplished simply by using properly selected reading books, and by the oral teaching of the master in extension of the suggestions of these books, if he is supplied with proper apparatus, and, above all, is himself properly trained.

Consider for a moment how the time is now spent that is not devoted to such studies and training. In "getting up" history so called, and grammar and geography, in the teaching of which every demand made by the Department is right in the teeth of all sound educational principle. Go into a school

where the children are learning history, and you will find a huge black-board covered with the names of kings and battle-fields, and an accumulation of dates that would provoke the laughter of every cultivated mind not depraved by working the system. As to grammar, we have more than once met little ragged boys on the road not more than ten years of age with Morell's "Analysis" in their hands, and little girls of seven with their slates covered with lists of nouns! As well might we ask them for lists of the fixed stars. This cannot be in accordance with sound educational principles and method, for it shocks our common sense. It was not from "educational theorists" that Government got such ideas of school work, but from "practical" men! Even where the Department does by some lucky chance open a passage for the entrance of an educational principle, it converts it into an absurdity the moment it tries to manipulate it. For example, it is a recognized part of educational method that the learning of geography should start with a child's immediate parochial and county surroundings. This the Department seizes on, and immediately perverts it by requiring the children to waste their valuable time in getting up the names of every insignificant locality in the county,—localities which were unknown to the inspectors themselves, although they had traversed the county again and again in the discharge of their duties, until they specially got them up for the sole purpose of torturing children and turning the study of geography into ridicule. We speak what we do know.

This is the way the precious hours of childhood are passed, and this is what we are paying for. And all to please whom? We should like to know. Not certainly the school Boards, who care only for the Government gold, and watch, lynx-eyed, the teacher, lest he should cheat them out of a three-shilling pass. Not the schoolmaster, who, if he be an under-educated drudge, may be content, for he can conceive nothing higher than the mechanical ideal of the Department, but who, if he

be a true teacher, with a living soul in him, is crushed with the dead weight of official demands; or, if he smiles at all, smiles the smile of educational despair as he sees the inspector take up his pack and go. Not the children, who not many years ago were beginning to love school, but who now regard it as a task-shop and a thing to be avoided—one of the pains instead of one of the pleasures of their little lives—with what effect on their disposition to learn and obey may be conceived. Not the inspector: he cannot love his life of itinerating schedule-mongering, for he is an educated man. Not the Department: it only wants to get its honest pennyworth, and does not see how else to do it.

We are very far from being blind to the fact that, spite of all this wasted energy, the mere collecting of children together and subjecting them to organization, obedience, and discipline, is a distinct gain to the community, and worth a good deal in the shape of taxation; and we gladly recognize in the Code-improvements which introduce examination by classes and grants for discipline and intelligence, a distinct evidence of right intention. We still more gladly welcome the action of the present Chief-Inspector of Training Colleges in the direction of liberalizing the education of teachers. We are not blind to the groping good intentions of the Department. But the Code is vitiated throughout: it is rotten at the heart. The supposed necessity of maintaining the leading characteristic of the Revised Code of 1862 makes of the Code of 1880 a piece of patchwork. Two shillings a head for intelligence, and 1*s.* 6*d.* for organization and discipline! As if any school should be regarded as a school at all where the conditions of organization and discipline are not fulfilled. "Discipline" includes morality: 6*d.* a head for every boy who has told not more than two lies per annum is the necessary sequel.

So much for the school up to thirteen years of age. Children instructed on the lines which have been (necessarily in this place) very generally indicated, would go forth to sow

and to reap and to mine and to weave, ignorant of electricity and magnetism, it is true, but with open eyes. They would be ignorant of the precise date of the death of Henry VI.'s grandmother, but they would have in their souls some bright visions of British patriotism and valour, and some inspiring recollections of duty sublimely done. They would be ignorant of botany, but we hope that they would know something of the wayside flowers and trees: they would be ignorant of physiology, but we hope that they would know a good deal about the conditions of physical health: they would be ignorant of mathematics, but we hope that they would know something of weighing and measuring: they would be ignorant of Latin, French, and German, but they would, we hope, be able to read with pleasure, because with intelligence, the simpler prose and poetical literature of their own country, and to sing its songs and dance its dances. Their whole intellectual and spiritual life would have been started into activity, and the State's duty to the "masses" would have been discharged. Note also that if the elementary knowledge acquired at school has a direct bearing on the ordinary and daily life of the people, we thereby secure a continuity between the education of school and the education of life; and it is only in so far as this continuity is established that the boy becomes a wiser, a more intelligent, and more virtuous citizen than he would have been without the school. The material of school work must be of the same stuff as human life is made of.

While the "Lords" then were substantially right in their assault on the Code in its present patchwork form, they were wrong in failing to see that it erred by defect much more than by excess, and, above all, that it erred by misreading popular education in respect both of substance and method. Neither Lord Norton nor the Bishop of Exeter, while complaining of the encouragement by the Department of what are called "secondary" subjects, indicated why those particular subjects

were to be reserved for a higher class of schools than the primary. What is suitable in education for the sons of ploughmen is, speaking generally, equally suitable for the sons of noblemen of the same age. Except in so far as foreign languages and mathematics are studied with a view to a profession, they are, as instruments of education, equally good or bad for all. The question is a social one. If boys can continue their education from thirteen to seventeen or eighteen, the subjects we have named are held, rightly or wrongly, to be the best discipline for them, and an indispensable preparation for the studies of a university and for the higher walks of the Public Service. But neither on grounds of discipline nor of utility can the introduction of such subjects be justified, if circumstances prevent their being prosecuted beyond the initial stages; and as, probably, ninety-five per cent. of the pupils of primary schools must cease to attend school at thirteen at latest, it may be fairly argued that their attention should be confined to subjects having a more direct relation to their future lives.

But what of the five per cent. of superior organization? Brains are not confined to a class. It is of far more importance to the well-being of the State and to the position it is to hold relatively to other communities, that the finer spirits should be educated out of the sphere in which they have been born, than it is to the individuals themselves. The country cannot afford to waste brain-power on hedging and ditching. And there is another and a potent consideration. Social equality is a dream, and communism is an injustice, if not a crime; but it is not only within the power of the State, but incumbent on it, to make a passage from one class to another and a higher, at least possible. Scotland is liberal in politics, but we cannot imagine it becoming socialistic, and this simply because the finer and more ambitious spirits have a career opened to them. The path they have to traverse may be rough, and it is right it should be so; but it is at least practicable. The potential mental energy of the country is not dammed up. Outlets are provided, and

no boy can say that he has been unjustly used. Were the stronger spirits among the poorer classes north of the Tweed repressed—crushed down by an educational organization separating the lower from the upper in perpetuity, the nation would ere long hear of it to its cost. It would have to pay a much higher price than the trifling addition to taxation which education continued in the primary school beyond the age of thirteen demands. On grounds, then, quite apart from that of Christian humanity, provision ought to be made for the construction of the "ladder." In primary schools, accordingly, the Department is supremely right in encouraging more advanced teaching. Whether this encouragement should take the wholesome form of special grants to teachers to meet an equal grant from the local board, or the trading form of capitation payments in accordance with the genius of a nation of shopkeepers, is not wholly a matter of detail. The curriculum of study would be probably best determined by the local authorities, and should in any case be a *curriculum*, and continue till a boy is fifteen. By that time the special line of activity for which he is fitted would have declared itself, and if he still gave high promise, an exhibition should carry him to a "real" or "classical" high school. Few might get so far; but none could say that the machinery of society was so contrived as to block the way to any of Her Majesty's subjects and deny them free scope for their powers. What is of much more importance, ten would receive the benefit of the more advanced instruction for one who rose out of his social class: these would carry into their daily work a higher intelligence, and so leaven the lower stratum of society.

The establishment of certain exhibitions at county schools, open to country boys, may be of service to the sons of clergymen and medical practitioners, and the larger farmers; but it can never solve the question of the secondary instruction of the poor. The son of the poor man would soon find these advantages taken out of his hands by the lower middle-class,

whose domestic habits and means enable them to prepare their children for competition, while the peasant's son is labouring under domestic difficulties. Moreover, it is quite open to question whether such a system of connecting country with county schools would be salutary in its effects. It is certainly desirable to open a path for very promising boys and girls; but even were this path opened and strictly reserved for the peasant poor, only one boy probably in every three or four years would tread it, and the district from which he came would be only indirectly and slightly benefited. The true course, we repeat, is to provide for the intellectual and moral life of the people's schools up to the age of fifteen. By such provision the whole parish will be benefited, and a fair proportion of thoroughly intelligent citizens added to the agricultural and artisan class, not removed out of it. In the course of such advanced primary instruction the boy born for what is conventionally considered to be a higher line of life (in any case a life where mental power is more needed) would mark himself out from his fellows in ways that would be unmistakable. The main purpose of these advanced classes, however, would not be the discovery of such boys or girls, but the promotion of the intelligence of the parish itself, and the raising of the body of the people out of their cloddish indifference to all save physical requirements, thereby making them fitter occupants of the church pew and the village reading-room.

In small towns and populous places the higher classes of the primary school, to which we have referred, would naturally separate themselves from the primary school and specialize themselves into Higher-grade schools which carried the instruction of boys and girls still further; and this simply because in such localities a larger number of parents can afford to maintain their children after the age of fourteen or fifteen without the aid of their labour. It is surely not necessary in these days to argue for the increase and organization of schools of this class. The various occupations of life require the

services of men and women who have, as boys and girls, gone through a much more prolonged education than can be obtained even at the best primary schools; and, apart from this, the tone of provincial, and consequently of national, life must always be low, and its aims narrow and contemptible, where such schools do not exist. Permissive power should be given to England, in terms similar to those of the Scottish Education Act of 1878, to institute such schools. This for a time might suffice until a Minister of Public Instruction or (better) an Educational Council could take the matter in hand. In all localities so provided, the primary school should not carry its instruction beyond the age of thirteen, and this, if for no other reasons, because it would be a waste of power to do so. It will scarcely be maintained that the encouragement (not the enforcement) of advanced primary instruction in country districts could affect the institution of high schools situated in fit localities. In any case it would scarcely be just to sacrifice the children of the county to those of the county-town. The object is always to get as much educational work done as can be accomplished with the means at our disposal, and without waste of power.

We often hear it said that the middle classes should pay for their own education, and that they are in many cases now taking advantage of Board, and other primary, schools conducted under the Government fee-maximum of ninepence per week. But we are not aware that the middle classes themselves complain of this. On the contrary, they say, Why are we to pay for the education of the operative classes, and *also* for our own schools? May we not share in the educational machinery which our own self-imposed rates and imperial taxation provide? Is a child to be excluded from a country school because his father farms 100 acres? If not, then 200? Or, at what point are we to draw the line? Is it not enough to rest satisfied with the natural operation of social causes, feeling well assured that as soon as a man has money enough

he will seek on social grounds to separate his children from the mass? What is applicable to the country is equally applicable to the town. It is only men that are raised far above the struggle for a livelihood and who have exaggerated notions of the wealth of the middle class, who venture to complain of the small fee paid by those who, they imagine, are quite competent to provide instruction for themselves without the aid of rates. Those families of the middle class, that send their children to Board schools, do so only because they cannot help it; and those who talk of the unfair advantage the middle class seem to be taking are really ignorant of their circumstances, and of the bitter secret struggle of the men and women who bear themselves bravely in the face of the world in the maintenance of what is dear to them (and fortunately so, because important to the State)—their "position." And who are they that would cast a stone at their poorer neighbours? The charity of the past provides *them* with Eton and Oxford, Rugby, and Cambridge. We may rest assured that if we once have high schools in all our important centres, we may safely leave the relation of the lower middle-class population to State-aided primary schools to settle itself; and if at present, under shelter of the Education Department, a few families seek in such schools advanced instruction which would be otherwise quite inaccessible, we should rather be glad of this, and accept it as a clear indication that more is wanted than the State has yet provided.

Meanwhile, it would be well to encourage in every way the disposition of the Department to extend the education of primary schools to the age of fifteen, and at the same time to give them powers to refuse grants, beyond the sixth standard, to schools situated in localities already provided with high schools accessible to the poorer class of promising pupils and suited to the wants of the lower middle class. But in all cases where the Department recognizes instruction to the age of fifteen, they should, we think, simply test the education given,

allowing each locality to find out for itself what it most needs or desires.

We are not prepared to assent to the broad general proposition that the State is bound to educate all its citizens in the sense of promoting the culture of each individual. On the contrary, it is more strictly correct to say that the State's function to the individual is discharged if it leaves him as free as possible, and that, in charging itself with education, it does so for State ends alone—in the interests, that is to say, of the commonwealth as a whole. It is quite entitled, therefore, to demand efficiency in return for the expenditure it resolves upon. With a view to this it must ultimately, through some machinery or other, however decentralized, control the schools, control the training of teachers, and control the inspectors. But it must do this wisely, and on the sure foundation of educational principle. Its Code must not be an aggregate of dislocated suggestions tied together by no unity of purpose, but only by the thread that stitches the leaves together; nor must it shock the common-sense of the community by a vain show of science falsely so called.

Neither in the course of instruction we have slightly sketched, nor in the continuance of that course beyond the sixth standard, is there anything beyond the reach of the Department even as it stands. Trained teachers are, as a whole, quite competent for the task if they are encouraged to undertake it, the inspectors are all men of education and ability, and no one questions the efficiency of the Department itself to do what it thinks worth the doing. The weakest link in the chain of agencies is doubtless the teacher, but this instrument also is under the all-powerful hand of the Whitehall officials. For it is the Department that really controls the Training Colleges, while deftly managing to get gratuitous administration and responsibility for twenty-five per cent. of what is properly State expenditure, out of the various "Authorities" in exchange for an almost illusory right of management. But

this is a large question, and we shall not enter on it here. We would only say, that if popular education means what we think it means, the training of teachers is a matter of prime importance. If it means what Lord Sherbrooke thinks it means, then the arguments urged for expending public money on training fall to the ground, the present remuneration given to teachers is absurdly extravagant, and their claim to social recognition, in consequence of their presumed high social function, disappears. Female ex-pupil teachers can do all the national work that Lord Sherbrooke desires to see done; and if there be difficulty as to their maintaining discipline in boys' schools, this difficulty could be easily overcome by requiring the frequent presence of the local policeman.

We conclude then that while more advanced teaching and the so-called "higher subjects" have no place in the primary *education* either of poor or rich, they have an easily defined place up to the age of fifteen in the primary *school*, and that, in so far as the Department is feeling its way towards this result, it is in accord with all the best feeling of the country, and promoting the ends which a national educational system is intended to subserve. We are glad to think that there is no fear that the present heads of the Department will fail in carrying out this liberal view of their duties. Both Lord Spencer and Mr Mundella have at Sheffield strongly expressed their opinion that the spread of elementary education necessarily produces the desire for higher instruction, to which "all the children of the country" have a claim "according to their needs, capacities, and prospects"; and further, that it is the duty of the State to provide such instruction, "not only thoroughly, but generously and with an unstinting hand." The Duke of Argyll has shown, moreover, and I also am in a position to answer for it, that in Scottish schools attention to higher instruction has not resulted in the neglect of the general instruction of the main body of the school. As a mere matter of fact, the blue-books nowhere show so high a percentage in

the ordinary subjects of the Code as in those parts of Scotland where instruction is carried furthest. Nay, it is found that the existence of advanced classes in public schools has a stimulating effect on the intelligence of the *whole school*, and thus all are gainers—master and pupils alike. The same system rightly understood and applied would produce similar results elsewhere. A higher and more intelligent spirit would then arise in all our public schools, and Lord Sherbrooke would have no longer any reason to complain that a boy who had passed the sixth standard could not read satisfactorily. If he and his fellow Peers interested in education would direct their attention to the improvement of the Code in respect both of substance and form, they would further the cause which they have no doubt at heart, far more than by the mere negative and uninstructed criticism in which they indulged during the recent debate in the House of Lords.

NOTE. The Code for Scotland now meets almost all the demands made in the above paper, and that for England is following on the same lines (1901).

VII.

LIBERAL EDUCATION IN THE PRIMARY SCHOOL[1].

When your Secretary did me the honour to ask me to address you on this annual occasion I had some difficulty in finding a text; but as soon as I received a copy of your Annual Report, my difficulty was removed. This Council of Education I found exists to co-operate with the School Board generally, and chiefly to promote the advanced instruction of the masses of the people. It seemed to me accordingly to be not inappropriate, either to the function I am now discharging, to the objects of this Council, or to the circumstances of the time, to say a word in defence of what I conceive to be the true purpose of the primary school in special relation to the advanced instruction of the people, technical and literary.

It would almost appear from public meetings held in London, and from the action taken by some Chambers of Commerce, that young clerks can neither write nor count, and are wholly ignorant of the objects and ways of commerce. It has also been said that the lower class of commercial instruments—office boys—do not exhibit as much intelligence and sense of duty as did those of their predecessors twenty years ago, who had received such instruction as was then available. Again, we have the constantly recurring demand for the technical instruction of our artisans.

[1] Delivered before the Liverpool Council of Education, 1888.

Now, if the remedy for these defects is the institution of secondary schools of commercial and of technical instruction for boys who, at the age of thirteen, have got all that the primary school can give them, we could not but wish success to the movement; but I should still contend that such schools would not succeed in giving either the artisan or the clerk that ability to cope with changing circumstances which would keep England in the van of the industry and commerce of the world; and this because the instruction which it is proposed to give in them is too narrow and specialized. We have to keep steadily before us the education of men as men and as citizens, if we are really to attain the objects of the technical specialists themselves. By so doing, we shall make this life more worth living for the individual, while fitting him better for his ever-extending duties in a democratic and industrial society.

Professor Huxley has said that no one can yet define technical instruction. But it seems to me that the definition, in general terms at least, is easy enough. Technical instruction is instruction with a view to gaining a living in some specific department of industry, or to discharging some specific social function. A seminary for young men, devoted to theological instruction and to the inculcation of the proper way of preaching and of managing a parish, would be a technical school for the ministry of the Church. So with a medical school, or a teachers' school, or a lawyers' school. We call these schools "professional": strictly speaking they are technical; but it is, doubtless, better to restrict the term "technical" to instruction which fits a man, not for a social function in the liberal sense, but for dealing with those material things and agencies which form the necessary basis of the individual life as well as of society at large, while "liberal" instruction, on the other hand, is education with a view to living a life—the life of a rational being and a good citizen.

No one can have a word to say against technical instruction

in its own place. Technical schools, indeed, are destined, if organized on a liberal basis, to be to the lower half of the middle class what high schools, grammar schools, and our great public schools are to the upper half, and we do well to promote them for the education of boys *above thirteen years of age*. Technical Colleges, again, must ere long discharge the function of Industrial Universities. But it is constantly the duty of the professed educationalist to resist popular ideas, and to insist on a reasonable view being taken of every fresh educational panacea. We are now, it seems to me, threatened with an advancing tide of technical instruction, which aims at swallowing up all other educational agencies. Scotland has got a Technical School Act; England is about to have one. In so far as these Acts can be safely utilized by School Boards, it will be in the direction probably of evening schools for apprentices, and of adding a higher department to a few of the existing day schools, where those who have passed the sixth standard, and have not yet entered on apprenticeship, may assemble to receive instruction of a more or less specific character. Such schools will be a most important addition to the educational machinery of this city and other centres of industry, and will give definite character and aim to one of the objects of this Council of Education. But assuredly they will fail to be educative in the best sense, unless they are so organized as to include commercial subjects, and to give some place to literature, music, and so forth, as well as to elementary science and manual work. It is proposed by some to make such secondary schools for the people purely technical. Now it is against this that I protest in the interests of the secondary education of the artisan and lower middle classes themselves.

But still worse awaits us: attempts have been made to capture even the Primary School, which surely ought to be consecrated to liberal education. Schemes have been mooted for technicalising (so to speak) the fifth and sixth standards in

the Board Schools and for giving workshop instruction in them of a distinctively industrial character. Such movements are to be resisted, nay, I would almost say resented, in the highest interests of the people. Nor is this all; for not content with technical instruction, which, however defective when taken alone, yet certainly involves a certain amount of intellectual training, we are further threatened from America with an organized system of manual instruction for primary schools which gives, taken by itself, the minimum of mental training. Now, when boys have left the primary school, and have entered upon a technical course, manual training must, of course, be a part of this; for although it is true that a boy will never really learn his trade save in a workshop, it is yet necessary to include, as part of a technical school, shops for carpentering, metal turning, &c., in order to keep the instruction given in the school in close relation with its practical aim. But in the primary school, as distinct from the professed technical school, workshops and manual occupation are just as necessary as gymnasiums—neither more nor less. They belong to the department of organized recreation at this stage of a boy's life, rather than to that of organized instruction; and in a climate like ours, carpenters' sheds for boys above 11 years of age, and covered gymnasiums for all, should be a part of the equipment of every school, primary and secondary alike. Hand-work, I readily admit, though in itself giving the minimum of intellectual training, gives all that certain minds are capable of receiving, and, in all other cases, it reacts upon the intelligence, and gives a certain solidity to the purely intellectual and moral instruction of a school. In fact, we may say, generally, that the method of teaching any subject whatsoever, is never adequate until the fingers have been in some way brought into requisition in connection with it. In the manual work of drawing, for example, we have an educational instrument which trains both hand and eye, and insensibly contributes to the general education of a boy much more than is even yet understood.

Hand-work, then, in so far as it includes drawing, and, in the case of girls, needlework and cooking, all educationalists, I presume, advocate in the primary school: nor less would they gladly see carpenters' sheds and gymnasiums as places devoted to strenuous and regulated idleness.

But when we are asked to give to carpentering a certain portion of the time now devoted to geography, history, reading, and so forth, we object. Those who believe that the distinction between man and monkey does not depend on the development of the thumb, are driven to protest in the name of the distinctively human in man. Can we be expected even to restrain our laughter when we see it stated by a hand-enthusiast in America that one hour of carpentering will do more for a boy's intellect than three hours of Sophocles? If the spirit of man can be educated through his fingers, it is a pity that Plato and Shakspere ever wrote and Christ ever taught. The thumb educationalists must be commanded to keep their place; and, along with them, those technical educationalists who would take forcible possession of the primary school, and substitute science (so-called) in place of more humane and humanising studies. If in the technical schools, to which a Technical Schools Bill will lead, literature, music, and history ought to find an honourable place, in order to make them the secondary schools of the artisan and lower middle class, how much more do these subjects demand protection in the primary school? Technical instruction, pure and simple, can never educate; at best, it can only *contribute* to education. The Technical has in view the gaining of a living: Education properly understood has in view *life*. We "do not live by bread alone, but by the Word," that is to say by thought on human life, conduct, and destiny, conveyed in apt language. What shall it profit England, I should like to know, if she gain the whole world—that is to say, drive all other nations out of the field of neutral markets—and "lose her own soul"? The operative of England is not to be trained merely to be a useful tool in the hands

of the holders of capital. He has to earn a living, no doubt, but he has also to live a life—the life of a rational and immortal spirit. It is still generally held that we must have humanistic—that is to say, literary, historical, economical, and religious teaching in the secondary school: much more, it seems to me, must we have it in the primary school, if the masses of the people are to be put on the right way.

Again, one of the aims of this Liverpool Council is to keep children as long at school as possible, and so to begin the secondary or advanced education of the children of the poorer sections of the population. But the artisan, and even a large proportion of the middle, class cannot take advantage of your liberal offer owing to social necessities. They can receive their secondary education only through the experience and opportunities of life. The opening of people's parks, of playing-fields, public baths, of art galleries, of cheap concerts, of free libraries, of evening lectures, and the capping of the whole with cheap literature and with University Colleges (as here in Liverpool), are the opportunities now growing up in our great centres of population; and that not too soon. But all these things will fail to meet our expectations, if boys and girls have not been put on the right way when young. The artisan will remain outside these agencies, just as he too often, unhappily, remains outside the Churches. He will not adopt them into his daily life and make them an integral part of that. If he is to do so, I repeat, the primary school, and above all the advanced classes of the primary school, must put him, when yet a boy, on the right way. That right way is the way of the humanities, and the way of the humanities is paved with literature, history, ethics, religion, art—all that is humanising, all that makes a citizen a man and not merely a work-man. In short, the education of the primary school must, like that of the secondary school, be liberal and humanising, and

prepare for the general conduct and rational enjoyment of life, not for any specific department of labour.

To the primary teacher, then, I would say: "While boys and girls must be largely trained, by means of object-lessons, geography, arithmetic, and always on a distinct realistic basis, the teaching being closely practical, your leading idea, your constant purpose (spite of codes and all their demands), must be the moralising and humanising of the boys and girls under your charge." Let us face the fact that religion is really not at present in its proper place in our schools, because theologians cannot agree. While theologians quarrel, the people may perish. I feel very deeply, that, until these quarrels are settled, it becomes more than ever necessary that humanising and ethical aims should in our minds be paramount. Knowledge is not everything. Life is better. If the apprentice lad does his work honestly and as to God, if he is kindly and gracious and civil in his family and social relations, if he seeks the pleasures of society and song, and brings a pleasant temper and a gracious countenance to the fireside, if in short, he is leading the life of a rational and religious being, and so promoting the sum of human happiness, he is a worthy member of the commonwealth. Such a youth is the best possible product of school-life. But if we do not, or, owing to code restrictions, cannot, lay such a foundation as will rear this edifice of a true man, then all I have to say is, the school has lost its road. It is an expensive machine, turning out *machine-made* articles, and not the hand-work into which is put the honest endeavour of an earnest mind, the love and inspiration of the moral artist.

The education of the primary school, I have said, must be liberal and humanising. How is it to be made so? The answer is easy: by having a liberal and humane mind at its head, skilled in methods, instinct with ethical purpose. Religious teaching is at a discount at present, I have said, but nobody prevents the teacher telling the Gospel story, and

reading, as a father might with his children, its simple records in such a way as to touch the hearts and imaginations of his pupils. Then there is literature. In the rich stores of our country there can be no difficulty in finding materials to supersede, or at least to supplement, the barren teachings of our school-books. Were I a teacher, I should find in such materials the means of establishing between myself and my scholars that sympathetic bond which is the source of all true power over the human mind, because it is spiritual power. I should like to sit down, when time and circumstance were favourable, and read with them, and to them, pieces which stir emotion in the heart of old and young alike. Such child-pieces, for example, as this, by Blake, poet and artist, would, I think, yield fruit both in the present and the after time:—

"Little lamb, who made thee?
Dost thou know who made thee,
Gave thee life and bid thee feed
By the stream and o'er the mead;
Gave thee clothing of delight,
Softest clothing, woolly, bright;
Gave thee such a tender voice,
Making all the vales rejoice?
Little lamb, who made thee?
Dost thou know who made thee?
Little lamb, I'll tell thee,
Little lamb, I'll tell thee.
He is called by thy name,
For He calls himself a lamb:
He is meek and He is mild,
He became a little child.
I a child and thou a lamb,
We are called by His name,
Little lamb, God bless thee,
Little lamb, God bless thee."

This is literature, simple though it be. Can the child resist it? Certainly not, if the teacher feels it. England is full of child-literature even better than this, suited to every

child-stage of life. The poets of England have been generous in their gifts to children. Spelling is important, grammar is important, but not so important as the food that maintains the very life of the soul. Much of our teaching may evaporate, but the impressions of the good which we make by means of the beautiful, will never evaporate. The teachings of the heart and the imagination remain for ever.

It is by *such* means as I have indicated that we may hope to rear a population captivated by moral and religious truth, and disdainful of all meaner forms of pleasure; it is by *such* means that the immortal spirit is taught to shine, even "through a simple rustic garb's disguise, and through the impediment of rural cares." The school, we are told, is to fit for the larger school of life. True; but does life consist only of a struggle for the satisfaction of material wants? Are man's relations to the spiritual not life?

> "The world is too much with us: late and soon,
> Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers."

Nor is the moral and spiritual life, which it is the business of the school to evoke, the least potent element in the equipment for the struggle of each passing day and the cheerful acceptance by each of us of our special burdens. It is the moral element in man that supplies the source of power for working the hammer or the loom to the best effect.

Let, then, the intellectual and spiritual ideal of the school be fixed, let the master be himself inspired with that ideal, and then allowed freely to work for this, and the result will be a population, not of mere *working* men, but of men who can live and enjoy life, as well as toil intelligently for a living.

What we as educationalists desire to accomplish, and that even in the department of industries and commerce, is to raise the standard of national life. To accomplish this we must not only quicken the general intelligence of boys and girls but we must rely, mainly, on the training of the humanity in them.

No man who takes a broad view of education can regret to see the growth of physical science as an educational agency. The study of Nature had been for long left out in the cold, and it was inevitable that it should make importunate demands for admission and for an honourable place at the scholastic hearth. But it must not be allowed to drive the literary and the ethical from their supreme place. Even science itself becomes truly educative in the highest sense, only when it is transfigured by imagination and touched by moral emotion. It is the spiritual in man, not the logical understanding, which to Nature

> "Adds the gleam,
> The light that never was on sea or land,
> The consecration and the poet's dream."

To the popular eye and to the eye of Herschel alike, the starry heavens are but so much dead matter if they do not light the path of the sublime, and raise the soul of man above the petty and transitory. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth forth His handiwork." It is only the poetic ear that can hear "the silence that is in the starry sky." When this dependence of science itself on the alchemy of thought for its true significance is clearly seen, the present imperious claims of its votaries will be abated. There is an ebb and a flow in all social questions, but the time for the ebb of the scientific tide is not yet. Depend upon it, it is by the study neither of the molecule nor of the crayfish, but of the thoughts and deeds of epochs now gone that we ourselves truly understand ourselves. The dead generations are in truth our dead selves from which we rise to higher things. By the past we live. You and I are old men; thousands of years have passed over our heads. By the help of science alone, I admit, each man may in these days start afresh for himself, and succeed in correlating himself and his material needs with his environment, but assuredly he cannot attain to his full stature as man save by first spreading his roots deep and wide into

the soil which is enriched by the deeds and thoughts of his forerunners.

I am not depreciating scientific and technical instruction; I wish simply to look at it in the light of educational principles and to assign it its due place in the formation of character, and the fitting of a man for the duties and the enjoyment of this world. I hold that even in the primary school it is quite possible to meet all reasonable demands which our commerce and our skilled industries can make on us and yet subordinate all to the great educative aim. Only let realistic subjects—everything that comes under the head of Nature-knowledge—have their foundations laid in the primary school as a part of general education. Above all, let all subjects be taught with direct reference to *use*. This it is which makes geography and arithmetic alive—nay, moralises them—because it brings them into relation with the hard facts and the daily work of life. By this kind of teaching we shall, by the help of our humanistic instruction, to which our geography and history and arithmetic will always play up, turn out the youth of the country to do their part, when we leave the stage, with living hearts, open eyes, and active intelligences; and, above all, with that moral steadfastness which all men need when they "fall upon the thorns of life." We shall certainly not accomplish this educative result if we let bread-earning subjects supersede the liberal, the humanistic. On the other hand, that, at this time of day, we should pretend to educate our youth divorced from Nature and its teachings, and without specific reference to practical life, is simply absurd. All I wish to insist on is that the root of the matter is not in the various sciences of Nature, but in the ethical purpose of human existence. Man is capable of ideas and ideals. To say that his life is in the infinite is not a merely rhetorical utterance; but sober fact. He is not simply the aristocrat of the monkey-tribe, but something far other and better. Give me a man with an intelligent mind and with a moral purpose

in life—honest in his resolves, honourable in his aims—and I will guarantee you in that man the best manufacturer, the best merchant, the best weaver, the best engineer, the best plumber, given the necessary amount of knowledge of his business. I will guarantee you also against a "railway king" or a shoddy millionaire. To technical and scientific knowledge the words of the Laureate are even more closely applicable than to knowledge in general:—

> * * * "Let her know her place—
> She is the second, not the first.
>
> A higher hand must make her mild,
> If all be not in vain; and guide
> Her footsteps, moving side by side
> With Wisdom, like the younger child."

As with scientific and technical instruction so with manual work in schools: let it be subsidiary to the greater end; in brief, let it not be work at all, but *play*. The son of the poor man has to buckle himself to labour soon enough. Do not evade the Factory Acts by turning the primary school into a factory of factory-hands. It is a factory of minds, not of hands; if it be not this, let it go!

The primary school, then, you will see I regard as being, no less than the secondary, the abode of humanism. Its aim is liberal education. The classical master of our great public schools will toss his head at this and ask: "How is it possible that the 'common school' should give a liberal education?" I may use my natural privilege as a Scotsman and respond by asking him another question: "What *is* a liberal education? What do you think education is? What does it aim at?" By the time he has answered these questions he will find that in the primary school, properly understood, must be laid the foundation firm and sure of all liberal education. "To the poor the Gospel is preached." The word humanism, which has for centuries been the equivalent for a liberal education,

has not changed its true meaning, but it has, in these modern times, changed, or, rather, I should say multiplied, its instruments, while the secondary schoolmaster of a certain type, all unwitting of the change, has been left high and dry on the shore of the sixteenth century. Latin and Greek were once the only possible vehicles of liberal education, because they alone contained science, literature, and great moral examples for the modern world. And I would still say to every man who has the time "Study these," for in that antique world are to be found, to use Shelley's words,

> "Harmonies of wisdom and of song,
> And thoughts, and deeds worthy of thoughts so fair."

The fortress of antiquity must be held if our modern life is not to be overrun by the Philistine. But the campaign of the army of humanity has now to be conducted chiefly with weapons which our own immediate forefathers have forged. The fire lighted at the altars of Greece, having first burned with a dazzling brilliancy in Italy, crossed the Alps and, fed by Celtic ardour and moderated by Teutonic soberness, illumined the nations. The result has been modern literatures and a Christianised humanism, whose proper place is not merely the halls of universities, but the nurseries and schools of our children.

I would turn to another question which is at present the theme (like technical instruction) of platform orators.

By means of bursaries we provide for the advancement of clever boys who aim at professional work. But the ladder, which is to lead from the gutter to a university fellowship, has small interest for the educationalist compared to the ladder which is to lead from the gutter to a good and honourable life as a man and a citizen. It is not the higher education and success in life of this or that boy which can long arrest our attention. It is the higher education of the people as a whole. Whatever we do in education, this in all nations and in all

periods of history *must be done*—this, namely—we must educate the centre of political power. In this democratic country that centre is now the artisan class—the aristocracy of the millions of the wage-earners. These, when they leave the primary school, have to be brought in increasing numbers within the circle of intellectual and moral interests. And this is to be done by increasing the number of those who stay at school till they have passed the sixth standard, by evening continuation schools, by organized courses of lectures, by art-galleries, by music-halls of the right sort, nay also by regulated dancing saloons; and finally by our churches, when these have learned the secret of touching the heart, and speaking the language, of the working man. That scientific lectures (if given, not by what are called "science masters," but by masters of science) can attract and elevate has been proved by the University Extension Schemes; but all that the masses of the people can absorb of this kind of instruction is very limited. Not so with humanistic subjects—these have an infinite variety which "custom cannot stale." History, political science, economics, literature, art, religion, offer themselves. They promise enjoyment to the mind; and it is only through what they enjoy, as a relief from toil and harassment, that men, working hard from morning to evening, can be permanently expected to seek knowledge. It is this general and diffused education of the masses that can alone interest the true educationalists; the "ladder from the gutter to a fellowship" is a quite secondary matter, and has a touch of vulgarity about it.

The subjects I have named give, I say, enjoyment and recreation, and while they do so, they at the same time nurture, feed, elevate, and form. The interest of such subjects also is lasting, for they are in intimate relation to the present conduct of life and to the future destiny of each man. The doctrine of the anthropoid ape and adaptation to environment is played out. It is not the descent of man but the ascent of man we have to think of. Much retrospect to the monkey out of which

we have been evolved is not satisfying. A man must be a biological expert to go into intellectual ecstasies over *that.* "Let the ape and tiger die." Given due preparation in boyhood, and you will then find a potent auxiliary in the work of education in the artisan himself, when once he has entered on the duties of life. For, strange to say, his mind is commonly more open and more eager for fresh intellectual food than that of the college don or the scientific specialist. There is a freedom from prejudice and a naïve simplicity of receptiveness about him. Explain the fact as you may, it is a fact. We may have great faith in the British working man and in his power to work out his own educational salvation when the opportunity is provided, if only we have given him a fair start in the people's school, and humanised him there. He is of a good breed.

Why, indeed, should he not achieve for himself even "culture"? What this precisely may be it is not easy to say. It certainly is not the exclusive property of academic minds. I have elsewhere defined it as a disposition to know things and to think about things above our own petty personal interests and outside our particular department of work, combined with a love for art forms, a feeling for the historical past out of which we have come, all supported by what may be called an ethical habit of mind. Now all this is, in its essence at least, quite within the reach of the operative classes; and some individuals among them are at this moment more truly cultured than many of the wealthy, and not a few of the academic, class. Many of the latter are too apt to think that culture means scholarly acquisition or literary expertness, and not character, intellectual openness, and æsthetic appreciation.

Let us, then, see to it that every citizen has his opportunity given to him, by a liberal education in the primary school, to grow to this true manhood, to this genuine culture, in remote glens as well as in crowded cities. There is now no insuperable difficulty in this. What a depressing thought for every man

who is interested in the advancement of society if he had to confess that all that shapes the spirit of man to the highest issues is for ever beyond the reach of the masses of mankind —that education, in the best sense, is for the few. There are still some—far too many, it is true—who are, unhappily, in such daily anxiety as to the means of living that they have no time to live, and there will always be a certain number who, with every opportunity that could be given, will remain dull, obtuse, ignorant, evil: and this in all ranks of society. The devil, like the poor, we shall have always with us, I suspect; but we must do our best to fight him, or *it*, under whatever grammatical gender modern enlightenment may classify the dire reality. We work in the hope that the number of those outside the pale of a true civilization may grow less and less as the generations pass; and we already have reached this great and unprecedented position that we are now able to address ten for one whom we could so have addressed thirty years ago, inviting them to come and drink of the fountains of knowledge, no less than of the waters of life, freely.

To sum up in a sentence or two: What I have chiefly desired to impress upon you is that the primary, even more than the secondary school, must be sacred to the humanistic in education; and, further, that realistic subjects should be so practically taught as to relate them to the uses and enjoyment of life, and in this way contribute to humanistic education. If these two ideas are given effect to, you accomplish two things. You give the so much desiderated practical foundation for subsequent technical and commercial instruction, while at the same time you prepare the ground for the culture of life, which must, if it exist at all, be for the great mass of those who are likely to seek it—literary, historical, æsthetic, ethical; rarely scientific, and then only in a very popular sense.

The conclusion to which I point in the politics of education is, that, in the Technical Schools Bill, powers should be given to introduce commercial subjects into the technical school,

and, generally, to *continue the subjects now taught in primary schools.* If this be done, the Act will become the charter of the secondary schools of the people, and furnish an important and much-needed addition to our educational machinery. Whatever we do, let us always put the man before the workman, and we shall so not only best fulfil our duty to the humanity of the people, but also best fit them, each for himself, to acquire and apply the speciality by which he gains his living.

NOTE. The Technical Schools Acts admit of this (1901).

VIII.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CURRICULUM OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS[1].

To the best of our recollection, it was Lord Playfair who first, after the Great Exhibition of 1851–2, proclaimed to the British public that they must set about the technical education of both masters and workmen in all our great industries. The movement which he set agoing has gradually reached large dimensions, and we may almost say that little is now wanted to establish the technical education of the country on a sound and permanent basis, beyond a more thorough organization of existing agencies. More recently we have seen conferences in London and elsewhere on the allied subject of "commercial" education.

It is not our intention here to take up the question of either Technical or Commercial Schools, but rather to point out that, with technical schools on one side and commercial schools on the other, the old secondary schools are doomed, if they do not quickly reconsider their position and adapt themselves to the wants of the country.

Technical schools are for a very special class of the community, it is true; but a very slight modification of their curriculum and organization would convert them into secondary schools based on science, as opposed to the existing secondary

[1] Addressed to the Glasgow Branch of the Teachers' Guild.

schools, which are based chiefly on language. The same remark applies to the projected commercial schools. The question thus naturally arises, "Are we prepared to conclude the long-standing debate on the Humanistic and Realistic in education by capitulating to the latter?" For ourselves, we think that such a result would be a national misfortune. At the same time, it has to be faced as a probability, and accepted if necessary. But is it necessary? To technical schools as the secondary schools of the industrial classes and to Technical Colleges we are already committed, and the specific function which they discharge justifies their further extension. But it is not necessary, in our opinion, further to deplete the Grammar and High Schools of Great Britain in the interests of the new demand for specific *commercial* instruction. There is no defect which has yet been found in the boy-products of existing schools that cannot be traced either to a faulty programme or to bad methods of teaching. Take, for example, arithmetic. We are told that young clerks know nothing about the application of arithmetic to commercial questions, are wholly ignorant of foreign currencies, and are incompetent to transmute one into the other. Now, there is no student of educational method who will not say that this is due simply to bad teaching, and that the proper training of teachers is the true solution of this, and, indeed, of many other, scholastic problems.

. Humanism as the basis of education is now threatened on all sides, and it is because of this that, on this occasion, I would direct your attention anew to the aim and subjects of secondary education generally. My object is to advocate such a modification of the curriculum of schools as will leave the linguistic basis very much where it is in all essential respects, and to establish, not on utilitarian, but on purely educational, grounds, a working compromise between the humanistic and the realistic in the work of every school. The attack on the mediæval curriculum of our secondary schools and universities has been

very persistent during the past forty years, and the assailants, while compelled to leave Latin and Greek in the possession of all the strategic parts of the field, have yet scored not a few successes. The technical and commercial school movements are only the more visible results of a prolonged campaign which has shaken every old fortress to its centre. To save themselves from destruction, alien and hostile elements have been assigned a place within the older schools, though, it is true, a subordinate and humble place: for the recognition of science in the secondary schools of Great Britain has not been cordial; along with modern languages, it cannot be said to be more than tolerated.

Notwithstanding the coldness with which the British mind receives all theoretical considerations, it must yet surely be admitted that, unless we can find some standard by which we can test our educational aims, it will be impossible to adjudicate justly on the claims of competing subjects for a place among educational instruments. That standard can only be the *end* which we propose to ourselves. Given that secondary education terminates when a boy is 18 (and taking the country overhead, this is a reasonable assumption), we have to consider what we would have him to be, in respect of knowledge, faculty and character generally, when he enters on the work of life.

To put before ourselves as our aim the merely technical requirements of this or that industry, profession or occupation has a show of wisdom about it, but is in truth unwise, and will be found in its results unprofitable for our youth in an educational, and for the nation in a material, sense. Since the revival of letters, the idea which the Attic Greeks introduced of educating a man not for this or that special function, but simply for manhood, has governed the education of civilized Europe. There have been many quarrels, which still indeed survive, as to the best way of doing this, but among

the combatants the leading idea has always been unque
Whether we ask Plato, Aristotle, Melanchthon, Sturm, A
Montaigne, Milton, or Comenius, the answer has bee
substance the same. And when that answer is properly un
stood, it amounts to this, that the aim of all education
ethical, that it has in view Wisdom and Virtue; and that mere
knowledge, nay, even discipline of mind, are to be regarded as
taking their true value from their power of contributing to the main purpose—the wise and capable conduct of life. What are called "practical" considerations, however, are not on this account to be left out of sight; and in a country like our own, which can maintain its existence only by a vast system of manufacture and commerce, it is absolutely necessary that the "practical" should enter into the education, not merely of the future manufacturer or merchant, but also into that of the future civil and military servant, and still more into that of the politician who is to legislate for the whole or to administer affairs.

While recognizing in the fullest sense the necessity for the recognition of the "practical" in a national scheme of education, and the need there is, in a reconsideration and reorganization of the curriculum of secondary schools, for the fuller development of those new lines of activity on which they have already entered, we yet must hold that all efforts to attain the supreme educational end—capacity, wisdom, and virtue—will assuredly fail if we subject our boys to courses of instruction which, being "practical" in the narrow utilitarian sense, fail to educate in the larger Hellenic sense. Accordingly, we maintain that in the primary school and secondary school alike, language must still continue to take precedence of all other studies. If the educative aim is to be secured, language is the chief of all liberal studies. By liberal studies are to be understood those which have in view the manhood of the man, and not merely his technical equipment for special departments of industrial or professional activity. By such liberal

even the practical aims of life will, we hold, be best
d.

ut by Language we do not mean grammar, though this
st be its basis, if the teaching is to be sound; but language
its concrete form as the expression of thought on human
ife—in brief, as literature. It has been recently maintained
that literature is an impossible subject in schools; but the reason why it is always a difficult subject, and often an impossible one, is simply this, that the masters of secondary schools are not trained to teach, and know little or nothing of methods. It would be an easy matter to show that even in primary schools[1] language as literature can be taught; but my business, here and now, is with secondary schools, which profess to carry on the education of boys from their fourteen to eighteen years of age. These boys, we must assume, know (to begin with) at least as much as the seventh standard boys in Board schools. If they do not, there is something seriously wrong somewhere. They must be presumed to be able to read ordinary English, to write accurately a simple letter, to parse ordinary sentences, to give a fair account of the general geography of the world, to have some knowledge of history, to work sums in all the ordinary rules of arithmetic, to sing from notation, and to draw a little from models. So equipped to begin with, and being now of an age to engage with advantage in studies which demand a certain power of abstraction and reasoning, we have to consider what we are to do with them in order to fit them, as fairly cultivated and capable men, to enter on the duties of citizenship; and, let me add, on the enjoyment, as well as the work, of life. It is not so much the creation of any specific power of mind that we have to aim at as the giving to a youth command over his own powers generally. This we cannot accomplish unless we both feed the mind and discipline the mind. For the attainment of these objects, there is no subject that can compare for a moment with language; and whatever

[1] See Lect. VII. "Liberal Education in the Primary School."

else we may teach, this is the one governing subject which must run through all education from the infant-school to the university. By Language we mean language in the concrete form, as literature, with a view to the nutrition of mind, and also in its grammatical and historical forms with a view to the discipline of mind by abstract exercises;—briefly, language both as a synthetic and as an analytic study.

Why now should language be raised to this eminence? Because it is the sole "universal" in the intellectual education of every human being. Occupation with the relations of weights and magnitudes and numbers is not to be despised, but it cannot by any possibility educate: such studies can at best only sharpen faculty; and that within a narrow and closely defined range. If we can imagine a man devoting himself to these questions *alone* during a lifetime, he would at 70 be still a boy as regards all the great questions of human life and destiny. The precise extent to which the concrete physical and natural sciences can be truly educative I shall not, on the present occasion, try to determine. Instructive they certainly are in the highest degree. But language, as such, is, what they can never be, universal in its sweep and in its educational efficacy. It embraces the whole of human life and penetrates into the remotest of its recesses. The study of it gives command of thought in all its ramifications; it clears our apprehension, makes easier our daily observations, clarifies judgments and reasonings. Above all, it fits us for intelligent communion with the great thinkers of our race. Language, in truth, is always with us; in our getting up and our lying down: and if we start well-equipped when young, it cannot but grow daily in reach and definiteness under the pressure of our multifarious relations to men and things. Step by step with language grows our life as thinking and active spirits, and of this we may be assured, that if language is not growing in us, we are intellectually dead.

But it may be said that in studying science we are studying

language, since all knowledge is necessarily acquired through language. The language of specialisms, however, is not the language we mean; except, of course, those specialisms (if we may so call them) which have a deep and wide human and humane significance, such as philosophy and art. Specialistic language adds to our knowledge of a particular department; but, simply because there is nothing universal in it, it fails to educate our humanity. Perhaps an illustration will best convey what I mean. If any man of general cultivation were to open a book on embryology, he might read a whole page without understanding a single word, except the more ordinary verbs and particles necessary to the construction of all sentences. But, as a man, he is none the worse because he does not understand it; and if he had been able to understand it, he would, as a man, have been none the better. Now let him take up a volume of poems and read a piece by, say, George Herbert. If he does not understand *that*, then, as a man, he is so much the worse; but understanding it, he is, as a man, so much the better. It is this universality of language as such, causing it to touch every human interest, every moral and spiritual aspect of life, and every spring of human activity, that gives it its claim, even if there were no other, to a governing place in all education up to the time at which a young man must specialize. Other subjects may give an edge to faculty. Language at once feeds the soul and enlarges faculty.

Important, too, is the consideration that the study of language is a historical study. And this in a far other and deeper sense than the analysis and origin of word-forms. It is historical because it is itself the reflection of the thought and the whole active being of man through all time. It is the accumulated and complete resultant of all history. In studying language as it ought to be studied, we are re-thinking, each for himself, the thought of past ages, and it is in this sense, chiefly, that language is, in truth, history. Just as it is community of language which more than anything else makes

of a crowd of men a nation, so it is language, simply as such, which binds together the remotest past of man with the present. Each new form of speech, as it attains maturity, tries to make the riches of preceding allied forms its own, thereby to find a fitting vehicle for ever subtler and more adequate expression. The very sentence which I now write may be said to be influenced by all the words which have preceded it in time and which have made us moderns possible. It is to this their lordly heritage—this embalmed history of the human soul, that we desire to introduce boys when we teach them language.

Again, the study of language is the unobtrusive and indirect study of m ɔrality and religion. It is the *indirectness* of the moral and religious sentiment, that constitutes the substance of literature, which enables us to influence the young through works of genius. Boys resent *direct* moral and religious teaching in the very years in which they most need it, if it be too obvious. It is only by means of literature, including historical literature, that we can lead them insensibly to make acquaintance with moral and spiritual ideals. In our great writers we find recorded the experience of the past on the deepest human relations; and in a single sentence we may find more of the *real*, more of the true substance of things than in a complete enumeration of the facts of mere sense in ordered file of cause and effect. The things that constitute the substance of human life, not physical facts and relations, are specially the *things* which touch the inmost soul of even the naturally callous. "Train and perfect the gift of speech," says Prof. Seeley[1], "unfold all that is in it, and you train at the same time the power of thought and the power of intellectual sympathy." "Literature," says Mark Pattison, "is the moral contemplation of the universe"—the "criticism of life." Without further argument, then, we may conclude that the study of language, thus humanely and largely conceived, expands the

[1] p. 222 of *Lectures and Essays.*

sympathies and feeds the soul of man as no other subject can possibly do.

But language can further lay claim to a unique power of sharpening and disciplining faculty. For, as a grammatical or logical study, and as an inquiry into the growth of historical forms, it exercises the intelligence in the making of distinctions, it makes words bear their true meaning, it dissipates 'fallacies of matter,' it puts us perpetually through life on our guard against sophisms. By training to exactness and precision of speech it trains to exactness and precision of thought. It is the best ally of the seeker after truth, even in the domain of natural science. This exactness is an inevitable effect of the formal study of language, for, properly conducted, the analytic study of speech is the study of the machinery of thought itself. If the study of language does not accomplish all I have claimed for it, it is the fault of defective aims and methods. It is true that there is a certain discipline in all purposed activity, even writing and carpentering; but the discipline is not equally good in all. In these manual occupations, the successive efforts are a repetition of acts loosely connected, calling into activity a minimum of mental effort and only a very restricted range of intelligence; but in the thorough understanding of language there is a purposed act of reason, which, in its series of efforts, is an organic process and demands a sustained continuity of mind. In translating and retranslating from a foreign tongue, for example, the difficulties are not to be overcome unless perception, discrimination, judgment, association, imagination, reasoning (inductive and deductive), are all brought into conscious (if not self-conscious) activity; all these, through their organic connexion, creating a synthetic result, viz. the translation we are given to do. It will be said that, on similar psychological grounds, mathematics is a most effective mental discipline. This is true so far; and because it is true so far, mathematics (within certain limits, at least) must always be

assured a place in our curriculum only second to the leading subject of all. I say *second*, because the mental operation involved in understanding the proof of a theorem, or in working a rider, is confined within narrow grooves, and is concerned with necessary matter. The imagination which enters into the solution of a geometrical problem is confined within strict limits. Its wings are clipped. In language, on the contrary, we have to deal with the subtle, variable, and uncertain relations that exist among words and between words and thoughts. The shades of feeling which enter into our thoughts can never be exhausted, and are constantly demanding more apt expression.

In advocating language in its real and formal aspects as the central subject of secondary instruction, up to the age of eighteen, we advocate nothing new. The Athenians and the Romans trained their young men by means of language; the education of the middle ages had language, and, indeed, solely Latin, as its instrument of education; and even at the mediæval universities, the extension of language-teaching into Rhetoric and Logic was but a natural development on linguistic lines; for the study of Logic and Rhetoric is merely the study in an abstract and formal way of what is already familiar to the student in the concrete form of language. The revival of letters did not dethrone language, but merely added the study of the substance of language—that is to say, literature, to that of dry, tedious, and badly formulated grammatical rules, thus restoring the Hellenic idea. Since the Reformation, the Latin language, thus more or less modified by the influence of the Renaissance, and with the addition of Greek, has formed the chief matter of school discipline throughout Europe. Of course it may be said by some, that the more old-world the doctrine the more is it to be repudiated by the enlightened modern; but we would ask the modern realist to pause and consider what the past, trained on the lines we have indicated, has done for humanity and for us. There must be not a little to be said for studies which fed the genius of Greece, which gave substance

to the virile mind of Rome, and which have yielded to modern Europe the rich literature of the past 450 years. If we are reminded, by way of objection, of the barren outcome of the 950 years that elapsed after Constantine, the answer is ready; for this was due partly to historical conditions, and partly to the ignoring of language as a concrete subject. It was only analytically and with a view to *immediate use* as an organ of communication that language was taught (save in a few places) in the Episcopal and Monastery schools. Down to the 13th century the mediæval studies were thus not only abstract and grammatical, but they were also, in truth, utilitarian. It was this utilitarianism, the subservience of language to merely ecclesiastical and other necessary uses that emptied it of all genuine liberalizing influence.

In settling what and how much of language, concrete and analytic, we are to teach, it is to us almost self-evident that the mother-tongue ought to be the beginning, middle, and end of all linguistic instruction. Here we part company with the classical Humanists. All other languages should, so to speak, play up to the vernacular. It requires no argument, however, to shew that no man (we, of course, except men of marked genius) can know his own tongue, unless he knows at least one other *well*. This has been often said. Among the alien languages at his command for school use, the teacher must, accordingly, select that one which will most surely attain the ends of all linguistic teaching—that which will most effectually give command of the mother-tongue, both in its words and forms, that which will historically best connect him with past thought, that which will be most moral and æsthetic in its influences, that which will most surely contribute to discipline in thinking and in exactness of expression. There can be no doubt that it is in Latin that we English find these conditions alone in union, and that Latin, accordingly, above all other tongues, ought to be the basis, along with English, of all linguistic training. So true is this that it seems to us that (to

apply an old witticism in a new connexion) if we had not Latin, it would be necessary to invent it.

With English and Latin—presuming that Latin is taught (which it rarely is) in the broad realistic way, broad both philologically, historically, and æsthetically, in which it will be taught when our secondary schoolmasters are trained in educational methods and aims, and that the English of the school includes extensive reading in the literature of our national history—the school-day would be well occupied to the extent of fully one-half, and the remaining portion (about three hours a day), is all that would be available for other subjects.

We may seem as yet to have said very little that can afford guidance in constructing a secondary curriculum out of the present confusion; but what we have said implies a good deal. For if we grant that the end to be constantly kept in view in all secondary education, as in all primary, is an ethical one—capacity for the personal conduct and social duties of life; and if, further, we have fixed the *leading* instrument in that education, it is not so difficult, as it at first may seem, to determine the rest of the curriculum, especially if we now bring within our consideration the directly practical uses of life,—the fitting of boys for their *specific functions* as citizens. For having once secured those instruments by which the young can best be truly educated, namely, English (including History), and Latin, we are now at liberty to look, with an impartial mind, at all the other subjects pressing for recognition in subjection to the second, but always subordinate, guiding principle—the preparation of boys for the various specific duties they may have to discharge as citizens. Here, we would place first in order that subject which might, did space permit, be shewn to be the most cultivating generally, as well as to be most directly related to the various occupations of citizens in a country such as ours—we mean Geography. Geography does not mean the miserable scraps of the modern school. We use the word in the sense in which it is taken in the recent work by Sir

Archibald Geikie, Director of the Geological Survey, and by leading authors on Method[1]. So taught, it embraces all that is essential for a cultivated man to know of the world of nature, it gives life to history and lays the sure foundation of commercial, industrial, and political knowledge. It is thus both a general and also a specific and useful study—at once liberal and utilitarian.

Next to Geography, in the large sense in which I have defined it, come Arithmetic and Mathematics, both because they are disciplinary, and because, as instruments in the work of the world, they stand in manifold relations to practical life. But neither on utilitarian nor disciplinary grounds is it necessary to go far in Mathematics. A boy leaving a secondary school at the age of 18, who has an exact knowledge of four books of Euclid with *their practical applications*, and of Algebra to Quadratics, has nearly as much as the majority of men had who graduated at our universities a few years ago. I say *exact* knowledge; for a single step in such subjects which is not exact is intellectually hurtful. Where there are proper methods of teaching, this department should not occupy boys above 14 (already by that time familiar with ordinary arithmetical operations) more than five hours a week. By proper methods we mean practical methods—the turning to *use* of everything that is taught. I am well aware that mathematical specialists will demand three times five hours weekly, but they must not be allowed to ride their hobby to the detriment of national education. Enough is conceded to them, if the instruction-plan of the school admits of those boys who have a marked mathematical aptitude specializing in the last year of secondary school study[2].

[1] See subsequent lecture on Geography.

[2] In these days, when all professions, and many occupations, are hedged round by examinations, the last year of *every* boy's secondary course should be largely a specialised one, having directly in view the examination he has to pass. A boy may quite well be coached at school without being crammed.

We consider that we have now laid down all that is *necessary* for the thorough education of a mind. The analytic powers have been exercised in Language, the inductive in the acquisition of nature-knowledge and Geography, the deductive in mathematics and in the application of the principles of language to translation and composition; the imagination and the emotions have received their proper nutriment in literature and the study of nature, and the national spirit has been fostered by broad and various historical reading. So far as mere education is concerned nothing more is wanted, always presuming that these subjects are so organized, and so spread over the school-period, as to leave a fair amount of leisure to boys, not only for play but for the growth of native aptitudes, such as handwork, music, &c.

But no scheme of instruction, however well devised, will succeed, except with the few ardent boys, if the minds of the masters are not richly endowed, and if the principles and methods of education are not studied and applied. Secondary schoolmasters often sit down contented with results which would insure the prompt dismissal of a primary schoolmaster in our remotest glens. They assume that nothing more can be made of boys than *they* make. They are utterly wrong. We recently saw a report by a distinguished headmaster of an English public school in which he spoke of the attainments of all boys, outside three or four racehorses who had specialised with a view to Oxford and Cambridge scholarship competitions, as "graded ignorance." Very honest this; but very lamentable. And this headmaster was one of those who publicly and deliberately gave it as his opinion that young Oxford and Cambridge graduates, who took up the work of education, had no need to study their life-work in its principles, history, and methods, because they had already had perfect models in their own teachers, and would likewise have them in the headmasters under whom they might take service! Our conviction is that

an examination of English secondary schools, in which the results were honestly put before the public, would explode our present system.

The restricted curriculum which we have briefly sketched is, we repeat, adequate, and should be universal. It is also practical and fits for life, "commercial" and other. There is no "modern" side in education. Education rests on principles. What is good for the future cleric is good for the future physician, schoolmaster, lawyer, merchant, publicist, and civil servant; and it is these guides, governors, and instructors of the nation that we have alone to consider in our secondary schools. Education is no respecter of persons or occupations.

But the above course of instruction, while sufficient for all educative purposes, still leaves a large portion of the school time-table a blank. There is room for more. In seeking about for other subjects, we may now allow ourselves to be wholly guided by practical considerations. And whether the boy is to be a cleric, a physician, a lawyer, a scientific expert, or a merchant, French and German urge their claims with irresistible force. In the first year of these languages not less than five hours a week, exclusive of preparation, should be set apart for each, and three hours in future years. French should be begun one year, and German the following.

A recent writer who is also a high official in the Education Office contrasts the Latin and Greek of our highest public schools with what he calls "slipshod French and inaccurate German." It may be that that gentleman found his own French and German when he left school slipshod and inaccurate; but, not to waste time in speaking of German, there is in French a training to accuracy and exactness and linguistic form of the most admirable kind,—in my opinion not excelled even by Greek. If it is not so well taught in our schools as Greek and Latin, this is a defect which can be remedied, and our duty is to remedy it. Is there no such thing as slipshod Greek? Ask the examiners for the "Little-go" at Cambridge.

Again, how long shall we continue to ignore the fact that the masters of literature, philosophy, art, and science in Great Britain knew little Greek? Because the early stages of French are comparatively easy, the French language as a discipline and culture is depreciated.

The Time-table is now full. With Greek we certainly part most reluctantly; but the claims of French and German are in these days such that Greek can find (I say it with regret) no place in the *enforced* curriculum of secondary schools. As a specific subject for the few who mean to be clergymen, philologers, or classical schoolmasters, it ought to be provided; but not demanded of all.

Art, however, need not be neglected: the adornment of the schoolrooms with good casts and facsimile photographs will engage the interest of every good teacher. Singing from notation will be taught twice a week, and drawing will have three hours weekly assigned to it. This would extend the school-day to seven hours, but these subjects do not add to the weight of the curriculum, but rather lighten it. Workshops also ought, like covered gymnasiums, to form a part of the equipment of every school, especially in a climate like ours. Manual work has a certain intellectual as well as moral significance in education, and it is especially valuable for that class of society which does not live by manual labour.

Now the clamorous school of educationalists outside will begin each to push his own peculiar hobby. We shall be asked, "If this be all, where is instruction in the laws of health? where instruction in our civil constitution, and the duties of citizenship? where are physics and chemistry?" The answer is that the first two questions are put by those pedants in education who imagine that to teach a subject one must give it a place in a time-table, and prescribe a text-book. The laws of health ought certainly to be taught to every boy, but a few diagrams and simple experiments, and eight or nine

familiar lessons in the last year of school attendance will give all that is necessary for hygienic purposes. As to citizenship and the constitution, this kind of knowledge is, as a matter of course, conveyed in connexion with the historical reading by every master who is really competent to teach history, and is familiar with the demands of method. Science again is sufficiently represented in the nature-knowledge included under the head of Geography largely interpreted. The theory of Chemistry and the abstractions of Physics are not more educative than the learning of a Greek verb; because they are, and can only be, received by a boy as *facts*, not as the outcome of his own investigation and inductive reasoning. He gets them by heart, which means by rote, and is consequently wasting his time, and merely learning to hate science[1]. The properties of matter and the mechanical powers, we willingly grant, when well-taught are educative, because they are capable of visible and palpable illustration; and we further admit that such elementary notions of Chemistry as bear directly on the constitution of matter can be taught experimentally with great advantage. So also can Botany, if it means the dissection of a plant by the boy himself under supervision. But if education in other and more important subjects is to be thorough, these subjects (which are the object-lessons of the secondary school), while they must be kept in view, must be treated not as serious studies demanding the application of a boy's full powers, but merely as parerga designed to interest and stimulate the intelligence. They will be more effective for this purpose if not formally prescribed. There is too much formal and magisterial lesson-giving in schools. These subjects should involve no lesson-*learning*. They should be handled conversationally, and a really good teacher of these might quite

[1] *Concentration* on these subjects if taught as *laboratory* subjects after 16 years of age is educative, but in that case language must yield its place to them. Is this desirable except in technical schools or departments of schools?

safely, with excellent results, make his conversational prelections optional so far as the boys were concerned; for if he were a *good* teacher every boy would come.

Our main object in this consideration of secondary instruction is to bring into prominence the necessity of organizing the instruction, not in a fragmentary way, not by the arbitrary setting up of different lines of study, not by external considerations, not in obedience to the clamour of the hour, but on broad and sound educational principles. What is good for one boy is good for another; and what is good for a boy is, so far as *general* education goes, good for a girl up to the age of 17 or 18 if she has time to spare from art studies. If there is anything in educational principles at all, there must be a unity in educational ends and methods and a unity in the educational curriculum. All outside what is best for the true education of a boy is of the nature of study undertaken for a specific, external, bread-earning purpose; for this I have provided the necessary time as far as modern languages are concerned, while indicating that the last year of attendance might be devoted to specialized work adapted to the future destination of the boy. If a boy is either too idle or too stupid to benefit by the general education offered to him, he can be kept in the same class until his father, disgusted, removes him, as much to the boy's own advantage as to that of the school, and puts him to some private classes or to a trade. The education of the country is not to be sacrificed to a few stupid or idle boys.

Remember that the quantity of knowledge to be acquired is not much—ought not to be much. No man who has had any experience of the work done in schools cares much for an extension of the quantity professed. It is the quality which has to be looked to. Exact and thorough knowledge of elements in languages and mathematics, if possessed by a boy of 17, will enable him after that age to advance with giant

strides in these departments, if he chooses. Every student, who has given himself to serious, independent work after reaching the university stage, knows this.

Our conviction is that the re-organization of the instruction of our secondary schools is an urgent one. The Latin and Greek curriculum which now prevails, accompanied by a merely ostensible teaching of other subjects, will soon attract only those boys who are going to be clergymen, for already the other professions dispense with Greek and take a minimum of Latin. More Latin, along with French and English, might be then demanded. What we should aim at is to preserve the idea of the old system in so far as it can be shewn to be educationally sound, and yet, at the same time, to meet the modern wants of all sections of the middle class. And the idea of the old system was that by language boys can best be fitted to be men as well as to be practical workers. We cling to this idea. It is thus that we are truly Greek, not by studying Greek. We hold the Hellenic conception to be fundamentally sound even in these latter days. But in adapting this idea to modern conditions, we have interpreted language to mean, first of all our own tongue, and then Latin and other tongues as merely subsidiary to it. By Latin, however, let us say, we mean more Latin and better Latin than is at present taught. Surely it is a public scandal that not more than 10 or 15 per cent. of boys below the 6th form (which form is constituted by a kind of natural selection), get any real benefit from Latin as at present taught. To the teacher we say: Study methods, fix aims; apply your methods and you will attain your aims. Above all, teach language not only as an analytic exercise, but as concrete, as literature. It is quite possible to do this. Make the whole study living, and save humanism from being overwhelmed by the advancing wave of scientific realism. With humanism will go, remember, moral ideals, spiritual life, art

and poetry. What a bleak and barren prospect! Is it to be supposed that the character of the nation will not be affected by the educational revolution?

We can imagine now, the purely classical humanist who still lives in the atmosphere of the 16th century, asking, 'If Greek is to go and so much time is to be given to English, Latin, history, realistic subjects, modern languages, drawing and singing, what is to become of culture?' If culture means Greek, then we say that there will be as much of it in the future as now. The schoolboys at our secondary schools and universities who are fighting a losing game with Greek syntax and prosody may surely disappear from the scene, to the great joy of themselves and their masters, without lowering the standard of Greek scholarship. What a sham the whole business is—this of the culture of the young bowler and batter by means of Greek! How can classical masters look parents and the public in the face with the dire secrets of the examination room in their pockets? Talk of augurs not being able to pass each other without a smile! If giving up culture means giving up the ability to write Latin and Greek prose at which Cicero and Plato would shake their heads, and verse at which Horace and Euripides would laugh, it had better go. Culture is not possible on these terms, never was possible except for 2 or 3 per cent. of the boys who frequent our secondary schools. Is the education of the country to be sacrificed to the small percentage of such successes? While allowing for the continued production of these linguistic experts, a public system ought to succeed in giving the full benefits of its organized curriculum to at least 70 per cent. of those whom it professes to prepare for life.

And, after all, what is culture? We readily grant that a man who can turn out neat verses in Latin and Greek is a man of culture, not because of the verses he produces (that would be absurd), but because the skill he displays is evidence

that he has gone through a long course of linguistic and humanistic training, which effloresces in this particular way. But such special accomplishments are, as a matter of fact, very seldom found in conjunction with culture in its truer and larger sense. If I find a man with a command of his own powers, with an open intelligence, with interests outside his own personality and his own particular department, with a feeling for the historical past, with a love for art-forms, and with high aims in life, I recognize in such a man the humanistic and human habit of mind in its broadest sense; and him I would call a man of culture. Many learned men are stupid, many scholarly men are oddities, many scientific experts are boors. It is the ethical outcome which Pericles and Plato, I imagine, would have called culture. And such culture is not the exclusive possession of academic aristocrats who can turn verses or fight over emendations. It is in order to promote that larger culture, which alone is Hellenic culture, that our schools, primary, secondary, and university have their existence as parts of the national polity; and (leaving out, meanwhile, all consideration of universities) we believe that such culture can be best promoted in schools by the curriculum which we have sketched, if masters understand their business.

But here lies the difficulty—with the masters, not with the boys. To turn over the teaching of English to men who have no love of literature and no understanding of the methods whereby it may be made to stimulate the minds of the young, or to ask a master to teach geography who is not himself an expert in geography, with a fair knowledge of geology and physics, as well as a student of economics, is to ensure failure. Such a mode of procedure would introduce into even the richest and most fruitful of subjects the barrenness and aridity of the old gerund-grinding. And fulness of knowledge alone will not suffice for the master: the study of the principles and methods of education is essential. But what hope have we of

this when we find headmasters of great public schools openly telling us that they have nothing to learn, and that they, and those who have the privilege of working under them, have already reached "perfection's sacred height"? There are not a few certainly who are born teachers—men with a singular capacity for guiding youthful minds; but the great majority must always be dependent on the study of the history, principles and methods of their craft for the due discharge of their educative function. "Even the youngest" fellow of a college may have something to learn from Plato, Quintilian, Ascham, Comenius, and Locke.

NOTE. The subject of the training of secondary schoolmasters has made considerable progress since the above was written.

IX.

THE UNIVERSITY AND THE PEOPLE; AND THE UNIVERSITY OF THE FUTURE[1].

NOTWITHSTANDING the difficulties that surround the question of the rise and early constitution of Universities, the leading historical outlines have for some time been clear enough, it seems to me; sufficiently so, at least, to enable us to understand the purpose of the higher institutions of learning and to forecast their function in the future.

But if we are to do this and to convey to the reader anything but a mass of uninterpreted facts, we must find a point of view which will also be a point of departure. We must go back to the pre-Christian world, and find there the beginnings of our modern academic life. The reader must not be impatient of apparently remote events if he desires to understand the universities of the present day, still less if he would form an intelligent conception of the aims of the "university of the future."

We may say, generally, that the chief purpose of the higher academic institutions was always KNOWLEDGE. This knowledge, however, had always for its aim a practical purpose—the explanation of man's life and destiny and the settlement of

[1] Written by request for the Annual Blue Book of the Trade Unions, 1893.

questions which bore on the personal conduct of life and practical organizations.

Three nations have moulded the life of modern Europe—Palestine, Greece, and Rome. As soon as these nations had settled down to civilized life and had leisure to "look before and after," there gradually grew up among them groups of men who devoted themselves to investigation and thought. In every political organization, the mass of men are too deeply engrossed in industrial work or in the duties of government and war, to find time to do more than acquiesce in the theory of life which they have inherited from their ancestors, and which is embodied in their customs, religion, and laws. Only a few can give themselves to thought with a view to knowledge and the criticism of custom. So it is now, and so it will ever be. And if we are to continue to advance in knowledge of nature and man, and in a true comprehension of the significance of human life, the growing pressure of industrial competition and the clamant demands of each exacting day make it more than ever necessary that institutions should exist in which a few men may be set apart to maintain the connection of the present with the past, and to advance the knowledge of mankind for the benefit of their fellow-men. It is true that men, so set apart, often forget mankind in their devotion to their subjects, and prosecute their studies with little thought of their practical bearing; but none the less, perhaps all the more, are they the leaders of thought and the benefactors of their race. The printing-press disseminates their results, and all can now share in the fruits of their labour. The love of knowledge is in man inextinguishable, and the attainments of one generation are but the starting-point for new enterprises of discovery.

Accordingly, were it the fact that "knowledge for the sake of knowledge" exclusively engaged the universities of Europe and America, it would still be necessary to maintain them in the interests of humanity at large and the ideal realities that

give a meaning to the life of man. But they do not exist for this purpose alone, but for teaching what is known to all who frequent their halls, for preparing the next generation of investigators, and for training to the various professions that minister to our daily wants. These professions rest on knowledge, and universities give it. The clergyman, the physician, the lawyer, the teacher, can (speaking generally) find in universities alone the knowledge bearing on their respective fields of social activity, ready organized and fashioned for their use; and so with the engineer and the agriculturist, in so far as the principles that guide practice are concerned. Accordingly, every man, however humble, who benefits by the laws of his country, whose diseases are diagnosed and alleviated, whose children are instructed, and to whom the teachings and consolations of religion are offered, is a debtor to universities. And it is scarcely necessary to point to the close connection of the higher mathematics and physics with engineering, railways, telegraphy, steamships, etc., etc., and of chemistry with innumerable industrial arts, to satisfy even the most exacting that to universities are largely due not only the thought that elevates the mind of man and lifts him to a higher plane of existence, but also that exact knowledge which makes his life more tolerable while it lasts, and promotes further advances in the conquest of nature and in the equitable adjustment of social relations. It is true that, in modern times, much of the function of universities is discharged with surpassing ability through the agency of those living outside them, by means of the printing-press; but the majority, if not indeed all, these active agents in civilization ultimately owe their knowledge and inspiration to the work of men who live alone for abstract knowledge, and who are chiefly to be found now, as in the past, within academic walls working in accordance with academic methods. It will be apparent, then, that universities, which at first sight seem remote from the life of the ordinary citizen, are in truth closely connected with that life,

existing, as they do, not merely for knowledge but for the dissemination of knowledge, which is thus made the possession of all. No institution, accordingly, is so essentially democratic in its aims, for none is so universal in the benefits it confers, irrespectively of race, religion, or social position. I think it of the utmost importance that those to whom this paper is addressed—the trade-organizations of Great Britain—should realize these facts. The universities are the true friends of the people.

It will be apparent that I am using the word "university" to include all schools of higher learning set apart for young men and women above eighteen years of age, the aim of which is at once scientific and practical—that is to say, which exist to prosecute departments of human inquiry and to teach what is known to others. By these tests we may always safely try the higher university schools of the past and the present. If they fail to identify themselves with the advancement of learning, but confine themselves to the teaching and training of the youth of the country with a view to the professions, they discharge only partially the function of universities. If, again, they aim at knowledge for its own sake alone, they become semi-monastic institutions, and are divorced from the life of the nation: if, further, they take up only one part of the encyclopædia, they become departmental colleges and forfeit the name of University.

These remarks are not unnaturally suggested by our reference to the sources of our modern academic life—Palestine, Greece, and Rome. In Palestine we find the higher intellectual life of the Hebrews in the "schools of the prophets[1]," out of whom came the men who formed the religious and moral conceptions of the Jewish race. These men of genius gave us

[1] I use this expression, though well aware of the want of exact knowledge as to the organization of the "schools," if they might be strictly called by this name.

the Old Testament, in so far as it is a book for the whole world and not merely for a Semitic tribe. They desired to *know*, but the supreme object of their knowledge was God and the relation of men to Him. Consequently they were great spiritual teachers, not only to the Jews, but to all mankind.

Among the Greeks, we find that the thought of that wonderful race (represented chiefly at Athens) did not restrict itself to the idea of God (for which indeed they may be said to have substituted the Beautiful and Art), but sought knowledge in every direction, impartially and with an open eye, giving to Europe great philosophies and the elements of the sciences, as well as a pure and noble literature which, in the interests of the humblest modern citizen, must ever be conserved and studied anew.

In Rome, again, we find a practical spirit. The Romans took up Greek thought and speculation, and tried to correlate it with the practical life of man. In so far as they speculated at all, they followed the Greeks; in so far as they were original, their higher schools gave prominence to law and oratory—the one to regulate social life and the administration of the State, the other to influence opinion and direct current politics and public policy.

If, now, we leap forward over a space of about 2000 years to the present day, we find that a fully-equipped university comprehends these three great human aims—knowledge of God and His relations to man and the world; knowledge pursued in the Hellenic spirit, wide and impartial, including philosophy, literature, science; and jurisprudence and politics pursued after the Roman manner. To these has been added, in the course of the centuries, and as necessary outcome of the primary ideas, the scientific study of medicine, of history, philology, engineering, agriculture, and education, some of these more obtrusively "practical" in the ordinary sense of that word than the others, but all claiming a place in our

higher institutions of learning, in so far as they rest on abstract knowledge and can be handled *scientifically*. To constitute a modern ideal university accordingly, which is at the same time to be the university of the future, we have to take all that was valuable in the higher teaching of antiquity, and to extend our investigations on every side in accordance with the spirit and needs of the time we live in. The ancient nations, it is true, had no higher schools with the designation of "universities," nor any institution with an encyclopædic aim, but they had the reality without the name, each in its own special line of national genius. To the Greeks, for example, we owe scientific medicine and our medical faculties; but, except at Alexandria, medicine was not included in the philosophical and rhetorical schools, which were the true universities of Greece, and subsequently of Rome. And yet, by a succession of distinguished men, Medicine, closely bound up with the study of nature, was taught to willing disciples; and when, after a lapse of time, modern Europe began to rise out of the ruins of the Roman Empire, Medicine at once took its place as a leading academic subject.

About 2000 years ago there occurred a great breach in the intellectual continuity of the race. With the exception of Palestine, the religious faiths of the ancient world were going to pieces when Christ appeared, and the higher schools of thought were themselves fast degenerating into arenas for speculative disputations or into rhetorical forcing-houses. They had worn themselves out. The earnest pursuit of truth for truth's sake was represented only by a man of genius here and there. The more earnest minds, having thrown off the superstitions by which their ancestors had lived, were clinging to some scheme of philosophy which seemed to offer them the only solution of man's life and duty in this transitory existence. The teaching of Christ now intervened, with its direct bearing on human life in all its relations. The divine enthusiasm, which it inspired in its converts, began to remould

the civilized world, and, even before the recognition of Christianity by the Emperor Constantine towards the end of the fourth century, its doctrines had engaged the attention of almost all the ablest minds. It is, however, an error to suppose that the new religion undermined the university schools of Athens, Alexandria, and Rome. These were already tottering to their fall, when the new spiritual movement made them in the fifth century an anachronism. Had Christianity, indeed, assumed a purely negative attitude to the Romano-Hellenic life and culture, and done no more, it would have to be classed among the destructive powers of barbarism. But it had its positive side; it had in it a power to build up as well as to throw down. It introduced more than one new idea into the life of our race. It broadened and deepened the sentiment of the common brotherhood of man, which the Stoics had preached, by giving to sympathy and love a divine sanction. It gave spiritual solidarity to the human race. Most important of all, it fortified the growing sense of personality. The individual was now not only a free, thinking spirit which had its personal life and personal rights, but this self-conscious spirit, the true person of each individual, was now seen to be rooted in God—to be of infinite importance even in His eyes. Thus, by one stroke, as it were, the personality of each man was deepened, nay, consecrated, while at the same time his bond of sympathy with all other human beings, as children of the same Father, was strengthened. Two opposite results were thus attained; and these two were conciliated. For the deepening of man's spiritual, personal life meant in truth the life with God, and it was in and through this life that his personality became a matter of infinite worth. This rooting of the finite subject in the eternal and universal Being, while giving infinite worth to the soul of each man, at the same time made impossible that insolence of individualism and self-assertion which had characterized the sophistical movement among the Greeks. Man became as a personality much

greater than the most exalted Stoic could have conceived; but by the very same movement he was taught humility, dependence, toleration, humanity, love. Education had now to be reconstructed from this foundation.

As may be easily understood, that part of the new doctrine which taught that man lived for a hereafter, and that this life was a preparation for that hereafter, first told on the educational efforts of the time. The leaders of the new Evangel directed themselves chiefly to catechising and instructing with a view to a city not of this world; and they did so in expectation of the early dissolution of all things. They also began to prepare ministers of Christian doctrine; for the people had to be instructed in the new philosophy of life, and temple services had to be conducted. There was great moral activity and a wide comprehensiveness in the new "sect"; and so far as education was concerned, it might fairly be said that every Christian assemblage where the Gospels were read, prayers offered, and hymns sung, was a people's school. To discharge this religious duty and to train its ministers was as much as the infant community could be expected to do. This it did in the catechetical and, afterwards, in the episcopal schools[1]; and thus a fresh beginning was made for the education of the human race.

The rise of Christianity and Christian education, and the irruption of the Teutonic races into the fruitful fields of Southern Europe, finally dissolved ancient society, and swept away the very memory of Hellenic genius. Even in the East, where nations were held together by Byzantine dynasties governing from Constantinople, it was the settlement of Christian doctrine that now exclusively engaged the minds of men, and, save in the department of jurisprudence, and of medicine (at Alexandria), the Hellenic and Roman conceptions of man and nature had disappeared. But even in the

[1] The catechetical schools, as distinct from pagan institutions, date from the close of the second century.

defining and developing of Christian dogma, which had been going on side by side with the decay of ancient learning, there were no great minds engaged after the death of St Augustine (395 A.D.); and for 600 or 700 years after his death, the higher education, as it had been understood at the great ancient seats of learning, was practically non-existent. Ancient books and traditions, however, were fortunately preserved in the monasteries, and such learning as existed was to be found in these secluded religious communities.

If we are to understand modern Europe, we must, at this point of history, turn our back on the disintegrating past and fix our eyes on the new constructive forces which were already beginning in the fourth and fifth centuries to mould the Europe of the future. These forces were essentially ethical in their character, as indeed are all the forces which ultimately determine and explain the history of nations. On the one hand, the Christian scheme of a philosophy of life, and on the other hand, the civil and the civilizing law of Rome, were the great living operative institutions. It was a grand conception, this new conception of a universal Church. Men organized not merely as political societies, but as a one all-embracing spiritual society independent of national distinctions—a community of souls whose ethical life and immortal destiny were the supreme concern, all else being subordinate, and of small (because transitory) importance. This Church idea ran parallel for a time with the civil and secular law of the State, but ere long it sought to overpower the latter, as it had already overshadowed it. Hence the beginnings of a contest between two principles still alive in our own day, a contest which at bottom is a struggle between the civil and the spiritual conception of society.

It was the spiritual power which alone, as might have been expected, concerned itself with education; and nothing could consistently be held by it to contribute to the forming of the life of a human being save what trained up to the Church

conception of human life, which was necessarily a theological conception. Greece and Rome, as sources of intellectual and moral teaching, had been blotted out, and the atmosphere breathed for at least 750 years was, essentially, that of Palestine. Men, however, could not live permanently bound and restricted by the theological idea and the narrow formalism of a crystallized creed. The perennial and ever-recurring claims of reason as reason had to be satisfied. It was in the eleventh century that the mind of Europe began to be stirred to activity in various directions outside the ecclesiastical. In the field of education it gave itself to the furtherance of the higher learning only, and not to the education of the people. And, I think, rightly. What the people chiefly wanted was good clerics, good physicians, good teachers, good lawyers; and for this they had to look to higher schools, afterwards called universities. More is accomplished for the civilization and education of the masses by supplying every part of a country with good professional men than by teaching everybody their A, B, C. The educated professional few carry with them a standard of life wherever they go, while serving their fellow-men in all that concerns their daily needs and highest interests.

The voluntary associations of learned men which represented the awakening mind of Europe, and formed the nucleus of universities, were in truth engaged in restoring the thought of Greece and Rome in connection with the now dominant and organized Christianity. Roman law in its full historical sense, and Greek philosophy and medicine, formed the substance and source of the new teaching. The men of the 12th century were, in truth, knitting together the broken continuity of the life of human reason. The thought of Greece and Rome had now to be co-ordinated with that of Palestine in the education of a modernized Europe.

It will be apparent from what I have said that the modern Universities had now, and henceforth, for their function the

carrying forward, in accordance with modern methods, of the united traditions of Palestine, Greece, and Rome, and, as pioneers of humanity, advancing the bounds of knowledge on all the ancient lines. They did this, however, and are still doing it, in no abstract spirit, but with a view to place men on a higher plane of rational life and also to prepare for the various professions, so that the *whole nation* may, through the professions, benefit by the endowments which have been left by far-seeing citizens, and the privileges which have been granted by wise monarchs and statesmen.

It was, in point of fact, this practical and professional side of the higher learning which engaged the attention of the originators of universities — then called *Studia Publica* or *Generalia*. The earliest of these institutions was, in fact, a medical college, with, of course, a preparatory training in arts (1060). It was situated in the ancient health-resort of Salerno, near Naples, and, if it did not owe its origin to the Benedictine monks of Monte Cassino, not far off, who had always a reputation as skilful leeches, it was certainly indebted to them for much of its early reputation. The next institution holding university rank was Bologna, which also was a specialist school devoting itself to Law (1080). The university of Paris may perhaps rank next in order[1]: theology constituted its special study, and teaching and the services of the Church its practical aim. But as theology required for its scientific treatment the study of philosophy (including under this ethics and Aristotelian physics), it naturally and early came about that for philosophy and theology Paris was eminent, and kept the lead of Europe for centuries. Oxford and Cambridge next arose as schools of arts and theology, and Montpellier, in France, had already established itself as a school of medicine.

It was only after these universities, or specialist *studia publica*, had existed for a considerable time that each began

[1] When we consider the standard of teaching at Notre-Dame, Paris may be almost regarded as cotemporary with Salerno and Bologna.

to add to itself (and that very gradually) the "faculties" in which it was deficient; and accordingly, before the year 1300, no institution was regarded as a complete university which did not profess investigation and teaching in the four faculties of theology, law, medicine, and arts. By "arts," in its more restricted sense, was meant grammar, logic, rhetoric, and mathematics.

It was not necessary, however, that all the faculties should be included in order to justify the title of "university," for this word meant nothing more than a *Studium Publicum*, or *Universale*, or *Generale*; that is to say, a school open to all the world which gave the higher teaching in one or more departments, and granted a qualification to practise the professions or to teach in the universities. To this day, many of the universities are incomplete in their faculties, and it is only of late years that great universities like Oxford and Cambridge have revived faculties which had been allowed to die, such as medicine and law. In the ancient university of St Andrews, in Scotland, there is even now no faculty of law, and Aberdeen is only forming one. The faculty of medicine also in St Andrews is only now being established on a proper basis, largely by means of a separate, but incorporated, college in Dundee.

The above facts sufficiently show that the original aim of the higher schools of the modern world was practical and professional; nor could they have existed on any other terms. It was at Paris alone that philosophical inquiry, embracing under philosophy questions of natural science in accordance with Hellenic tradition, truly flourished, leading in the course of time to freedom of speculation and to scientific investigation, and thus indirectly accomplishing much for the political liberties of Europe by promoting liberty of thought in abstract fields.

The Renaissance of the 15th century only very tardily affected the work of the universities; but during the last 100 years the conception of their function and their duty to the

nation has been expanding: and, in these days, our modern requirements have given an impulse which is being everywhere felt. The response to our demands for a larger interpretation of humanism, by assigning a high place to history, economics, modern languages and literatures in the ordinary graduation curriculum, is doubtless tardy; but this is largely due to want of funds and insufficient pressure from the outside.

Let us now advert to the constitution of the first universities, which is the next point of interest as bearing on the university of the future.

Universities were, to begin with, not founded either by Pope or King. They were voluntary associations or colleges of teachers, who offered to instruct all who came to them with a view to the different professions. They lived by fees. They had no public buildings. The lectures of the masters or doctors were given in their own houses or in hired halls. Their great ceremonies were performed in churches borrowed for the occasion. These voluntary associations of learned men were free, in so far at least as they professed and taught in independence of monastic restrictions, although, it is true, monks taught, and, in course of time, monastic orders tried to get possession of the academic machinery. The university, accordingly, is to be regarded as not only marking the beginning of professional studies, but as the beginning of the liberation of the mind of Europe from the monastic and ecclesiastical control of the earlier half of the Middle Ages. It is an exaggeration, I think, to say that the university was a "lay" movement in antagonism to the Church, but it was unquestionably a lay institution and contained the seeds of intellectual liberty. To the university accordingly the modern world is deeply indebted. It can never pay its debt, so great is it. And, resting on a historical basis and discarding merely theoretical views, we may affirm this, in addition to certain other propositions already implicitly laid down as emerging

from the above survey of academic origins, viz. that freedom of thought and speech is essential to the idea of a university, just as it was in the inmost heart of them when they began to live.

Further, I would say that these self-constituted, self-governing communities moulded themselves, consciously or unconsciously, on the mediæval guilds. They were guilds of learning—literary guilds. Of these guilds even the scholars were, in some cases, members, and the Masters (afterwards called regents and professors) held very much the same relation to the scholars as a master in an industrial guild held to his apprentices. The masters were equal one with another and elected their own rectors (in some cases with the concurrence and votes of the scholars). From this historical fact emerges another mark or note of a true university. It is a guild, republic, or commonwealth resting on intellect and character alone, and in no way dependent for the position of its members on the adventitious circumstances of fortune or birth.

Ere long the Pope granted Charters of Privilege to these institutions, and soon after kings and emperors began formally to found them within their dominions for the benefit, primarily, of their own subjects, though they were open to all the world. The stream of young men, constantly traversing Great Britain and Europe to study at Paris and Bologna, was thus gradually reduced. But it can be easily understood that the formal founding of universities and the granting of privileges gradually abstracted somewhat from the freedom and independence of the learned communities. But the freedom, independence, and autonomy were never wholly lost, and, under new forms, they substantially exist to this day in the leading universities of Europe. In so far as a learned institution is not autonomous, but governed by a single head or an outside committee or board, it is not the ideal university, but rather a magnified college or school, however great its reputation may be. There can be no

doubt that it is the freedom of thought and speech, the personal freedom, and the republican equality and autonomy of universities which, more than anything else, have attracted to them the intellects of Europe. The university has existed from the first in the interests of the people, and, under democratic conditions, it is of vital importance that universities should be self-governing and free, and so be in a position to offer resistance to temporary phases of popular feeling or political despotism.

I may now sum up the characteristic notes of a university in its modern and best form as these are suggested by the above brief survey, and propound them anew as the essential marks of the university of the future:—

1. The university must embrace the whole tradition of philosophy (including under this religion), science, and learning (language, philology, literature, history, law, etc.), and each subject must be represented by a professional expert, with such lecturers, assistants, and tutors as may be required, working round him as centre.

2. As the university exists for knowledge which all are to share, each professor is under obligation to advance the bounds of his subject and contribute them to the world outside the university (and this should be done at the expense of the university, if need be).

3. Each professor, with his staff, must teach the subject, and the method of investigation peculiar to it, to all who may come to him, whether they intend to graduate or not. The professor is there to teach as well as to prosecute learning.

4. Each university must so group its studies as to train for *all* the professions, and so benefit the world at large by sending out its ambassadors and representatives among the people in every department of intellectual, as distinct from industrial, activity, so that all may share in the thought of universities.

5. Each university must, as a guild of investigators and

teachers, be a literary republic, self-governing and free, with only such restrictions and right of supervision as the State may, in the general interest, determine.

6. As a guild, each university must train apprentices and specialists, so as to secure the apostolic succession of competent representatives.

7. As the guardians of the realm of knowledge and ministers of science, each university must be at once a storehouse of the learning of the past and a leader of thought. To it, graduates, who, wherever they may be, always remain members of the guild, should be encouraged to return from time to time to find there (without payment) the last results of investigation—each in his own department of social activity. And this for the general weal.

I hold, further, that an Institution, however encyclopædic and however free, is not worthy of the name University which does not recognize as sum and consummation of all its teaching the science of Man and the conduct of life. It is thought on man as man which has yielded all our religions and philosophies, and to which all sciences are merely contributory; and the modern question is how, in the midst of the diverse and conflicting studies that claim a place, the end and issue of all study can be so kept before the student as to lift him out of the particular studies, that tend wholly to engross him, into a personal relation with the "things by which men live." Literature, art, philosophy, religion—these constitute the true life of man, and they should in some form or other enter into the culture of every youth who is to go forth as the legitimate son of a university and not as the bastard child of a specialist school. Somehow or other, all specialist and professional training should be liberalized. In view of these things, it is a matter of constant surprise to me that men concerned for the "ancient studies" should have so often failed to welcome the introduction into our graduation courses of modern literatures, history and economics and of such applications of philosophy as

Education. In their zeal for the form of Hellenism they have become pedantic and anti-Hellenic.

The urgent present-day question is "To what extent are the ancient universities to adapt themselves to modern requirements in the application of science to the industrial arts?" viz. Engineering, Mining, Agriculture, Manufactories of all kinds of products—even bread and beer. To a certain extent some of these subjects have already found a footing in our universities. This seemed to be the only way of giving them the necessary status. But now, the pressure of international rivalry has given rise to what may be regarded as a new university movement and led to the founding of Technical Colleges. I cannot but think that it is in the true interests of mankind, that instruction in all the practical applications of science which have to do with bodily needs, should be outside the universities and find a home in separate Technical Colleges. In the interests of these Colleges I say so, as well as out of regard for the higher purposes of our ancient Institutions. I have elsewhere given to the fully equipped Technical College the name Industrial University: and I hold that all endowments which have industrial ends in view should go to these modern Institutions, and that, where they attain to a university standard of teaching, they should be affiliated to the old universities as the Technical Faculty[1]. If the industrial applications of science take their place within the old universities, there is a danger of their overshadowing the subjects which pertain to the higher interests of humanity.

As to the financial support of universities: It is quite clear that if these Institutions are to accomplish their work for the nation they cannot be self-supporting. Even primary schools cannot be self-supporting, much less secondary schools, least of all universities. They have to look ultimately not to individual benefactors, but to the whole body of the people

[1] Veterinary Colleges teaching on a university standard might also be affiliated.

for maintenance. They are entitled to it in a sense in which no other institution is entitled to it, because, as I have shown, they work for every profession and for the *whole* nation, and not for a part of it only. Moreover, they know no sect or party in their official capacity. Let the idea and purpose of universities, as I have endeavoured to explain it, be thoroughly understood by the people, and the people will not grudge their fitting maintenance. In Germany, where the university idea has been most fully developed, the State contributes 72 per cent. of the total expenditure. In England and America (outside the State universities) the main source of revenue is private endowment and the fees of the students. In Scotland the State contributes about £70,000 a year.

As regards the students *in statu pupillari*—these are presumed to enter on their various groups of studies fitted to do so, not merely by acquired knowledge, but by maturity of mind. Graduation in this or that subject or group, so far from being essential to a university, may be said to be, in these days, almost a superstition. Universities, it is true, have inherited the sole privilege of granting degrees; but they do not exist for this purpose. They exist to prosecute study for the sake of mankind, and to equip young men for the work of life and the prosecution of knowledge. In the interests of the people and for their protection, however, it is necessary that every man and woman entering a profession should have a certified qualification, and this we call a "degree." Such a qualification is best to be had through universities, to which the privilege from the first belonged, and the State should always depute it to them in order to save the duplication of agencies, and to give strength and dignity to their highest educational institutions. But, except for this specific purpose, degrees are mere accidents of a university; and I sometimes think that, if there were less competition for honours in graduation and for the rewards attached to these, our universities would produce more and teach better. In any case, few, I hope, will

question the position that every professor and every subject should be accessible to the general public without reference to graduation.

Intelligent artisans, while frankly acknowledging the benefits they receive from universities, may yet sometimes feel aggrieved that they are not, for want of the necessary means, open to their sons. In a sound social system, the rise and fall of families is necessary to the health of the body politic and to the stability of social order. To facilitate this, reasonable provision should always be made to secure for scientific investigation and the professions the really able children of the poorer classes; but only the *really able.* Much nonsense has been talked about the "ladder" from the gutter to the university. Make that ladder easy of ascent to the ordinary youth, and, ere long, young men, of creditable diligence but of ordinary capacity, will find themselves, among a crowd of competing graduates, elevated to genteel destitution and supreme discontent, instead of earning an honest solid wage in the service of society in some congenial occupation. In this "ladder" phrase of the popular orator we encounter, it seems to me, both a superstition and a vulgarity. A superstition because many seem to imagine that the "higher education" can be obtained within the sacred walls of the university alone. This is in these days notoriously not the fact. *Professional* fitness, it is true, can alone be adequately obtained in such institutions (including Technical Colleges), but *education* can now be obtained outside them by all who have it in them to care about their own intellectual and moral progress. Libraries, cheap literature and lecture courses, have placed within the reach of every youth in our towns (and will ere long do the same for our villages also) all the education a man needs for either this world or the next. I guard myself so far as to say that the "ladder" has a meaning, and it should exist, as it has always existed in Scotland, for the specially able;

but I hold, in the interests of the climbers themselves, that it should be difficult to mount. Were a university course necessary to education and culture of a human being, the ladder should then be made easy to climb; but to suppose this is to be the victim of a survival of an effete idea. Education is what *all* want, and *all* may now get it, if they choose, without going to universities.

I have often said that true education—the culture of the whole rational and emotional nature of a man—is to be got only through humanistic studies. What I desire now to urge is that education in this true sense is now within the reach of the vast majority of those who never enter universities. It is through the personal enjoyment of literature, art, and speculative thought that culture can alone come. A young man may have "got up" the masterpieces of Greece and Rome, but if it has been done for an external purpose and he has not enjoyed a living contact with the great minds of the past, he is less cultivated than an artisan whose intellect and heart respond with lively emotion to Shakespeare, Burns and Tennyson and to the ethical and spiritual inspirations of the Old and New Testaments. The phrase by which men would in these days conjure, viz., "ladder from the gutter to the university," embodies an anachronism in so far as it regards university life as essential to education. It misses the meaning of human life and shuts its eyes to present facts. There is a "professional" and expert knowledge of subjects, which a university can alone fully give; and there is an educative knowledge which is not restricted within Academic walls.

On the other hand, it is of great national importance that as large a proportion as possible of those who can afford the time should be drawn into the universities and go through a regular curriculum; and to ensure this, it is incumbent on universities to extend liberally the conditions of graduation by providing courses of cognate studies which will attract young men who aim at culture, but who do not

contemplate a "profession"—Merchants, Diplomatists, Publicists, Politicians. To accomplish this, and to attract the kind of student to whom I refer, modern subjects must be put on a substantial equality with the classical tongues. To doubt the value of the intellectual discipline which a young man obtains by translating into Latin or Greek prose is a mark of ignorance; but the question is, can this discipline be, at least approximately, got on modern lines? Have the most distinguished thinkers and masters of literary expression in Europe been experts in Latin or Greek prose? It is also a mark of ignorance to maintain that a man is fully equipped for linguistic and literary appreciation who is ignorant of the masterpieces of antiquity. But we cannot allow a consideration such as this to govern a national system of education. It gives too narrow a basis.

I have said also that the "university ladder" is a vulgarity as well as a superstition, because there underlies it the notion that, only by rising into a higher social class in life than that into which he was born, can a man fulfil his function as a man, and be also "happy." Provision must of course be made for the absorption, into the professions and the work of investigation, of the very best brains of the poorer classes: but, speaking generally, there can be no doubt that the average man will best attain both education and "happiness" by doing thoroughly well the business for which he is best suited, it matters not what it is. Infinitely more important than the "ladder" are such industrial arrangements as shall admit of social relaxation, literary interests, and intelligent political study on the part of all. It is not desirable to *tempt* men into professions. The gospel of "getting on" is after all a devil's gospel. All any man can rationally desire is the means of adequately maintaining himself and his family under civilized conditions—conditions which will enable him to make the best of his humanity, while doing effectively his specific duty in the social organization.

If we might venture on the hazardous work of prediction

we might say that the university of the future will be simply the ideal university of the present; and this, as we have seen, is a product of the best traditions of the past. But is there nothing else and nothing new that they can in these days be expected to accomplish for the nation which supports them? This they can do—they can further extend their aims so as to embrace the theoretical treatment of all subjects that admit of scientific and philosophical handling. The nation is entitled to claim this comprehensiveness. Exclusiveness in particular lines of study will be fatal to universities when they finally rest on the popular will, as they must do in democratic countries; and it ought to be fatal to them. A university which imagines that it attains the ends of its existence by the production of a "classical fellow" is digging its own grave. Vast now are the fields of knowledge, vast the intellectual and ethical interests of mankind. In every field the university, while not breaking with the past, has to adapt itself to the present and the future, and in every department to investigate, to propound, and to guide. As soon as the broad current of the life of humanity passes them by, leaving their walls untouched by its living waters, they will perish, as some have perished in the past.

If the above be a correct statement of the social function of a university, it follows that a body constituted solely to examine for degrees usurps the name of university. It has only one characteristic of a true university, and that is an accidental and adventitious, rather than an essential, characteristic. It is, in my opinion, vital to true education that those who teach should also examine on the lines of study which they have laid down; assessors being appointed to check narrowness, and to secure an equitable exercise of a power which affects materially the rights of students.

There is still another way in which the university of the future will continue to extend its benefits and consequent influence; and this, by bringing them in immediate contact

with the people, will react on them by stimulating their vitality, for it will supply to them some of the breath which sustains the great world outside. I refer to the Extension Lecture system.

I am well aware that a sacred few who monopolize "true culture," and whose intellectual life revolves round elegant sentences and the settlement of all questions by epigrams, despise this form of university activity. The idea, however, is older and more respectable than these men think, for it will be found in the *New Atlantis* of Bacon. No doubt this recent movement requires criticism, and will be the better for it. Above all, it requires to be purged of the greatest of all the evils that attend it—examinations and marks. But who originated this essential departure from the idea of genuine education but the universities themselves, where examinations and marks flourish rampant, destroy unencumbered freedom of study, and tend to quench original investigation and devotion to truth irrespective of "rewards"? If we put an end to the false notion that extension lectures can of themselves give a university education, what but good can come of courses of lectures which widen the interests and help to direct the thinking of the middle and artisan classes? Every good movement has its attendant evils.

Professor Mahaffy, in a *Nineteenth Century* article, thinks it a poor result of the extension of popular education that those who have learned to read, read only trashy stories and partisan newspapers. But what is the result of secondary education among the upper classes, not "persons of the poorer sort" (whom Professor Mahaffy feels to come between the wind and his Academic nobility)? What does the Public School boy, who has been bred on what he calls the "great old studies," read? What does the young lady peruse in the boudoir after she has been duly "finished"? Who reads the "odious weekly press," with its adulteries, society scandals, fashion news, "fashionable intelligence," etc.? Professor Mahaffy

seems to think that it is the board-school boy and girl. Does he forget that these journals, with few exceptions, cost sixpence? In truth, the argument of the too clever Irishman is an argument against all education except that of the College don, who is to sit in his chamber and gaze with rapt eye at the "great old studies," although he probably has not read, except for professional purposes, a play of Sophocles or a line of Lucretius, since he used them for the double purpose of gaining money and place. Does he really, in his heart, think that the College "common room" product of the "great old studies" is the triumph of civilization?

Let me say, in conclusion, that the danger to which the university of the future is exposed, is interference with their liberty of thought and government on the part of the democracy. Slow to apprehend remote issues, and swayed by the impulse of the moment, the people may be intolerant of abstract study, and may also resent teaching which runs counter to their own temporary convictions and supposed interests. To obviate this, we can only look to the general diffusion of education, and to the action of the universities themselves in casting aside all narrow conceptions of their duties to the public.

X.

GEOGRAPHY IN THE SCHOOL[1].

I SHALL first consider what may be called the preliminaries of all method whatsoever in their specific relation to geography as a school-subject,—viz., the "*What*" and the "*Why*" of geographical instruction. I propose, thereafter, to speak of the "*How*" of geographical teaching; and without pretending to exhaust the subject, I shall, in this connection, lay before you some of the leading rules of Method in their special relation to Geography as a *school*-subject.

PRELIMINARIES OF METHOD.

I. *The* "WHAT."—Geography would, according to its etymology, be defined simply as a description of the earth—not necessarily including a description either of men on the earth, or of beasts or plants. The definition would comprise, however, atmosphere, climate, rain, hail, snow and thunder, and the movements of parts of the earth—currents, rivers, earthquakes, volcanoes, glaciers. A description of the earth in all these respects, if confined to them, would be an important part of Physical Geography, and this would necessarily embrace a certain amount of Geology as a part of the larger

[1] Delivered before the Royal Geographical Society of Scotland, Edinburgh, July 16, 1886.

Physical Geography. But we should have not merely to describe but to explain—that is to say, to unfold the characteristic causes of these phenomena and the relations and harmony of all the parts. Even in this restricted sense, Geography, properly taught, would be the most interesting, and, with the single exception of Literature, probably the most nutritive, the most feeding (if I may so speak), and therefore the most cultivating, of all school-subjects, although defective as a discipline. It is not to be despised by the classical master because it is a useful subject: to be useful is not to be utilitarian. It is the perception of "use" that gives interest to studies and stimulates the intelligence of young learners.

But it so happens, and this not solely owing to unthinking traditionary habit, that the term "Geography" has a wider range. For how can I speak, in any adequate sense, of soil and climate, of elevations and depressions and movements of the earth, without reference to the plant life and animal life which they support, and the kinds of these in any particular locality as determined by particular circumstances and general environment? And how shall I speak of animals, and omit the paragon of animals—man? And how shall I speak of man without considering types of race—the Mongolian, the Tartar, the Semitic, the Aryan? And when I touch upon the Aryan, how can I resist the fine field of observation supplied by the various species under this head—the Hellenic, the Italic, the Slavonic, the Teutonic? Still further, when speaking of these, how can I intelligently do so—how can I convey the mere facts, without relating them causally to physical and climatic conditions? But when I begin to do this, I find myself engaged with one aspect of the philosophy of history. I contemplate, say, the Mesopotamian basin or the Nile valley in all their physical characteristics, and I place men and beasts and plants there; and then I may almost turn round on an intelligent pupil, and ask him to predict the great outlines of the social and industrial history of these regions. For, if my class has been

well prepared, I may call on it to tell me the products of these countries, to anticipate their industries and commerce, to forecast the *tendency* at least of their religion and literature—indeed all the potentialities of their social and economic life, and all their possibilities of civilization. When, under my guidance, the class has exhausted its predictions, the actual history becomes a mere filling-in of details. When these details fail to correspond to our anticipations, the reasons of the failure—the omission by us of some condition of life or characteristic of Race, it may be, or the intervention of some influence from without—are themselves a fresh source of knowledge, and a stimulus to thought. The discovery of unexpected causal relations conveys a historical lesson, and contributes to that intelligent interpretation of everyday experience which is the main end of all our education on the intellectual side; for what is our aim in the realistic department of instruction, if not the placing of men in a rational attitude to the world past and present, and to the conditions of life by which they are now encompassed?

I may now, perhaps, after these remarks, venture to define (not Geography as a scientific pursuit but) SCHOOL Geography as a co-ordination of the elementary aspects of many sciences in their relation to the dwelling-place, the life and the works of man. This is an answer to the preliminary "*What.*"

The "WHY."—All possible subjects of instruction fall, speaking generally, into two classes—the formal or abstract (*e.g.* arithmetic, mathematics, language as grammar, logic), the main purpose of which is discipline; and the real or concrete, the main purpose of which is nutrition, and with and through this, training as distinct from discipline. Of the latter, the prime subjects are,—first, language as literature, and second, geography, as above liberally interpreted. Geography is all-embracing; it is rich and abundant in its material, and consequently has claims on the teacher of a paramount kind.

For, observe, boys (and men too) are hungry for the real. The formal in teaching is "too much with us." I find a class

of bright girls of fourteen years of age working sums in advanced arithmetic. Does any rational man doubt that lessons, say on Egypt, or Greece, or Italy, or Britain, conveying all that is included in the geography of these countries, would do more for the *minds* of these girls than discount or stocks?

Again, is it not an universally admitted principle that children are educated best through the sensible, and that up to fourteen, and indeed long after it (and sometimes indeed for the whole of life), the formal and abstract does not either discipline or cultivate as the real does? It is through things, and events as *things*, and thoughts as *things*, that children and men and women live and grow. Discipline merely sharpens the instrument by which they perceive and think. If this be so, then why is not this fruitful educational principle applied? If there be any difference of opinion about the principle as a principle, by all means let us discuss it. But if it be accepted, as I believe it universally is, why is it not applied? Now in the department of the real of sense, the THING (and I write this word in capital letters) is Geography. Teach this THING *as* a thing, and your results will be almost sure. And what admirable results! The engaging of the *desire* of the intelligence, if I may so speak; that is to say, the giving of a daily exercise of the intelligence so pleasing in its nature that the mind will always desire its repetition. You thus ensure an activity of mind which will not stop short of the THING—which, indeed, by the very nature of the intelligence itself, cannot stop short at the THING; for, once intellect moves, it moves for ever. It is irrepressible; it is so irrepressible as to be dangerous to society—so irrepressible as to be full of blessing to society. What a "result," I say! You, as an educator, have now attained your purpose on the intellectual side at least; and you may fold your hands in the consciousness of a work well done. In Geographical teaching, it is Nature and History that engage you. You

have seen into many things when teaching *the* thing. Climate, for example, has brought your pupils into immediate contact with the elements of physics, while the men who inhabit a country have brought your pupils face to face with history in its origins, with civilization as a growth, with economics as involved in the account you give of that country's industries.

You will thus have attained your educational purpose, I repeat, on the intellectual side. But am I right so to restrict my argument? Will the mind so exercised on the causes of *things* not also be constrained to exercise itself on the principles of *actions*? Will it not be more open than ever before to moral truths, as governing the conduct of men? Will it not have seen the working of moral principles in the characteristics of nations, in their economics, and in their national and individual life, and so have been furnished with a rich store of concrete teachings—worth a cart-load of abstract preachings?

Were the "Why" of geographical teaching to be summed up by the one word "information," it could have little or no interest for the thoughtful teacher. It is because of its intellectual and moral effects chiefly that Geography claims an important place in the education of youth. There is probably no one subject so prolific of matter for independent thought and judgment on the affairs of life. By means of it, too, we not merely furnish moral material, so to speak, but we extend the sympathies of the pupil, and lay the foundation of that sentiment of humanity which is the necessary counterpoise to narrow and parochial prejudices. Such teaching, accordingly, tends to comprehensiveness of mind, to the correction of hasty opinions, to the strengthening of patriotism, but at the same time to the moderation of insular patriotic insolence. It broadens the narrowness of the young, and the selfishness and exclusiveness of the adult. It is a sworn foe to the prig. It widens intelligence and enriches the whole mind, furnishing not only matter for reasonings, but

nutrition to the ethical sentiments and a stimulus to the imagination.

Need I add that, in an island home like ours, dependent, for its very existence, on its industrial relations on the one hand and the continual flow of emigration on the other, a knowledge of our connections with other men and other lands, especially our dominions beyond the seas, is essential to the right understanding and guidance of our own lives. There are men and women to this day so grossly ignorant of their geographical and human relations that they shrink from crossing the bounds of their parishes: a still greater number who dread a step beyond the limits of their counties. As an economic instrument, then, no less than as an intellectual and moral instrument, geography is probably unsurpassed by any other realistic subject of the school curriculum, excepting always literature.

Having briefly indicated the answers to the two *preliminary* questions of method, viz. the "*What*" and the "*Why*," we may now proceed to consider a few of the rules of method itself; in other words, the "*How*" of the teaching—Method-proper.

The "How."—And here I would first say to the teacher: 1. *Begin by considering the end.* All method in teaching a subject is to be governed by the ultimate end of your instruction; or, to put it more pointedly, by the concluding and consummating lesson you propose to give at the end of years of teaching—let us say, at the time your pupil, at the age of seventeen or eighteen, is leaving the secondary school. Now, in the department of geography, what kind of lesson is that? Let us figure it to ourselves. It is a lesson which, starting from the physical geography of a country, brings into view climatic conditions, and, in the consideration of the causes of these, involves a knowledge of elementary physics. It then proceeds to discuss the type of man—the

race—which has taken possession of the country under consideration; it shows how the necessities of life, concurring with physical conditions and configuration, have given rise to its industries and commerce, and have determined the localization of its towns and fortresses; how morality has arisen and social order has been maintained; how all these things, taken together, have moulded, through contact with the opposing interests and ideas of other nations, its military power, its art, and its literature—have, in short, made that nation all that it has been and can be. It overflows into history and goes on to tell how and to what extent the nation has contributed to the progress of humanity; it explains how it is that this country, and not that, has become the battle-field of rival empires. We next call upon our pupils to draw the country, putting in strongly its physical characteristics, and entering, in due causal relation, the leading towns and centres of population; and, finally, to write a paper on the basis of the lesson we have given. This, very briefly summed, is a geography lesson as it ought to be given to youths in the last year of their secondary-school work. It may have to be spread over several days; but when finished, we shall have given a kind of knowledge highly educative in its effect, *because* it is all given in relation to causes, and which is applicable, since it contains general principles, to other countries and peoples. By keeping this our last lesson in view, we are guided at every previous stage of our progress. So much for the first rule of method.

2. *Begin at the beginning.* This, the second rule, is like the first, a governing rule. No teaching of a subject in its final stages will take effect on the mind of the average pupil, unless we have prepared the way for the last lesson by a long and slow process of previous instruction which anticipates the end. This rule is apt to be disregarded. Some, for example, imagine that if you introduce boys of seventeen suddenly to literature or religion, they will comprehend them and take to

them. The exceptional boy may, but not the average boy —*i.e.* not 90 per cent. of boys. So with a subject like geography, although it is more within the grasp of the ordinary intelligence. A final lesson, such as we have sketched above, would usually have for its sole response dull eyes and languid minds. The mass of boys would probably describe the lesson, in their peculiar jargon, by saying that the master had been "jawing" away for half-an-hour about Greece or Italy or Spain, as the case might be. As well might you expect boys to write Greek Iambics all at once without a long preliminary training, as expect them to comprehend and appreciate a final lesson in geography without a long, slow absorption, spread over years, of those elements of knowledge which alone put life and significance into the large generalizations and instructive suggestions of your concluding conversation. You must begin, then, from the beginning.

3. And this brings us to a third rule of method—"*The instruction must, at every stage of school teaching, be adapted to the age and progress of the pupils.*" This compels us to put to ourselves the question, "At what age shall I begin geography in a school?—and is it possible, at the age which I may fix, *so* to begin it as really to contribute to the *final* lesson in all its detail, all its breadth, all its generalizing, all its reasoning?"

Now my answer to the first question is, that geography, like every other subject[1], is to be begun in the Infant-school. And, having so committed myself, I am bound to show that the Infant-school instruction affords a basis for the final lesson. Nay more, that a right understanding of the Infant-school lesson reveals an absolute harmony and coincidence with the right conception of the final lesson. I am strong for unity in method. I hold that if the first lesson in any subject cannot be shown to be the best foundation for the final lesson, then

[1] Is Greek to be begun in the Infant-school? No, but *language* is. Is mathematics to be begun in the Infant-school? No, but lessons in form and number are.

either my conception of the final lesson is wholly mistaken *or* my conception of the initiatory lesson is all astray. But the harmony and coincidence do exist; and the initiatory lesson, rightly understood, admirably supports and illustrates the final lesson. For here I am confronted with a fourth rule, the application of which solves the difficulty; for, be it observed, all sound rules of method support each other.

4. The fourth rule—"*The real is to be taught through the real—things of sense through the senses.*" Now this very obvious rule is worth considering for a moment, if I am to justify my position and establish my argument.

In the final lesson, what am I dealing with? The names of countries, towns, and rivers merely, as is the usual way of teaching geography? Certainly not; this is not geography at all, but only a very small part of it, to be rightly called topography—just as dates and successions of monarchs and battles is not history at all, but merely a subordinate part of it, called chronology. Let me recall my final lesson: I find that I was speaking of mountains, lakes and rivers, of the atmosphere, of climate, of industries, of the implements or machinery of those industries, of harbours, of ships, of products, of exports and imports, of the people, of their arts, of their religion, and so forth. A large text—but, after all, I was only speaking of a *portion of the surface of the earth*, and its inhabitants and their doings. Now, I have a portion of this same earth here at my school door, and people on it living and working. This is all at my door, I say, and subject to all my senses of touch, of sight, and of hearing. My course in the Infant-school, then, is clear. It is to give those rudimentary and particular conceptions which are the indispensable basis of my final generalizations and reasonings, and to do so by means of things submitted to the senses and close at hand. We are dealing with a realistic subject, and all our teaching must therefore be realistic. I take advantage of the window, or go outside, to look out on the portion of the earth within

my immediate range; and I draw upon the experience of the little children as they walk to and from school, and extract from them that experience. Thus they are introduced to plains, to hills, to streams, to cultivated land and uncultivated land, to rocks and stones, to herbs and flowers and trees, to animals, to products, to men and their various industries, to sizes, distances, relations in place, buildings, names of places, &c. &c. This is Nature-study. I call on them to bring to school specimens of the portable objects by which they are surrounded —leaves of the different kinds of trees, the different grains, &c. From this I gradually pass to manufactures, as illustrated in their own clothes and books, and so introduce them to those vegetable products and manufactured products for which they are dependent on other parts of their own country or of the world.

The pupils see for themselves the physical and industrial characteristics, and name to me what they see; and as to those other names which are unfamiliar, I explain them by the help of the school play-ground and the school supply of water. When once they have, in the course of time, supplied me with a description of their own parish and all it yields, as a foundation for geography, I proceed on an old tin tray, with the help of clay or mud and a little water, to model it roughly; and, on the same tray, I illustrate to their senses an island, a strait, a cape, a promontory, and so forth. I ask them about the climate as my lessons advance, about cold and heat, and their obvious effects on growth, and the kinds of things grown. I have now constructed a physical model of the parish—a bird's-eye view; and I have drawn *out of my pupils* its whole geography, in so far as they can yet grasp it. I now transfer the model to the black-board with the help of variously coloured chalks.

Now, what have I really been doing? I have been giving in the particular, and by means of the direct contact of the senses, almost all that I propose to give in my final lesson, nine

or ten years after, in a large and generalised world-view. This course of procedure, constantly revised or referred back to, gradually builds up true geographical conceptions in the largest and richest sense. And what is the result? The fulfilment of the educational requirement to train the senses of children, to cultivate their powers of observation—the fulfilment, further, of the duty of every teacher to give, with a view to sense-training and information, object-lessons. In later stages, when I ask them to reproduce what they have been taught by filling up an outline map, and then by drawing a map, I teach drawing: all this by merely teaching geography as it ought to be taught. So remarkable is the harmony of method-rules—so distinctly does each contribute to all the others, if they are sound. The initiatory lessons, it will now appear, properly given, contain all the elements of the final lesson.

A fifth rule of method now demands our attention.

5. And this is, "*That all knowledge must grow out of what is already known, in order that the growth may be organic, and not mechanical merely.*" But we find that we do not need even to consider this rule, for it is already complied with in the mode of procedure which we have just described. So harmonious, so mutually helpful, I repeat, are all sound rules of method.

But there are other rules which are also complied with, for we are told that memory has to be cultivated; and a rule of method here is—

6. *Association strengthens the memory; therefore link your teachings.* But what association so strong as the association of all our knowledge of a subject, with the familiar objects of our own daily lives, out of which we have made the teaching of geography spring?—what association so strong as the organic connexion which this mode of teaching establishes in the mind?

But there is still a seventh rule of all sound method, which deserves attention, viz.:—

7. *A pupil in learning should instruct* himself, *the master being only the cooperator, the guide and the remover of obstructions.* This is not only the best way of teaching, but gives the pupil a sense of power and of self-achieved progress. But this rule too has been already observed; for when I extract the basis of geography from the child's *own* experience, and from his *own* observation of things around him, he is teaching himself; and when I call upon him to reproduce by drawing, he is then also self-instructing.

8. *Teaching, like charity, begins at home.*—In accordance with these various rules, and starting from our initiatory lessons, the pupil extends his knowledge from his parish to his county, and so on. The consideration of these steps in the building-up of geographical knowledge suggests a few remarks as to detail.

It will be said, "All this we know; in every technical book on method we are told to begin with the parish," &c. My answer is, that I do not pretend to have made discoveries, but merely to put things in my own way, and, above all, to shew the simplicity and unity of pedagogic method; but I must honestly confess that I do not find geography begun and ended, in such schools as I have visited, on the method I have been expounding. It may, notwithstanding, be done here and there[1].

Let me now illustrate further the third rule which bears on

[1] The only objection that can be taken to the true method of teaching Geography is, I think, that it is not always applicable to town schools. But the great majority of town schools are within easy reach of all that is absolutely necessary for sound teaching and with the improved apparatus now available, including lantern-slides, much may be done. London, no doubt, presents great difficulties: but what a happy chance is there afforded to a paternal Board of giving the children a day in the country at the expense of the rates, on the plea that the excursion is a geographical or nature-study lesson! Then in all matters of products, of buildings, of the arts, of commerce, and of the organisation of social relations, the towns have an advantage over the country.

the progressiveness of the instruction given, viz. the extension of the knowledge beyond the parish to the county. In the parish the whole world is to be seen in miniature, and our future work is simply the work of expansion. At the county stage the teacher is still, as in the previous stage, independent of prepared maps. With coloured chalks and a black-board, he sketches the county round the parish, and outlines the country round the county. He gradually puts in the physical features, and then in the course of a few weeks, bit by bit, introduces leading industries in connexion with a few towns, etc.

You may now, or indeed before this, hang up a good map of the parish; and I need scarcely say that this should be a large Ordnance map coloured by the hand; and, after an interval, a county map may be exhibited.

The next stage is *not* to enter into further detail with respect to the native county, as is too commonly done. If you will consider the preliminaries of method—the "What" and "Why" of school geography—you will come to the conclusion that the next step, after a fair knowledge has been obtained of the physical geography and the leading industries and towns of the native county, is to introduce a large globe. Paint the native country red, and then, in this relation, let the whole round world burst upon the pupil's view. Globes should be at least 3 feet in diameter; the maker of them should care less about absolute accuracy of detail than about effect. The physical features should be here again strongly marked, as in the maps you have been drawing on the black-board. I should have nothing strongly circumscribed by outline save the great divisions—Europe, Asia, etc. The teaching, with constant reference back to the fundamental conception of the parish for illustrations and explanations, should consist of the constantly repeated contemplation of this globe, and making acquaintance with the great divisions, and half-a-dozen great mountain chains, oceans, and rivers. The names on the globe should

not exceed a couple of dozen. Climatic zones should be, of course, clearly indicated on the globe with a view to future teaching.

The pupils at the next stage should have presented to them a strongly accentuated *map* of the whole world on a large scale, with the globe constantly there in view of the class—never, indeed, to be parted with throughout the whole school course. This map should be physical, strong, and even rough—only the important mountain ranges and rivers being indicated, and should have the countries, as well as the large divisions, outlined off. The study of this map with the help of such assistance as the geographical apparatus of the school provides, should be a daily occupation. The pupils should have outline maps given to them, to be filled up in imitation of the large map before them. I should keep them at this for a whole year, merely introducing a slightly more detailed knowledge of their own country after the first two or three months of exclusive world-contemplation. If there be such a thing as a raised map of the world, it should be hung up. If it is on a smaller scale than the big wall-map, this would not matter, as it is time now that children's imaginations should be called on to understand greater and lesser scales. In fact, their own filling up of outline maps has already taught them this.

At every stage, even up to sixteen or seventeen years of age, the globe and the big map of the world should be always there for reference and revisal.

The next stage is a still further extended knowledge of the native country, but always *concurrent with an extended knowledge of the world as a whole*, and especially of the British Empire.

The more advanced school stage is to return to the globe, and explain more fully the climatic zones, and so introduce the pupil to Astronomical Geography.

After this, you may do what you please, provided you

follow the principles that have guided your earlier teaching—the real by means of the real; seeking the aid of vivid diagrams and illustrations, and lantern-slides, but not confusing the children with too many of these. They are getting older, and you can now safely draw on their growing power of constructive imagination. As they advance, the teacher himself will be guided by large and descriptive books on geography, such as those recently issued by Messrs Stanford and other publishers; and, to steady and rationalise his instruction, he should have before him some such book as Geikie's *Lessons on Physical Geography*. The filling up of the outline maps should be a weekly exercise at every stage of instruction, and all past work should be frequently revised.

Now, in doing all this, as thus briefly summarised, you are simply extending the Infant-school work, and following the rules of sound method, as these have been applied to that initiatory stage of progress. The first lesson contains the last lesson, just as the parish is the miniature of the world. It is thus that you slowly rear in the pupil's mind a conception of the world, and all the lessons, historical and economic and moral, which a true comprehension of it has in store for him.

All other ordinary rules of method are applicable in the course of your teaching; but they are not more significant or essential in the case of geography than of any other subject. There is one rule, however, which is an exception to this general statement, and I have reserved the introduction of it to the last, because of its great importance, and the constant breach of it by almost all teachers, especially in the two subjects of Geography and History.

9. That rule is—"*In all subjects of instruction, when there is a mass of particulars, teach first the leading particulars only, and ignore all else until these are firmly rooted in the mind.*" I have found teachers exhausting every hamlet and bridge and road in their county with boys and girls, whose school period

was necessarily brief, while leaving them in almost total ignorance of their own country, and in quite total ignorance of every other, and even of the elementary fact that the world is a globe. This is giving an extreme instance; but you find a similar thing being done, substantially, in every school you choose to visit. You find, in some, minute details regarding Scotland or England, or, it may be, France or Italy, to the necessary exclusion (necessary, for there is not time for everything) of the rest of the world. Now, if what we are teaching is geography, and if geography in its school sense be what I said it was, and if our reasons for teaching it be what I said they were, all this kind of procedure is utterly wrong—a waste and misuse of power and time. It, moreover, deprives geography of the attractions which it naturally has. You will at once deduce for yourselves from this rule of method a condemnation of the usual atlases and wall-maps, covered with names of places which nobody wants to know. Every map should contain only the names necessary to know, and nothing else. Map-makers confound two very different things—teaching-atlases and consultation-atlases; but in this they only follow the example of the overcrowded geographical text-books for schools.

As a subsidiary of sound method in teaching geography, I may, in passing, refer to the mental stimulus which can be given by a skilful use of etymology. To illustrate this one subordinate aspect of geographical teaching, so as to exhibit the history, the poetry, and sometimes the humour that there is in names, might engage us profitably for hours.

But if the individual words yield us much to stimulate the minds of the young, and to startle even the dullest wits into thinking, how much more may be drawn for purposes of illustration and of genuine culture from our poets. "Geography in Literature" would make an admirable subject for a lecture. When pointing out to a class Stirling and the winding Forth,—

our Scottish Maeander,—we may quote with effect Wordsworth's lines—

"From Stirling Castle we had seen
The mazy Forth unravelled."

And not far off we may see, through the eyes of Scott, where

"On the north, through middle air,
Ben-An heaves high his forehead bare."

Or, turning our face in the other direction, we may ask our pupils to behold with us how—

"On Ochil mountains fell the rays,
And as each heathy top they kiss'd
It gleamed a purple amethyst.
Yonder the shores of Fife you saw;
Here Preston Bay and Berwick Law;
And, broad between them roll'd,
The gallant Firth the eye might note,
Whose islands on its bosom float,
Like emeralds chased in gold."

And as we carry the pointer south to the Border, so rich in the song of localities, we shall surely stir some human interest as we repeat—

"'Oh green,' said I, 'are Yarrow's holms,
And sweet is Yarrow flowing;'"

and look with the poet's eye on the "chiming Tweed" and "pleasant Teviotdale," on "lone Saint Mary's silent lake," and

"The shattered front of Newark's towers,
Renowned in Border story."

Passing into the west of England, we recall Milton's "shaggy top of Mona high"; southward the "sweet, tranquil Thames" of Arnold, and a multitude of poetic descriptions and felicitous epithets applied to our country, such as, "This precious stone set in a silver sea." When we leave our own country, our poets still accompany us. Byron illumines Greece, and when we touch on the Gulf of Venice we may recall the lines of Arnold—

"Far, far from here the Adriatic breaks
In a warm bay among the green Illyrian hills."

And can we point to Mont Blanc without thinking of the "sovran Blanc?"

". . . Thou, most awful form,
Risest from forth thy silent sea of pines
How silently!"

But to pursue this aspect of our theme would be an endless task.

Finally, let me say to the teacher:—

Your aim on the intellectual side, whatever the subject of instruction, ought not to be knowledge, but knowledge in its practical relations to ordinary life, just as your aim on the moral and religious side ought not to be moral and religious truths, but moral and religious life and action. This is the reverse of the usual order, but depend on it, it is only by keeping this practical aim in view that the teacher can be an educator. *Turn to use.*

I would now, in concluding, ask leave to make a remark or two on method in general, in its relation to philosophy of mind, and I cannot do so better than by simply taking the rule I have last laid down. When you open your eyes, and look for the first time at an object—say a tree—you may be said to *feel* in a vague brutish way every part of it, but you *perceive*, in a definite rational way, only the more prominent or salient features. If you wish to know the object thoroughly, you proceed to take up detail after detail in succession; and, with every detail so perceived, you increase your knowledge of the object. This is the process by which mind knows things of sense. Now if this be the process or way of mind in knowing or learning anything, it is also, necessarily, the proper and only proper process, way, or method of teaching it. Hence, deduced *à priori* from a psychological fact, comes the rule of method

which I have given above (9). You see the closeness, the necessity of the connexion.

But this is true of all rules of method: they all, if sound, flow necessarily from the facts of the mind-process. The study of the philosophy of Education is the study of these connexions: surely a most interesting, instructive, elevating study for the professional educator.

And not only so; for as I have more than once said, the various rules of method, if sound, all play into each other's hands. Each helps the other: many of them necessarily involve others.

You will thus see that it may be possible to reduce the Science and Methodology of Education to a very simple scheme—that is to say, if you once get at sound fundamental philosophical principles; for the truer an exposition of mind or nature is, the simpler it will be.

Doubtless, method-rules may be learned by heart; and the way of putting them in practice, if cleverly exhibited by a man apt to teach, may be copied by the young teacher with good effect. But imitation and learning by rote are non-intelligent processes: they are not to be commended as the preparation for a profession. Is a so-called profession a profession at all, and not rather an empirical trade, which fails to comprehend its work in its deepest and rational relations? I think it is not. The only questions which really interest me in Education are, such a settlement of the *end* of all our educating as may give to the teacher a daily conscious purpose; and such a philosophy of the *method* of attaining that end, as will reduce all rules to a unity—not a dead unity, but a living unity—and so keep him in close daily contact with the philosophy of mind as a growing organism.

XI.

THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG[1].

In religious instruction and training there can be no such peculiarity as to exempt them from the principles that govern method in education generally. In speaking of this subject I shall not, however, trouble you either with psychology or with method in the pedantic sense.

And yet Method there must be in all teaching; above all in religion, where the aim is to convey to the growing mind skilfully and effectively what you know and believe and *feel* with a view to evoke the spiritual life that animates yourself. "Soul," says Carlyle, "is kindled only by soul:" that is certain. But there is a method or way which must be observed, if there is to be kindling. A man who has not a method or 'way' in educating the young to religious conceptions and the religious life is to be likened to a man who should undertake to pilot a vessel to the mythical Islands of the Blessed, knowing only this the islands existed somewhere in the far west, but being unfurnished with a chart of the ocean to be traversed, and ignorant of navigation. He steers on the impulse of the moment. Such a man might have all the *personal* qualifications for his post, but he has none of the *professional* preparation and fitness. He would stand in need of a chart, and of instruction in the method or way of finding his true course. By some happy inspiration he might be going straight for his haven in

[1] Delivered, by request, to the Edinburgh Sabbath School Teachers' Association, 1886.

the morning, and again undoing all his work in the evening by retracing his course over the pathless ocean, and perhaps finding himself further from his destination than when he started. So with the teacher. His impulse in teaching may keep him all right, for example, during the first part of a lesson, and in the second part he may undo everything—nay, like the mariner in search of the Islands of the Blessed, he may more than undo his work; he may be further off than ever from his goal.

The goal of the teacher is the religious *result* in the mind of the pupil; and this result is life, not knowledge. Without this religious result—the true spiritual gain for the pupil—the facts of doctrine, which may be acquired after a rote fashion, are of little value.

The most difficult and delicate of all subjects of instruction is religion, if what we aim at is the spiritual life of faith, hope, and love sustained by ethical ideals which have their beginning and end in God. A man who can give a really good religious lesson can give a successful lesson on any subject which he knows. And this, because the subtleties and delicacies of spiritual life demand more subtle and delicate handling than any ordinary school subject. As trainers in religion, we are dealing with the sentiments and emotions of childhood, and the smallest untoward incident may rouse in our pupils sentiments and emotions the very opposite of those we desire to call into activity.

It is childhood we are dealing with, I say. The autumn harvest depends on the work done in the spring-time.

1. *The desire to teach.* First, the religious instructor—be he a volunteer teacher or a parent—must have the *desire to teach.* The teacher who takes up Sunday-school work simply because it is the "right thing to do" will fail. He must have in him, I say, a desire to teach, a longing to teach, the truth as it is in himself. He has found a guide for his own life, and his

affection for young and unformed minds constrains him to impart to them the spiritual treasure he has found. A mere sense of duty in teaching is not enough. The sense of duty vindicates the primary impulse, so to speak, and comes into requisition as a motive-power in those periods of dejection and of hopelessness which attend all work of a moral or spiritual kind. In religious teaching, above all other teaching, the consciousness of an inner law *commanding* you to teach is a mere accessory to the spiritual impulse of love which *impels* you to teach.

2. *Belief in the children you teach.* Next to the first and prime qualification of a desire to teach is belief in the children whom you teach. If you do not believe that they have an innate capacity for spiritual truth, your teaching will certainly not reach their minds and hearts. It is their soul's *need* that you are supplying. You must presume that they are, in however rudimentary a way, crying out in the depths of their nature for a knowledge of God and divine things. They are truly children of God, not of the devil. They do not stand in antagonism to their spiritual Father; they desire to be friends with Him, to give Him *their* love, and to receive *His.* If you do not teach in this conviction, your instruction can take the form of external precept only; it cannot reach the inner springs of the human spirit. All the words of all the catechisms cannot create God in the heart of the child: they can, at best, only evoke Him. It is not you that sow the seed: the seed was sown at the moment the child was born—sown both in the heart and reason of the child. Your task is simply the careful nurturing into life and flower and fruit of the seed already there. Your fostering hand supplies appropriate soil and gives the warmth and tendance necessary for growth: that is all. Christ Himself has said: "Of such is the kingdom of heaven." When He said it, He meant it. Happy the teacher who could say, after he has left behind him the turbulence of boyhood, the egoism of youth, the struggles of mature life, "I am as one

of these." It is to protect these children from being even such as you know that you yourself have been, that you seek to instruct and to guide them. Believe in their simple instinct for the elements of spiritual ideas.

3. *Restriction of the teaching.* Do not teach all you know and feel. The temptation to do this is great—greatest where there is zeal. It is a mistake to yield to it. You have to teach only what meets the children's *present* need, their *present* case. Confine your instructions, then, to what is essential—to what is germinal; that is to say, to those truths and sentiments which have in themselves an inherent power of expansion and growth through their encounter with the teachings of life—those truths which will stand the wear and tear of every day, which shine the more the more they are shaken by the shocks of destiny, and which come out vindicated by stern experience.

4. *Give milk to Babes.* In selecting from what you know, select not only what is essential, but also what is easy and comprehensible. You cannot, if you would, antedate spiritual growth. God has set down *an order* in the manifestation of Himself to our souls. The attempt to anticipate growth produces in the child a feeling of intellectual and moral anxiety, and even perplexity, which become so associated with religion that children reject the whole because of its seeming intricacy. This feeling of difficulty and complexity hangs about the whole subject throughout boyhood and youth, and, in the case of even the well-disposed, one of the results is a merely formal, hard, and unintelligent belief as opposed to a living faith. Christianity is a very simple matter. If it were not so, it could not be the world-religion. Give, then, milk to babes, for this is all they can assimilate. We are not nourished by what we eat or drink, but by what we digest. To begin religious instruction with catechisms is a great—nay, an irretrievable blunder. Hooker says, "With religion it fareth as with other sciences; the first delivery of the

elements thereof must be formed according to the weak and slender capacities of young children." To religion above all subjects the injunction of Watts must be obeyed, "In learning anything there should be *as little* as possible proposed to the mind at once: and, that being understood, proceed then to the next adjoining part." Lessons should be short, easy and pleasant. No punishments, no place-taking, no prizes are permissible.

5. *Prepare your teaching.* It is impossible to carry out the preceding advice as to selection and as to simplicity, if you do not *prepare* the lessons you mean to teach. Every Sunday-school teacher should study his lessons in some such book as the *Cambridge Bible for Schools*, and should carefully make up his mind as to what he means *not* to say, as well as to what he means to say. If you do not prepare, you may spoil the whole effect of an otherwise good lesson by introducing matter either too difficult, or alien to the subject in hand, or by in some way confusing the lesson and destroying its unity. You thus deprive it of clearness, directness and efficacy. If you are really fit to be a teacher, the preparation for each day's work will be easy; for if you are yourself living the Christian life, your experience will readily suggest to you the true import and significance of the lesson in hand. Besides, it is not the deeper spiritual lessons that may be drawn from your subject that you ought to convey to the young mind, but only those that lie on the surface and are of obvious application.

6. *Determine the substance of your instruction.* I am dealing with Method, not with dogma; but, as there can be no religion without dogma of some sort, I must illustrate Method by emphasizing the dogmas specially to be taught to the child. Certain characteristics of the substance of instruction have been already indicated. We must teach the essential and the comprehensible. Let us, then, make up our minds as to these. I should say that the prime and

primary object of a teacher of religion should be to bring into living activity in the consciousness of each child what may be called the sense of God. We wish him to *feel* God within him and about him. Next, we wish him to feel this God to be Father and Fountain of his spirit. We must then beware of representing Him as the prototype of the stern traditionary father of the Scottish race. This is what the historian of religions would call a tribal conception of God. We fathers of to-day are not now such barbarians as many of our well-meaning and pious, but ill-conditioned and mistaken, grandfathers were. We have attained to a purer and higher conception of fatherhood. This child is the child of God, and God is his Father, in the modern Christian sense of that sacred word; nay, better even than an earthly father, for He is much more ready to forgive. The face of the Almighty Father is a benign face, and if His child errs, the change on that face is a passing shadow only, not a judicial frown. If His justice is infinite, so also is His mercy. It is *this* which "endureth for ever." Penitence and the earnest desire after new obedience restore the clouded fatherhood in all its native benignity, for He does not desire the death of the sinner. His demands are really not exacting; He does not drive His young flock over hard and stony paths, but leads them over the green pastures and by the quiet waters. See that this feeling and conception of God be evoked. Beware of blasphemy.

Along with the feeling of God and of the fatherhood of God, we must evoke in the child's heart what naturally tends to arise in connexion with these teachings, viz. Reverence and Awe. These sentiments, when they are of the genuine and not the spurious kind, are compatible with love alone. Fear is not compatible with love. No man who ever lived feared God and loved Him at the same time, though, like a poor slave, he might call aloud that he did love Him in order to obviate possible penal consequences. "Fear," says Jean Paul,

"is begotten of the devil." And, I may add, the worship of a God whom we fear is devil-worship.

Next to the feeling of God and the sense of His benignant Fatherhood, penetrating like a warm light into the soul of the child, and the awe and reverence which accompany these spiritual ideas, I should like to make the child early feel in his inmost heart the elder-brotherhood of Christ. The man Christ Jesus walking here on earth, working and loving and suffering—coming here to lend a helping-hand to the weak and erring child and to the strong and sinful man, is the conception I should wish to present to the young Christian. Let him grasp this and understand once for all that, if he is in Christ, he is also in the Father. This elder brother is the revealer of God to him and as such his supreme Teacher; He is the Way by which he is to walk, and, as such, the bridge between man and God; He is the Master who is to be loyally served; or, as the Scottish Catechism sums it up, He is Prophet, Priest, and King.

Note this, that the personal Fatherhood of God tends to give place, as the child grows older, to that more universal conception of God as a Spirit infinite and incomprehensible, removed to a distance from man, which is expressed so well in the Scottish Catechism. It is just at this time that the elder brother Christ comes to the child as God in the concrete, God humanized, God-man, and restores the *reality* of the idea of God. The Son is there, and each, by being in Him, is in God the Father.

Again, the immortality of the human spirit has to be assumed in all religious teaching—the fact that our striving life is a preparation and probation for a higher existence and that a blessed eternal life hereafter is for all who find eternal life here.

> "The low dark verge of life
> Is but the twilight of eternal day."

These truths, I consider, are the essential substance of

Christian instruction. Whatever else may be added must be built on them as on a sure foundation. There is no difficulty in them: difficulties begin when men begin to speculate and refine and theologize. The child will accept these simple teachings readily, easily, gladly. Why should he not?

And how all-important it is that he should accept them! Leave human nature alone, and, spite of the divinity in it, the evil which is also there has a curious and appalling persistency and an ease of conquest which bewilder us. Give the ideas of the divine Fatherhood and of the elder-brotherhood and Sonship of Christ—thoughts so concrete as to be easily grasped by the young, so real as to seem like nature's food—and by the help of these the child, the boy, and the man will raise themselves to their true and sole humanity. That there should be a daemonic tendency in a nature which has yet, by its very constitution, a capacity for God, is part of the mystery of man. The physical world reveals many a parallel. Do we not see the flower rooted in the earth and earthy, and yet that same flower striving to take into its bosom the light of the sun as the primal source of life, growth and fruition, and truly living and growing only in so far as it absorbs the central light?

7. *Preserve a due proportion in your teaching.* If we are to limit our teaching to the essential in the first instance and to the milk of the Word, we are to take care when we advance to the teaching of other things less vital, to give our various teachings their due proportion in respect of importance. For example, if you believe that strict Sabbatarianism is an essential teaching, teach it; but if it be only subordinate and accessory doctrine, if (as the greater part of Christendom holds) the keeping of the Sabbath is merely a *means* of grace, and if your own deliberate practice affirms this, beware of putting the duty of Christians in respect of such matters on a level with the truth essential to the Christian life. By so doing, you divert attention from what is vital. For the moment, the teaching may be accepted on your mere authority; but as the pupils

see your doctrine practically set aside by those who hold high and admitted positions as Christian men, the doubt which attaches to such subsidiary beliefs will assuredly tend to infect the essential truths. Rebellion against the whole Christian system will be, and we all know is, the inevitable result. Beware then of confounding the essential with that which, though desirable, is only subsidiary and instrumental. "By faith we are saved"; the faith, that is to say, not of intellectual assent, which by itself is simply husks, not grain, and increases the probabilities of spiritual death rather; but the faith that is living and may be seen of all men in our judgments and deeds.

When I say preserve a due proportion in your teaching, I merely say, in other words, give prominence to the essential. It is very important, for example, that children and grown people should go to church and take advantage of every means of edification; but even this, important as it is, is not essential. True, with a certain class of people, there is no religious life at all, if there is no church attendance. In speaking thus I do not wish to give offence, but merely to emphasize the vital character of certain truths as compared with others. That is to say, teach only what in your heart of hearts you believe.

8. *Speak the truth.* Take your daily conduct, that is to say, as the test of your belief. When a man takes your coat, you do not give him your cloak also; when he smites you on one cheek, you do not turn the other. On the contrary, you either strike back, or hand the offender over to society which has got instructions from you and others to smite him back. The true significance of such passages is summed up in the general doctrine, "Forgive your enemies." If you do not teach such scriptural utterances with the necessary explanations and qualifications, you make a pretence of an ideal system of life which the child and boy find to break down in practice. You *know* it to be a pretence. When these utterances are taught *absolutely*, the sensitive young conscience finds Christianity unworkable, and the doubt, which thus attaches to these

doctrines, extends to the whole fabric of Christian truth and brings the whole down in ruins. I beg you to consider these things. Christ's yoke is easy and His burden light. We do not live under the Judaic Law. The Christian life is a simple matter to see into, though it may be difficult to exemplify in all we think and do. By putting difficulties in the way and exaggerating breaches in conduct, you do a wicked thing. It is the finer spirits that suffer most from the inner contradictions that result. These difficulties are stumbling-blocks, and check the natural flow of the spiritual life, sometimes causing its total extinction. It were better for you, teacher or parent, that you were cast into the sea with a millstone round your neck to sink you, than that you should thus choke the growing seed of the religious life in the young soul. This is a strong utterance, but it is not mine. (St Luke xv. 2; Mark ix. 42.) Offences must come; but woe to you if they come by you.

9. *Preserve an order in your teaching.* We must never forget the difficulty the young have in grasping the abstract or general. Take, for example, the question of regeneration or sanctification. We all feel the child's difficulty instinctively, for no one, I suppose, would think of asking a child of five to learn these theological definitions. If we would not ask a child of five, should we ask a child of seven or of nine or of eleven? This, surely, is an important question; for our object is to preserve religion from being mere formalism, and there is a formalism of words and dogma which much more surely retards the religious life than the formalism of ritual. "Training up children" is one of the leading characteristics of the Christian religion; and it might give it a claim to acceptance if it had no other, that it addresses itself to the young, the ignorant, and the simple-minded, in accordance with the now recognized principles of sound educational method. For it makes use everywhere of the *concrete*. The whole essential truth is told through things and persons and acts. Christianity is a life and can be learned through human lives. It is a story, and as a

story alone should it be first learned—not as dogma, save in respect to those essential truths of which I have spoken, if they may be called dogma. Educational method regards dogmas as tares that push up and choke the fine grain of God as it begins to grow in the heart of the child. There is no time to develope this aspect of the question, nor is there need: it is so manifest, though constantly forgotten.

10. *Reverence.* If with all your teaching you fail to evoke reverence, you have failed altogether. Injunctions are here useless; the children must be trained to *do* what is reverent, if they are to grow up reverent. Reverence, instinct with a certain awe, can be taught; not by the bare statement of facts, but only by stirring the feelings and by giving reasons for acts of reverence and worship. Not only in children, but in men, this feeling or emotion is, probably, the most vital part of religion. It brings a great deal else in its train. Reverence and worship of an infinite God-Father humbles, and at the same time exalts, man to the highest of which he is capable; and this elevated state of being cannot but influence character and conduct. When reverence is wanting, the child may know his catechism, yet remain irreligious. You may make an eminent Pharisee in this way, but not a living Christian. By presenting God as a Father, you call forth the finer emotions; and by means of habitual prayer, you give that expression to the emotions you have evoked which makes them permanent. But the prayers should be simple, intelligible, and above all, in their *manner*, reverential. To this simple attitude of reverence and worship you can easily bring children, for it is a natural and needful expression of their inner life. This is what Christ meant when He said, "Unless ye become little children" &c. Simplicity and reverence are of the essence of the religious emotion; and they are characteristic of childhood.

I would now speak of certain auxiliaries in the teaching

of religion. These are Memory, Music, and the Style of examining.

(1) *Memory.* All parts of the New Testament are not of equal value to children. But the passages which more directly appeal to them in the Gospels and Epistles (and these passages, so fit for children, are also precisely those which will most give strength in middle life and consolation in declining years) should be read, understood and committed to memory. The modern educationalist is apt to slight the learning of passages by heart. These words of truth and beauty should not be committed to memory once for all, and then set aside as done with; they should be frequently reverted to in the course of instruction. Then, verses and hymns which simply and rhythmically present religious truth should be learned by heart. Such publications as "Hymns for Little Children," for example (if you omit what teaches sectarianism), are invaluable. So, also, many of the paraphrases and psalms, if taught to us when young, become a life-long possession. These memory-stores are, in truth, a kind of living presence in our souls watching over us. They furnish us with spiritual armour for the battle of life. They are a part of every militant Christian's weapons and equipment. These passages of Scripture it is far more important to lodge in the memory than the precise words of catechisms.

Understand that I would not exclude catechetical dogma—the form of sound words when the fitting time for this comes. But I would never forget this, that the ability to define adoption and sanctification is a small thing compared with being adopted and sanctified. There is a prevalent superstition on this subject. The very words of catechisms must be given by children. Is it not a surer sign that the doctrine is intelligently apprehended if the substance and meaning are given in a boy's *own* words?

(2) *Music.* But if religion, in the rhythmical falls of hymns and psalms, be so helpful in building up the spiritual life of the young, what shall we say of verse set to fitting music

and sung by children's voices in unison? It is in popular music that that most effective aid of all educational method—viz., Sympathy, is evoked. I have said elsewhere, "The united utterance of a common resolution, of a heroic sentiment, of the love of truth, or of a common feeling of worship, gratitude or purity, in song suited to the capacities of children's minds and to the powers of children's voices, devotes the young hearts which pour forth the melody to the cause of humanity, morality and religion. The mere utterance of the song is, in some sense, a public vow of self-devotion to the thought to which it gives expression. The harmony of the singers falls back on the ear and seems to enforce afresh, in accents pleasing and insinuating, not harsh and preceptive, the sentiment to which the music has been joined. The humanity and religion of song thus drop gently and without the parade of formal teaching into the deepest heart of the child, and in this form they are welcome." Music has a subtle influence in the school and is a commender of truth. Besides, does not the mere music itself, apart from the lesson which the song conveys, reveal the inner harmony of the spiritual life? Bishop Beveridge says, "I find my soul is become more harmonious by being accustomed so much to harmony, and adverse to all manner of discord, so that the least jarring sounds, either in notes or words, seem very harsh and unpleasant to me." "The meaning of song," says Carlyle, "goes deep. Who is there that can express, in logical words, the effect music has on us? A kind of inarticulate, unfathomable speech which leads us to the edge of the Infinite and lets us for moments gaze into that."

(3) *The Style of Examining.* Still keeping to the subject of the auxiliaries of method, I would point out that the method of intercourse, between pupils and teacher, should be always conversational, not preceptive and as from a height. The children should read to the master, and the master should read to the children. In religion, at least, if in no other subject,

the master may easily assume the attitude of a fellow-learner with his pupils, and lay aside the magisterial airs of superiority and infallibility. In no other way can religious instruction be truly religious. The magisterial and highly preceptive style cannot possibly be a fitting vehicle for that hope, love, and faith, which are the Christian graces, or for nourishing that sense of mystery, infinitude, and awe which evokes reverence.

Need I say in this connection, that all place-taking, personal competition and prizes are wholly out of place—nay, they are destructive of true religious teaching. They vulgarise and secularise it. There should be no formal examinations and summing up of marks, although there ought to be frequent conversational and informal revisions of the lessons of the month or quarter. To make use of religion as an intellectual exercise is on a par with using the account of the Crucifixion for spelling or grammar[1]. In religious teaching again, punishments of whatever kind are ridiculous. Severity of discipline was consistent with being under the Law, and was good enough for Jews; but it is out of place in the Christian scheme, which abjures Pharisees, formalists, and pedants.

11. *Attend to manner in teaching.* It is through the eyes, through the observation of the bearing of the teacher that children receive the strongest impressions. If the manner of the teacher is not in perfect harmony with the spirit of the religion he is teaching—with its gentleness, charity, humanity, he will fail; if it is in marked discord with that spirit, his teaching will be positively hurtful. He is an unworthy vehicle of the evangel, an impure channel of the Spirit. Better, I think, that the child should grow up in ignorance than be so taught; for, in that case, the avenues to his soul would still remain open, whereas, in the case I have imagined, they are probably closed for ever. The manner of the teacher may more than undo his oral lesson: it may destroy the present lesson and bar all future and possible lessons. Love cannot

[1] As has been often done.

be taught in harsh accents; humanity cannot be taught where there are bitter judgments; devotion cannot be taught with the face of threatening and command. The manner must also be reverent and earnest; for reverence cannot be taught where the bearing of the teacher is irreverent: earnestness cannot be taught where the manner is frivolous. Temper must be under control and the tone must be kindly; for self-control and mutual kindliness cannot be taught where there is impatience and a cross or peevish tone. Manner with the young is, indeed, so potent that it may defeat the matter of instruction and put it to rout. The evil characteristics of manner in the teacher are due largely to impatience for results, and this naturally leads me to my next remark.

12. *Have faith in your teaching.* Select wisely what you mean to teach, adopt a sound method, *assume* the virtue of a fitting manner (even if you have it not), and your teaching cannot possibly fail to have good results. Be assured of this: nothing is lost in the spiritual, any more than in the material, world. It cannot possibly be lost. You may never yourself see the results, but the bread you have cast on the waters will ultimately return. Nay, more than the bread you cast; for God takes it, and the miracle of the loaves is daily repeated. We often read of late conversions. I do not quite believe in them. They are, for the most part, simply the revival of the teachings of childhood—the grown man after many wanderings going back to his mother, the prodigal, after feeding on husks, returning to the rich abundance of his Father's table.

Now if you have brought up a child in such a way that the feeling of dependence and the sentiments of reverence and love centre in the idea of God and the person of Christ, if he has been so accustomed to receive your teachings as the natural and needful food of his spiritual nature that they are to him truly good news—an evangel—and gladly made his own, what more do you want? This, so far as we can see, would have

satisfied Christ; why, then, should bishop, priest, or presbyter seek for more? Assuredly, if there be anything in educational method at all, this is all that is possible to the teacher. The school must restrict itself to broad and universal truths, and the sentiments which underlie them, if it is to accomplish anything for the spiritual life; and it may be that, owing to this necessity, the school is destined one day to teach the Church what things are "generally necessary to salvation."

It would be ignorant and foolish to underrate the importance of bringing up the young to be sharers in a religious scheme of thought which embodies a system of life, and to be members of a Christian communion which professes it; but these things are outside the religious life in so far as it is vital. These externalities it is always easy to enforce, and hence the temptation to dwell on them to the extinction of the spiritual life in the young altogether. They will come in due time as the external habit of the inner life,—that external form with which man naturally seeks to endue all his sentiments and social activities.

Do not be discouraged by the apparent throwing off of religious feeling and principle, which is too often characteristic of boyhood and adolescence. It is for the most part due to the mere force of animal life in the youth—the dawning manhood which, conscious of its powers, is egotistic and resists authority, law, and convention. But this is only for a time. God does not relax His hold of any one whom He has once put His hand upon. In the words of the well-known hymn,

> "Thou on my head in early youth didst smile,
> And, though rebellious and perverse meanwhile,
> Thou hast not left me, oft as I left Thee,
> On to the close, O Lord, abide with me."

But remember you have no right to expect such fruits early or late, unless your teaching has been apt in substance, sound in method, true in manner. "Train up a child in the way he should go," has, we all know, been often to the outward eye

falsified; but has it really and to the inner eye been a delusive utterance? I do not believe it. Depend upon it, the Spirit is still in that youth who has gone astray, and it will finally assert itself. If it does not, it is because your training of him has not been "in the way he should go."

In conclusion, let me say, the teacher should never for a moment forget the practical issues of religious teaching. "Religion is use," is, I think, a saying of Swedenborg's. Never cease impressing on the young that Christianity is a *life*—that the substance of your teaching—purity, love, godliness—has significance only in action; that the Christian graces do not even exist at all in us, except in so far as they are constantly being translated into an infinite series of daily and hourly detail. Even our way of looking at outer things is transfigured by religion, so rich is its practical outcome. "To the religious mind," says Jean Paul, "every being is a moving temple of the Infinite, everything purifies and suns itself in the light of God." Break down, then, with reiterated persistence, the wall between belief and life. Our highly respectable grocers, bakers, farmers, squires, lawyers, teachers, ministers, professors, and so forth, too often make the business of life and their religion run on parallel lines. The boy has to be taught that the labour by which he is to gain his living is *itself* the divinely-appointed channel for his true inner life to flow in. It is by that business he will be judged, whether it be selling bacon or teaching philosophy; it is in and through his daily relations as hirer and hired, buyer and seller, that his *chance* is given him, and almost wholly in these. God will not accept even his Sundays or his charity subscription-book. The Hellenic idea, even in the exalted and humane mind of Plato, virtually restricted salvation to an academic aristocracy. The power of the Christian idea lies in this, that the occupations which to the Greek sages were banausian, if not degrading, are no longer

common or unclean. The way of earning a living not only may be, but is, the way of life. In the discharge of the lowliest functions, the path to the highest and best may be trodden.

As teachers, keep these practical issues before you, and the world will shortly be a better world than now. "God's true Church, remember, is the temple of the universe," as Jean Paul well says. In that temple we must always be worshipping. The going within walls to worship is a mere incident of the Christian life: the worship must be always going on in the world of men and women and affairs. This is the true worship which stated services only symbolize.

I need scarcely say that whatever may be the result of your instruction as regards others, the reward to yourself is sure. The old saying *docendo discimus* is in nothing so true as in moral and religious teaching. Thus it is that children educate their parents. The depth and significance of spiritual ideas, indeed, are fully known only when we try to hand them on to others. They are then, like Mercy, twice blessed. They bless him that gives and him that takes.

XII.

EXAMINATIONS, EMULATION, AND COMPETITION[1].

We all know that this is the age of examinations. We are beset by them on every side, and every profession and the Public Service hedge themselves round with examinations, qualifying or competitive,—except, indeed, the profession of secondary schoolmaster. The members of this profession are not *required* to know anything about their work in so far as it is teaching or educating, for the sufficient reason that they, by the mere fact, I presume, of their being Masters of Arts, have served themselves heirs to all the arts, including those they do not know; they alone, of all professional men, are heaven-born. All skilled occupations, no less than professions, have their principles and their technique. The secondary schoolmaster will not deny that the educator of the middle and upper classes also requires principles and technique; but he always has them, if not by Divine inspiration, then by apostolical succession.

Now we certainly all—both examiners and examinees—detest examinations. The former have a decided conviction, that, after all is done, the resultant class-list is a very rough

[1] Delivered (by request) at the Moray House Training College, to Students and Teachers, 1887.

affair; and the latter, if not at the top, is apt to feel that his real capacity has not been gauged. And both may be right. Both sigh for the golden age when examinations were not and the "march of intellect" had not begun.

Examinations are the pricks of the modern boy's life; but it is vain to kick against the pricks. The human animal has to adapt himself to this new environment, and he who fails to do so, must give way and let the fittest survive: there is no escape for any. Let us, then, see what of real justification they have as a piece of educational machinery, and, above all, their relation to emulation and competition in schools and universities. Is it possible to reduce the evil and save education?

There are three kinds of examinations to be considered:—(*a*) Teaching or Class examinations; (*b*) Qualifying examinations; (*c*) Honours and Competition examinations.

There is a good deal to be said for all these, but especially for the first and second.

(*a*) Teaching or Class Examinations.—As regards the first (teaching or class examinations), it is certain that there can be no good teaching which is not a continual process of oral examination. We may talk at and to boys, but we shall talk in vain. The highest kind of teaching is simply an intelligent and free conversation between a ripe and unripe mind. This, more than anything else, truly educates the young intelligence in the best possible way. But, if done consciously and with a purpose, it is examination. This was what Socrates did, a great educator. But the qualities needed for this are rarely to be found. We cannot presume on their being found at all, and we have to condescend to instruction and examination in the ordinary vulgar sense, and to be thankful if we can get this fairly well done in our schools.

Now let us consider. Instructing a boy in anything is guiding him and helping him to find out how it is done, and

then exercising him in the *doing* of it. Generally, it will be said that the knowledge of the *how* is best gained by simply doing the thing in imitation of a model. But if we omit the analysis of the "how," we are pretty sure to produce parrots and imitators. Originality and mental elasticity find their best friends outside the walls of such a school. The intelligent use of the intelligence is never acquired, and conventionality of mind—the boasted "practical" mind of the Briton—is the result. If, again, we dwell too much on the "how," we certainly stimulate the intelligence, but the mental energy thus generated has a tendency to dissipate itself in aimless and spasmodic activities. It is only by getting a thing *done* again and again that we give solidity of faculty. As in intellectual, so in moral method: I cannot, for example, cultivate justice in a youth by talking to him, or getting him to talk, about justice, but by getting him to do just acts. Character, in the intellect and in the moral nature alike, is not determined by the potentialities in a man, but by his activities in doing.

Hence, it is a wise course to make instruction consist mainly of oral exercises supplemented by written exercises, once the way of doing the thing has been shown; but without waiting for the *full* understanding of the process. Every day's examination is a testing of the power of doing,—of the art or faculty of reading, speaking, writing our own or other languages, or of demonstrating relations of magnitudes and numbers. Our weekly or monthly written examinations make larger demands on the faculties that are being developed. Examinations, then, are tests of how the pupil can, unaided, *do* the things he has been taught. Sometimes, it is true, questions must turn on the mere reproduction of knowledge conveyed; but to the extent to which examinations call for reproduction instead of doing, they are (though a necessary, yet) a defective test of mental power, and therefore weak as a mental discipline. You are teaching the humble arts of reading, writing, and spelling; how else can you ascertain whether you are actually teaching

them, except by calling on your pupils to read, to write, to spell? So with grammar, you call on them to parse a sentence; with arithmetic, you call on them to work their way through numerical relations; with Latin, you call on them to translate an unprepared passage, or to write a Latin composition; and so forth. All your instruction points to the *doing* of something as outcome,—hence examinations in order to see if your pupils can *do* the thing they have been taught. A good teacher aims at the training of faculty, not the giving of knowledge. Encyclopædism in education is bad;—encyclopædism of knowledge that is to say, but we are bound to aim at what may be called encyclopædism of faculty. By examinations alone can we find not only in what respect the pupil has failed to learn, but also in what respect we (the teachers) have failed to train faculty in a specific direction. These should, therefore, be not daily but hourly, and conducted orally; but no week should pass without examination papers being also written, the pupil being then left entirely to his own resources.

Let me now consider teaching examinations in relation to emulation and competition. In how far may the teacher legitimately make use of these moral motives in the necessary work of class examining and class testing? I confine myself, in the first instance, to class or teaching examinations, because the true significance of the *general* question of emulation and competition is best seen in their bearing on the inner and ordinary work of a school.

Emulation is a passion on which schoolmasters rely, more than on any other, to urge boys, who are already well disposed to work, to exert themselves to the utmost. Emulation, strictly defined, is, I imagine, a desire to be equal to the best; and so understood it is not morally hurtful. As manifested in school, however, it is a desire and effort to be better than others, and consequently, has its root in that love of self-assertion, power,

and acquisition, which is native to the human breast. It is the school aspect of the struggle for existence.

Even in this its school form of a desire to *surpass* the best, emulation may, under the influence of a good and watchful master, be restricted to a generous rivalry, and foster a high and vigorous moral spirit. But when it degenerates into mere competition, the setting of one against another, the evil passions of jealousy and envy must inevitably enter and work moral injury to all concerned—master and pupils alike. Moreover, emulation, in the degraded form of competition, incites boys and youths to overstrain their powers, and is consequently hurtful to the brain, and so to the general health of body. It may be assumed that exertion and all that incites boys and men to *exert* themselves, are good, and all that urges them to *strain* themselves is bad. I speak of course of the ordinary circumstances of life, and of habitual conduct, merely; for there are critical occasions on which duty requires that we should overstrain ourselves, even at the risk of our lives, and, for that matter, of the lives of others also.

You will ask, Is it impossible that two boys should compete against each other without becoming victims to the evil passions of envy and jealousy? The answer is, No; but it is so rare an event that we cannot calculate on it. The cases which are sometimes cited are, I believe, misinterpreted. Two boys are straining for a prize, one against the other, and are good friends not only during the strife, but after it is over and one has been beaten. The reason of this really is, that the friendship of the boys is so strong that it survives the unnatural test to which it has been subjected, or that the beaten one has all along been secretly content to be beaten for the sake of his friend, and has not really cared very earnestly for success. But such friendships are rare,—more rare than the simulation of them; and as, in educational matters, we have only to do with the ordinary case, I am driven to the conclusion, that wherever there is strong personal competition, there exists also a hostile

feeling which gives rise, or, at least, *tends* to give rise, to jealousy, envy, malice, and all uncharitableness; and this because the gain to one is loss to another. As boys grow into young men these feelings are doubtless much moderated, and, in well-conditioned youths, if they exist at all, they exist only in so far as they belong to the ordinary rivalries of life. But the point for educationalists to consider is this, What is the effect of personal competition on the unformed and ill-regulated passions of childhood and boyhood? Does keen personal competition give rise or does it not, to petty feelings of a jealous and envious character, which lead to all sorts of efforts being made to gain advantages—sometimes unfair advantages—over others? I think it does most certainly. And if I am right, the moral evils must greatly outweigh the intellectual benefits. The results are, excessive self-appreciation, unjust depreciation and detraction of others, and the painfully immoral condition which these feelings engender, and that at a period of life when impressions made are deep and lasting, and when moral habits once formed are formed for life. The generosity, ingenuousness, candour, so often attributed to the boyish nature, but which I maintain *do not at all exist except in circumstances favourable to their growth*, are seriously interfered with. False life-aims also are set up before the boy, with the sanction of his elders: to beat others is the great object of his existence. All this now I call demoralisation. It is anti-social.

Note that I grant exceptional cases, and I also admit that under exceptional masters all these melancholy results may be obviated. I speak of the general case only. I have spoken of false aims; for is not the whole system due to an exaggeration of the importance of mere intellect, and of a kind of intellect too which is by no means that which the higher work of the world demands, but of memory—quickness, smartness, δεινότης,—the vulpine intelligence which knows where the geese lie? When the ethical idea of education has fully entered into the souls of schoolmasters, this deifying of the intellect

will be abjured, as opposed to all the highest and best aims of education. But the result, some say, is good for the nation, because competition secures the best intellect for the service of society. But, in answer, may we not point to the small outcome of the mental force of school and College "duxes" in the work of the world? Their aim has frequently been not knowledge, not truth, but success; and when this stimulus has been removed, their interest flags, and the world has accordingly to find the majority of its best workers in those who have escaped this kind of training. If school and College duxes retain their bodily health, they almost always, it is true, do well in the world; but my impression is, that the cases are few in which they contribute much to the moral and intellectual advance of humanity. To the evil physical results of all this straining of the over-worked brain we must partially attribute the small result in after-life.

Then as to the demoralising effects on masters. They inevitably come to regard their few competing boys as alone their school; and consequently, those who fail to take a place in the front line and who from an early age have ceased to care, because it is vain to hope, for success, are neglected. The master's pleasure is naturally in those who more than respond to every demand made on them, and on whom his own reputation and the reputation of his school depend. There is thus fostered in schoolmasters a mistaken conception of duty, as well as a false educational ideal. Education by competition is, in short, not *liberal* education; it is education for a mean end, and, by using Horace and Sophocles for instruments, you do not thereby make it liberal and moralise the end.

We have been speaking of emulation, remember, when it takes the degenerate and vulgar form of competition. If emulation be a desire for excellence, even though accompanied with a desire to be *alongside* of the best, there is nothing save what is commendable in it. Excellence is too abstract a notion to constitute an aim for boys; and, indeed, for most men. To equal the best in any line of activity, is to desire excellence in

the only form in which we can measure it, viz., what the best can do. It is in this concrete form that excellence is intelligible to us. It is in this sense that we may be rightly told to emulate Christ,—that is to say, to rise to the highest excellence of our humanity Emulation, then, in the sense of a desire to be alongside the best, may be fostered, and the moral nature benefited by it; the demoralisation begins when for this is substituted the desire to *beat* others and exalt self over others,—when, in short, for emulation, which is noble rivalry, is substituted competition, which is ignoble antagonism.

True, a matured man may legitimately desire to excel others in virtue, in knowledge, in good works, in service to the State; but in the case of a mature, well-regulated mind, this takes the form simply of a striving after abstract excellence, not the vulgar form of a desire to eclipse his neighbours. The excellence of our neighbours is merely the external measure by which we measure the degree to which we have attained our own ideal. If it be anything else than this, it is the mere exaltation of our own ego,—it is spurious emulation from the moral point of view, and thus far *immoral*. But how can we expect pure emulation, in the moral sense of it, from mere boys?

An argument frequently urged in support of competition in schools is, that in life there is this competition and personal rivalry, and the sooner boys are taught to 'give and take' in the struggle of life the better. I do not admit the necessity for competition among men. But supposing that competition in the sense of a desire to beat others and to exalt self over their prostrate bodies, is among grown men, though immoral, yet inevitable; is not this rather an argument for excluding it from a sphere where it is *not* inevitable? Because immorality must exist among men, therefore train boys to it! This is a Spencerian conception:—Train up a boy, in short, in the way of immorality, that when he is old he may not depart from it. A singular argument truly, only needing to be stated to furnish its own refutation.

A master's business, then, is to foster pure emulation, and to check all the spurious forms of it; and to foster it in *all* his pupils, not simply in two or three, letting all feel that they have obtained his approbation when they have done their best, though that best be far short of what others can do.

Now what practical conclusions do we draw from all this? The following:—

1. The work of a class should be well *within* the capacity of all in that class, so that each, by doing his best, may be held to have attained excellence as regards his moral striving, and, along with this, full recognition of his intellectual attainment, whatever that may be.

2. Recognition, both moral and intellectual, is not for a few but for all. Like the offer of salvation, I repeat, it is *for all*, and each must feel that, if he do not accept the offer, he has himself alone to blame.

3. Place-taking, therefore, and prizes should be abolished, and a certificate or card given to each, which should recognise his merits. The master will then feel that his grandest achievement will be, not to have one clever dux to be entered for the Oxford or Cambridge "Derby" and advertised in the newspapers *if successful;* but to have the whole class duxes. I do not mean to denounce place-taking altogether in case of very young pupils, so long as it does not become an instrument for estimating merit. It keeps a class lively; but the numerical results should tell on the position of each boy only to the extent of ten per cent. of the total marks obtainable in other ways.

The introduction into such certificates as have been referred to, of a moral scale, is not to be commended, because of the impossibility of always measuring motive, and, consequently, the probability of doing irreparable harm by an unjust judgment. But it would be quite safe to say that a boy's general conduct had been "unsatisfactory," "satisfactory," and "very satisfactory," without using the moral epithets "good," or "very good," or "bad." There is some danger in the too free use of these

terms. As to the intellectual progress, this can be measured by giving to each his due percentage. The theory here is that all, and not merely one, may have 100 per cent. This practically, of course, is impossible; but *all* may play the game. The fixing of definite percentages, however, such as 90 and 91 per cent., is apt to restore *competition* and all its evils. The best plan is to give all above 75 per cent. a first-class, all from 50 to 75 a second-class, and all below this a third-class, no ticket at all being given when a boy falls below say 40 per cent. If a master can issue first-class certificates to twenty boys in a class of twenty, he has thus twenty duxes, and has attained the greatest triumph which it is possible for him as a teacher to attain, so far as mere instruction goes.

In granting certificates (as indeed in all matters that concern our relation to boys), where there is a doubt, give the boys the benefit of it. You can only do good by so doing.

It is true that such arrangements as I have indicated put a moral, as well as an intellectual, strain on the master. But he exists to endure this. His high position in the State cannot be discharged on easier terms. A teacher who accepts his whole educational responsibilities, is the most important social worker we have. He has no slight task to perform; but if he performs it well, he ought to be a happy man, for to him, probably, it has been given to do more for humanity, in his day and generation, than to any other, if we except those men who, by dint of surpassing genius, solve the problems or elevate the thought and life of the race.

(*b*) QUALIFYING EXAMINATIONS.—Passing from Class Examinations, I might take as an illustration of qualifying examinations, school "leaving-certificates;" but I prefer to go at once to the universities, and take the leaving-certificate of these institutions, which we call by the traditionary names Bachelor or Master of Arts. A Diploma in Arts is merely a certificate that a young man has carried his education into

a higher sphere than the school,—the sphere of ideas, that is to say, of literature, of criticism, and science, that he has spent a certain number of years in contact with confessed masters in certain departments of thought, and has received in this way such an amount of discipline and of substantial knowledge as entitles him to be regarded as a cultured man, and qualifies him to prosecute study in any specific line. More than this it is not; less than this it ought not to be. The M.A. pass of an university does not proclaim that the holder is an expert in anything; all it does is to guarantee the liberal education of a youth. It is the business of our university authorities to see that it does this. If they do not see to this, they fail in their duty to the State.

Since the M.A. examination is a *qualifying* examination merely, competition is entirely out of place. All the successful candidates should be arranged in alphabetical order. And this should be done, for the very purpose, among others, of preventing overstraining, and ensuring that calm of mind which alone favours true educational growth at the critical period of life from eighteen to twenty-one. Mutual converse, collision of mind with mind, much use of the library under the guidance of professors who can point out the right books to read, and who present to the student the history of thought and its present position (each in his own department)—such are the true educational influences of an university. The leaving-certificate or diploma should simply testify that a man has undergone this process of education,—very largely a process of self-education under guidance. The examiners can ascertain this only by making sure that due attendance has been given, and that the students, as the outcome of the whole, have a power or "faculty" of doing certain things,—translating into and from a foreign tongue, solving questions in mathematics, logic or science, writing historical accounts and criticisms. The standard set up must always be a moderate standard; but great care should be taken that it truly testifies to genuine knowledge and

power within the limits fixed. If the standard were not a moderate one, it would defeat the true process of education, which is a calm and leisurely process. Time is an important factor. A youth entering the university, *properly prepared by the secondary school*, should have no difficulty in meeting all reasonable requirements in three years, if he proceeds "without haste," but also "without rest." The results of examination being arranged alphabetically, there is an absence of competition —there is not even rivalry. Why should there be? That we find it necessary even to ask such a question reveals that we are already demoralised.

I drew certain practical conclusions for the school. What, then, are our practical conclusions for the university, with a view to our giving effect to the proper mode of conducting qualifying examinations? These, and they are all for the examiners, are—

1. The object of a pass or qualifying examination should be to ascertain how much a man knows of his subject, and not his ignorance of this or that:—therefore the paper should always contain at least one-third more questions than he is *allowed* to answer.

2. The questions should always turn on the important parts of the subject,—those parts which involve principles or methods of working,—and avoid hole-and-corner details. Some papers seem to be drawn up for the mere purpose of plucking; all pass papers should be drawn up for the purpose of *passing* the candidates if possible. An examiner on the English language, who should take Murray's Dictionary and extract unusual words in order to pose his candidates, would proclaim his own unfitness for his position. But absurdities as great as this are constantly committed, especially in geography and history and literature; and, I believe also, in the sciences.

3. Questions should not be put which a candidate may be unable to answer, and yet know the *subject* on which he is examined.

4. Abundance of time should be given. The best intellect is not always the quickest. Indeed the original and productive mind is always a deliberate, and sometimes a slow, mind.

5. The questions should be as much as possible such as test the pupil's mental *power* in specific relation to the subject of examination rather than his acquired knowledge. If the subject is Aristotle, questions might be so framed as to pluck Aristotle himself, and a Chinaman could do it. If the subject be the interpretation of Robert Browning, anybody could have plucked *him* on his own works.

6. Finally, there should be taken into consideration the report of each professor under whom the candidate has studied, who should be required to say whether the candidate had received a pass-certificate in his class.

In short, the educational and educative should be kept in view in examining no less than in teaching, for the examination always tends to govern the teaching. We need to study in these days the art of examining as subsidiary to the art of education. Let examiners study examining, and themselves be examined on the art of examining.

Dr Fitch, in his excellent "Lectures on Teaching," has a very good chapter on the subject. He says truly, but with great naïveté, that the chief evils of the examination system will be obviated if the teacher does not teach for the examination specially,—if the previous questions of the examiners are not studied, and so forth; in brief, if neither teachers nor learners allow the coming examination to dominate their work. Now all these advices are perfectly vain so long as a teacher's credit and a pupil's success in life depend on the result. You will not convince either the one or the other that, if they have to run a race to reach a certain goal, the shortest line between two points is *not* the straight one. No; the only cure is in the principles that regulate an examination, in the character of the examiner and his mode of discharging his duty.

As to the examination of a school. My remarks hitherto have had in view not the suppression of examinations, but the possibility of so tempering and adjusting them that they will not govern the education given, but, on the contrary, be determined by the education, adapted to it, and, as essential to this result, exclude the element of competition. I have pointed out that the knowledge which a pupil has of a subject can be ascertained only by ascertaining what he can *do* in it—his faculty relatively to it. But there are educational results, and those often of a delicate and rare kind, which the mere rough testing of faculty must always leave out of account. It is too coarse a measure. How are these to be gauged by an examiner? In three ways: (1) By studying the instruction-plan, the organization and the aim of a school as an educational unity. (2) By hearing the master teach and estimating his method of procedure in its disciplinary, refining, and enriching influence on a boy's mind. (3) By the general impression which the boys make on him as active intelligences and moralized beings.

These functions of an examiner are not to be restricted to secondary and university schools alone; they apply equally to primary schools and cover at least one-half of the work of a Government Inspector. The other half is, of course, the testing of faculty. Imperial grants should be paid on the basis of the first and higher half of the Inspector's duty, provided always that *not more* than a certain percentage of the pupils who had completed their attendances fail, when tested as to their faculty in this or that. All possibility of undue pressure on pupils or masters disappears the moment we give effect to educational ideas in the inspection of education.

In granting leaving-certificates in Secondary schools regard should be had to the three higher tests given above; for a leaving-certificate, properly understood, is not merely a certificate that a boy has fulfilled a prescribed test as to

'faculties,' but it also guarantees that he has passed through an organized curriculum of instruction, has been taught according to sound methods, and has thereby obtained such an amount of discipline and training as fit him for the work of life or for the university.

(*c*) HONOURS AND COMPETITION EXAMINATIONS.—We have been speaking of class or teaching examinations and of pass or qualifying examinations; what now shall we say of Honours examinations? These should exist, I think, only for men who mean to be experts in a department, and devote their lives to it. They have, in fact, a *professional* character, just as the M.B., or B.D., or LL.B. has. After a certain amount of general and liberal study, a youth must be allowed to specialise with a view to his future life-work. But there need be no competition, when his competency comes to be tested: a standard has to be reached, and the notice-paper should give the results alphabetically. I doubt very much if there should be a second class in the honours or professional schools—certainly not more than two classes. The aspirants should pass simply; or "with distinction." I am keeping in view the moral influence of pressure, haste and competition on true intellectual development. What is morally hurtful must also be intellectually hurtful.

I have dealt with the various kinds of examinations and we see that they are not only justified, but may be so conducted as to lose their objectionable character. Examiners must study the art of examining, just as educationalists must study the art of education.

There remains only one kind of examination to be considered from the evils of which it now seems to be impossible to escape, viz. where there is money or a post to be got,—a limited number of rewards or places for an unlimited number of candidates: and here jealousy, envy, &c. have no place for

obvious reasons. Scholarships, Fellowships, State appointments, evidently necessitate competition in its most offensive forms. Unquestionably, within this hot and steamy atmosphere we are not in the atmosphere of liberal education at all; *that* at least is certain. We are conquered by the Chinese idea. China is called the flowery land; but where in it are the flower and fruit of true culture? All that can be said on competitive examinations, by way of practical guidance, is that in competitions the same leading principle should guide the Examiner as in 'qualifying' and 'honours' examinations. His business is to devise such a paper in his subject as shall bring to the front the youth of native capacity, and not the youth distinguished for his reproductive facility. It is a difficult thing to draw up such papers. So far as my observation goes, much more consideration and time should be given to the drafting of papers and the examination of answers than is commonly given. I cannot think that rapidity of working should ever be a factor in determining results in competition examinations—assuredly never in the highest kind of examinations such as those for Fellowships or Indian appointments. The quick and ready wit and the facile pen do not necessarily indicate great mental capacity, and it is the capable man we desire to select for honour and place.

There is a further question, viz. the relative value of subjects in competitive examinations: an important question in itself, and also because it determines the lines on which the higher education of the country will run. It is enough to say here that the subjects which are held to be most truly educative in their character should also, as a general rule, be those which are employed for the discovery of the highest capacity for the public service; but we must not omit practical considerations. A young man who can pass high in History and Economics is of more value in administrative life than if he could pass high in Greek.

It has, I may say, frequently occurred to me that Civil Service appointments should not be dependent on a State-examination at all, but that the posts at the disposal of Government should be distributed among Honours men at the various universities. Variety of culture and character would thus be secured and a great stimulus given to the universities. The 'social' qualification would thus also be best secured. One universal condition would be not only sound physical health but a fair proficiency in some open air game or manly exercise.

I have made these remarks because of the constant, and sometimes irrational outcry against examinations. In some form or other they will be always with us, and what we have to do is to find out ways of so regulating them as to make them efficient for the discovery of real capacity.

XIII.

HISTORY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE SCHOOL.

LANGUAGE and literature are not more closely connected with the humanistic in education than history is. And this for obvious reasons. It is the introduction of the young mind to the record of the past of the race to which he himself belongs, and whose traditions it will be his duty to pass on to the next generation. It would be to waste words to endeavour to shew how closely the study of this record is associated with moral training in the altruistic virtues, and with that kind of political instruction that best fits the rising generation for the discharge of their obligations as citizens in one commonwealth. It strengthens the sympathy of man with man and binds more closely the social bond. By the study of past greatness, moreover, we learn to strive to be worthy of our forefathers, and, by the understanding of the causes which have so often led mankind astray, we learn to understand better the questions that arise in our own time, and to act, during the brief period assigned to us on the stage of life, with circumspection, and under a sense of responsibility to those who are to succeed us. It is for these reasons that I might include history, whereby, as Montaigne says, "We converse with those great and heroic souls of former and better ages," under the head of Social Ethics. It is the instrument whereby we counteract individualism and make each feel that he is part of an organized whole, *for* which as well as *in* which he must live his life.

To discuss here the importance of history in education would, accordingly, be superfluous. Opinions, however, may vary as to the age at which it ought to be studied, and the method of instruction which ought to be pursued. It has been too much the habit, I think, to speak of history as a school subject from the point of view of the adult and cultivated mind, and to forget that, if the young are to enter into the life of bygone generations, and to take a living interest in the past out of which they have grown, the teaching of history must be adapted to the age of our pupils.[1] The childhood of history is best for the child, the boyhood of history for the boy, the youthhood of history for the youth, and the manhood of history for the man. A similar misconception has existed with regard to most other subjects; and hence the attempt to convey adult conceptions to young minds in almost every department of instruction: a mode of procedure which, so far from promoting the growth of knowledge, checks growth by destroying interest. And, as educators, we must admit that, if the result of our teaching be not to stimulate activity of mind, and to plant in the young an interest in the subjects taught that will outlast the school and influence the whole of life, we have failed.

History is a very large and various study, and to deal with it as an educational instrument in all its bearings would occupy a volume. My sole interest, here and now, is in history for the young as a vehicle of moral training, and (to repeat the words I have used above) as a means of extending the sympathy of man with man and of strengthening the social bond, thereby

[1] As an illustration of this tendency I may quote from Professor Dewey, "Everything depends on history being treated from a social standpoint as manifesting the agencies which have influenced social development, and the typical institutions in which social life has expressed itself"; and again, "It is necessary that the child should be forming the habit of interpreting the special incidents that occur, and the particular situations that present themselves in terms of the whole social life." All this is true; but to what age of pupil do these remarks apply?

confirming the feeling of the political unity and continuity of the commonwealth.

When we ask for a Method in teaching history, we are first under obligation to explain to ourselves what we mean by history; that is to say History in the school.

If history be the story of man's words and acts, the British Museum could not hold the history of a single day. By common consent the history of mankind is limited to an account of the words and deeds of men as members of a co-operating society of men, words spoken and deeds done in the interests of the progress of the community as a whole. The record of the past is full of many minor histories, *e.g.*, art, science, education, all of which throw a side-light on history in its ordinary accepted sense; but we must not allow our attention to be diverted by these contributions to the history of humanity, however in themselves important, from the specific meaning of history as having, for its chief subject-matter, man as a political being; as political, law-abiding; and as law-abiding, moral.

(1) History is not antiquarianism. Antiquarianism has something almost childlike about in it, so far as it revels in the facts and little things of the past simply because of its interest in facts and things in and for themselves, without special regard to their wider relations. There are, fortunately, minds of this type, and it is a good thing for the historian that they exist.

(2) History is the story of the long progress of political humanity *in time*. Consequently the mere *dating* of events and of the prominent actors round whom these events have chiefly gathered is essential. This, however, is to be called chronology, not history.

(3) Since history is the long record of time, it must present events, and the acts of the men who specially influenced them, in an accurate, *sequent* series. Now this is to be properly called historical 'annals.' Annals may consist of bald, colourless statements as in China, or they may be vivid and picturesque, and contain an attempt to portray the actors.

So far from such picturesque annals being, because of their dramatic character, less accurate presentations than a bald record, they are in truth more accurate, because they are a fuller presentation of human life; and human life is always dramatic. All depends on the objectivity of the mind of the writer. It is evident that annals well written are substantially narrations or stories, and furnish the raw material of all history. Mr Birrell would tell us that this itself is history, "To keep the past alive for us is the pious function of the historian. Our curiosity is endless; his the task of gratifying it. We want to know what happened long ago. Performance of this task is only proximately possible, but none the less it must be attempted, for the demand is born afresh with every infant's cry.' History is a pageant, not a philosophy." Carlyle, also, looks at history as a picture. And certainly, in so far as history rests on annals, it must be a moving picture, and include the domestic and social life and the personal relations of men and women. I say "women," because in the picturesque annals of the human race, women have played no insignificant part. There have been great female rulers, but it is not this I refer to. I speak of the silent, and because it is silent and always personal, the potent influence of women on the motives of men. So with literature: men are the poets, but women have been the living stimulators of poetry.

(4) History, then (and I do not speak of the philosophy or so-called science of history, which, again, is a distinct subject), contains both antiquities, chronology and annals; but, if we are to have history in the full sense, these elements must be so treated as to exhibit the causal relations of the series of events and their effect on the life of the community as a public ethical polity—a life of progress or of decay as it may be. To write history, accordingly, demands a combination of the highest powers. By the very nature of the case, history must be the most instructive and attractive of all

studies, for what can transcend in importance the history of man to men?

(5) The history of a nation, as distinguished from world-history, is the history of a particular race; that is to say of a significant, if not specific, type of man working towards a social polity and a material and ethical civilization under certain conditions of physical environment[1]. The chief factor is, doubtless, the racial type; but, inasmuch as man lives by the earth and its products, it follows that relations to environment must be of vast importance in the history of a nation, and will be found to explain much of its political activity and industrial growth. The material and economic conditions can never indeed be lost sight of by a historian. In an advanced and complex civilization these material considerations may seem to have given place to "ideas" as determining the acts and ambitions of a people; but they are always at work silently; and, when they are *urgent*, ideas, whether moral, political, or religious, may be swept away before them. The *prima vitae* will ultimately push their claims to the front. Geography, then, in its large sense, as the best expression for environment, is indispensable to the understanding of history[2].

(6) All the same, at the back of the sequence of events and the human drama which we call annals has been Thought, *i.e.*, ideas and purposes. These, again, have for the most part been closely connected with thinkers and with makers or transformers of politics; although it is true that tendencies often exist and will move a whole people which cannot be traced to any one personality. Thus the series of events as determined by external conditions, but above all by *thoughts* and ideals of social life, constitutes history a philosophy: that is to say, a reasoned account of the progress of civilization.

[1] It may be said that it is often a history of a political organization embracing many races. But when it is so, there is always a leading race which determines the polity and gives colour to the social life.

[2] See Lecture on Geography.

If we reflect for a moment we shall see that the writer of the history even of a single nation in the large and rational sense, much more the historian of the world, ought to be possessed of an intense sympathy with humanity, the imagination of a poet, the thoughtfulness of a philosopher, the knowledge of an encyclopaedist and the gifts of an orator. He has to deal with the largest generalizations, and, by dwelling on these, to lay bare the secret springs of events and motives, and all the causal relations of the growth or decay of nations. Hence, we may truly say, that a historical grasp of the life of man through the ages is the last and richest result of a man's culture.

I have dwelt on the various elements that enter into history partly to shew that, even if you have had a boy under tuition up to the end of the secondary school period, it would be little that he could know of history: on the other hand, instruction which he receives may always be such as will prepare him for the ultimate comprehension of the subject in its widest significance. It is not history, then, but only certain of the *elements* that go to constitute history a subject of humane culture so far as boys are concerned. As in all other subjects, we can do nothing in the school period but lay foundations. What we have to attend to is this:—*so* to teach as to give a sound basis for ultimate knowledge in every department that we admit to the school curriculum; but much more have we *so* to teach as to feel assured that we have already attained an educational purpose, at whatever stage the pupil may cease his attendance at school. What is that purpose generally?

Purpose.—We may sometimes be disposed to think that language is somewhat strained when it is said that the object we have in view, even in the formal discipline of intellect, is ethical. We see that it is so, however, as soon as we understand the meaning of the word "ethical" as marking the issue

in personal life and conduct of the rational and emotional which so curiously and subtly blend to make a man. To say that the end is ethical is no more than to say that the end of man is the Humanity in him—not this or that specific knowledge or faculty. But, however the word may demand explanation or justify restriction, as denoting the end of disciplinary studies, its application to the teaching of school history "leaps to the eyes."

We attain our ethical purpose in teaching history by connecting the life of the boy with the life of the past humanity of which he is the most recent outcome. Thus we make it possible for him to become a "being of large discourse looking before and after"; for the afterlook brings with it the forward look. We prolong his experience and his life thereby. Instead of threescore years and ten, he lives thousands of years. All the past of man's life pours into him, and he reaches forward also into the future of the race.

The supreme purpose then which we have in view in teaching history in the school is, I hold, the enriching of the humanity of the pupil with a view to an ethical result in life and character. The quantity known is of little importance.

But no man, were he to give his whole life to history, could comprehend it, if he did not rest all his experience on a home basis. Without this, the true significance of events in world-history will not touch him; their interpretation will lie outside his capacity; his imagination, on which true appreciation of men and movements depends, will fail him. What has been is what now exists around him, and what has been and is, is what will be. Accordingly, his historical appreciation and historical imagination must rest on the comparatively narrow basis of his own national history. If this be so with the professed historian, how much more is it true of the average man. This gives us our second proposition:

The history of the school must be national history, and its primary aim is the knowledge of the past of our own country as

a portion of the human family, with a view to the evoking of that personal attachment to our past and present and future which we call Patriotism.

A true patriot, as distinguished from a jingo, is full of history, though it may be somewhat vague at times. The history of the past, and the probable history of the future, of his country animate him, although he may be a poor hand at a history examination paper. His whole life as a man is stimulated and broadened by something much greater than himself, and that something is the idea of nationality. This idea operates as a formative force in the education of the young.

In educating the boy to nationality and patriotism we do not mean him to stop short at this; but we may be assured that the vague and watered cosmopolitanism, which some affect, can be genuine only in so far as it rests on a patriotic *national* feeling. If we do not love those of our own household the less we talk about loving Humanity with a big *h* the better. It is in respecting ourselves that we respect others. The youth of the country, then, must grow up in a knowledge of their own national record of arts and arms just as they must grow up in and through their own tongue and their own literature; and this they *must* do, if they are intelligently and sympathetically to comprehend the life of other nations, past or contemporary. Education manifestly fails to attain its moral and civic ends if it does not connect a boy with his own national antecedents and all that has made him and the present possible, and it equally fails to attain the ends of culture in its larger sense. Patriotism must be intelligent;

> "Love thou thy land with love far brought
> From out the storied past."

But while this is our first aim, we must never lose sight of our final purpose—the enriching of the humanity of the

pupil with a view to an ethical result in him as a member of the human race.

General Method.—Having defined our aim, how are we to proceed? Can we not find some general rule of method which shall govern all school history from infancy to the age of 18—the age which marks the termination of secondary instruction? I think we can, if we consider the historical elements of which we have spoken and the form in which these first of all present themselves to us, viz., as annals. The general method is, I think, to claim the chronology and annalistic materials of history for the school up to 15 or 16.

Now, as annals, under which I would include the biographical, history is a series of related events in Time connected with certain communities of persons, particular localities, and distinguished men; the even tenor of events being occasionally disturbed by outbursts of passion and emotion. That is to say, it presents itself to us as an epic made up of dramatic situations with interludes of lyrical raptures—all connected with persons and the aims or ideas which they represent. Or we might say, it is a prosaic epic every now and then passing into drama and accompanied by a lyrical chorus. History cannot be *reasoned* history to a boy; even at the age of 16 or 17, it is only very partially so; but it can always be an epic, a drama and a song. The *general* principle of procedure is thus revealed. We must teach history to the young as an epic, a drama and a song. A certain number of dates connected with great crises of national history, or with great characters, must, of course, be known for the sake of the time-sequence, and certain prosaic facts must enter as connecting links of the epic, as the pupils increase in years. But the younger our pupils are the more must the epic, dramatic, and lyric idea of history be kept in view, and the more indifferent must we remain to causal explanations, and the more sparing must we be of dates. Thus, history in the

school will be full of humanity, and so be a humane study; thus will it connect itself with literature; thus will it stir ethical emotion; thus, in short, will it be history in the concrete. And when history, in the larger philosophic conception of it, comes within the range of the cultured adolescent mind, this epic view of it will contribute to a *true* reasoned comprehension—a comprehension, that is to say, which will take full account of human character, feeling, and motive.

"History," says Montaigne, "is an idle study to those who choose to make it so; but of inestimable value to those who can make use of it; the only study, Plato says, the Lacedaemonians reserved to themselves * * * Above all let the tutor remember to what end his instruction is directed, and not so much imprint on his pupil's memory the date of the ruin of Carthage as the character of Hannibal and of Scipio; nor so much where Marcellus died as why it was unworthy of the duty that he died there. Let him read history not as an amusing narrative but as a discipline of the judgment. * * * To some history is a mere language study, to others a perfect anatomy of philosophy by which the most secret and abstruse parts of our human natures are penetrated."

History, taught in accordance with this method, shews itself to be, above all other studies, a humane study, and to be rich in all those elements which go to the ethical culture of the young by exercising their moral judgment. All subjects, when properly taught, contribute, it is true, to this ethical culture, for even science can be humanized; but language (in its larger significance as literature) and history contribute most of all; and these two play into each other's hands. Together they constitute, along with morality and religion, the humanistic in education and furnish the best instruments for the ethical growth of mind.

The general principle of procedure of which I have been speaking, naturally suggests the true method of instruction in

particular lessons. Let the period be the Scots' wars of independence. Round Wallace and Bruce and, at a later period, Charles I. this story chiefly gathers. The boy, with the map before him, must have conveyed to him a conception of the *conditions* physical, social, and political of each period, in so far as these are intelligible at the age which he has reached. The story should be then first of all *told* to him, and only thereafter read to him. He should finally read it himself. This is the epic: the dramatic and the lyrical enters by reading to him, or with him, all the national poetry and song that has gathered round the period. Dunbar and Barbour are put in requisition for the earlier periods. He then, as in every other subject, is invited to *express himself* in the construction of a narrative of the leading events.

In the history of England, the periods of the French wars and the Spanish Armada, for example, are to be treated in like manner. The boy must strike his roots deep into the national soil, or he will never come to much. It matters nothing that the poetry you give contains much that is legendary. A national legend is far more significant in the inner history of a people than a bald fact.

Such, I conceive, is the true method of school history in general. The minor details of method will be suggested by the Rules of Method applicable to all subjects; but a few words regarding three of these rules of detail may be added by way of illustration:—

(1) We are met at the threshold by this principle, viz. new knowledge must rest on knowledge already acquired, if it is to be a living and intelligible growth. In other words, we must always begin from a child's own mind-centre, if we wish to extend his area of knowledge effectively. Consequently, if he is to learn intelligently about past men and events, he must have some knowledge of existing men and events. He must have seen and talked and read about things present to his own

experience, before he can have the imaginative material at his service for comprehending the past and remote. This he gradually acquires from his every-day contact with people and things, the general course of instruction in the school, and from the reading of simple fables, stories, and narratives in his text-books and the school library, all aided by the introduction of newspapers into the school when important events are occurring. His arithmetic, meanwhile, is teaching him to stretch his conception of time, and his geography to localize his own and other countries and to become alive to the fact that he belongs to a distinct nationality. The only historical imaginative material which I would *directly* give before the age of ten complete is the learning by heart of national ballads, such as Chevy Chase, etc.

(2) At ten complete I may begin history proper, and I am now confronted with the rule, "Turn everything to use." The "use" is determined by the end or purpose. I have already spoken of this, but I may say further:—

Geography we teach with a view to extensiveness of mind; arithmetic and geometry with a view to intensiveness of faculty; history, not merely with a view to lengthening the brief span of man's life into the past, but as the basis of social ethics. Unless I stir a boy or girl through the emotions, I do not know how I am to get hold of them. We wish them, as they grow into youthhood, to be so taught that the national life and character in so far as it is worthy of admiration, and the achievements of their forefathers, shall form part of themselves, enter into their judgments on present affairs, and stimulate them to maintain and advance society by the memory of what has been done before they were born. It was as citizens of a particular nation and by a high sense of the duties of citizenship, that our ancestors accomplished all that has made the present desirable as an advance on their own time. Our object, then, is to lead the boy to consider himself as a continuation of the past, as the transmitter, during his lifetime of activity, of

a tradition of life and character. He will be taught to aim at making things better than he finds them. From precept and example he will learn to keep before him the highest ideal of the duties of a citizen, and recognize the need of deliberation, self-restraint, and self-sacrifice in the interest of the common-wealth:

> "Not clinging to some ancient saw;
> Not mastered by some modern term;
> Not swift nor slow to change, but firm:
> And in its season bring the law." TENNYSON.

If this is not our aim, what is? Why do I not give him the chronology and annals of Peru instead of England and Scotland?

Up to the eleventh year, I would confine myself, I have said, to ballads and a few graphic stories of heroes. In the eleventh year the course of instruction may begin to be continuous. But history is always a story *to be told*, and the wandering minstrel of old is our model teacher. The childhood of history, I have said, is the history for children. Text-books are out of place. The tale has to be narrated by the teacher, just as the minstrels used to sing the deeds of heroes at the courts of feudal princes. The teacher's mind must be full of matter, and he must cultivate dramatic and graphic narration. Preserve the human interest of the narrative, and point the morals, as you go, without *impressing* them. Narrations should always be given in the presence of a map, and geographical references constantly made. Certain facts and dates should be put on the black-board and copies made by the pupils. Lantern-slides should be largely used. All the greatest crises and great men of British history, if dealt with in this fashion, from Alfred and Wallace, down to the Boer war, could be presented to the pupils by the time they are 11 years of age.

From Twelfth to Fifteenth Year.—It is now chiefly that we begin emphasizing the time-sequence of events; within a narrow period, of course, at first. Boys do not object to learn

these by heart, if the events themselves have been first narrated. A chronological sheet, containing not more than 20 of the principal dates in British history, should be hung up and committed to memory. In teaching the time-sequence, the gathering of great incidents round kings and emperors has been strenuously objected to by some. I do not concur with these objectors. It is quite natural, it seems to me, to consider events in their relation to the chief magistrate of the country for the time being; and it is an aid to memory. So, also, the record of wars and battles has been denounced as "drum and trumpet" history. But these interest both boys and men, and, moreover, illustrate the great transitions of national and world development. As Tennyson says,

> "For all the past of Time reveals
> A bridal dawn of thunder-peals
> Wherever Thought hath wedded Fact."

Thus is history made interesting; and if it is not made interesting, it is of little use in the school. Moreover, it is of moral and intellectual value to a boy only in so far as it gathers round persons and dramatic situations which interest. Thereby it enriches his ethical nature and furnishes food for his imagination. In the thirteenth year a text-book may be put into the pupil's hands *for the first time*; but it should be a historical reading book, not a history. Thus the early stage of historical teaching is revised, and the record brought down to our own times.

I do not think that pupils should be questioned much in history, except with a view to the language of the text-book, when they have been introduced to one; but, unquestionably no lesson is complete which does not include a conversation on the substance of what has been read. The ends of examination in all *narrative* (except where new words demand explanation) are always best attained by a familiar interchange of opinion, and then by requiring the pupils to reproduce in their own words, first orally, and then on slate or paper, what they have read in their books or heard from their teacher.

The text-book, I say, should not be an epitome of history, but a historical reading book[1]. Epitomes are merely arid tables of contents; we ask boys to "get them up," and are surprised that they should dislike the task! Chronological connections will be furnished by the teacher orally, written on the black-board, and entered in the pupil's own note-book. Chronological charts (I have also indicated) should be hung up; but these should avoid much detail. The best chart for my study is the worst possible for a school. In history, as in all school subjects, eye-memory is too much ignored. The poets will be largely utilized, and if not read by the boys, then read *to* them. Portraits of great men and pictures of great historical scenes or monuments will be shewn, lantern-slides being used. You may be sure of this that the young can be interested in history only in so far as it is (in the words of a French writer) "a *living* resurrection of the past." Human character, motive, passion, are the true attraction, and this is attained by (to use Carlyle's phrase) "giving a picture of the thing acted."

The earlier stages of history-teaching are thus, as will be seen, annalistic, epic, pictorial, ethical—and only in the later period didactic. Oral instruction by the teacher is chiefly relied on. To say that there is no training in such teaching of history is absurd. That there is little *discipline* as compared with that given by formal studies is true. But training, though not discipline, is often something much better.

From Fifteenth to Eighteenth Year.—During this period of 'secondary' instruction, the pupil may begin his history over again, as a reasoned or rational history, in some such book as Green's *Short History of England* or Hume Brown's *History*

[1] It is superfluous in these days to say that history should always be taught in presence of maps, especially maps that emphasize physical characteristics, and that the master should sketch on the black-board the plans of battles with coloured chalks. Photographs and lantern-slides and casts should also be largely used. History apparatus is as necessary for a school as science apparatus.

of Scotland. In the course of these years he will be much exercised in writing historical narratives. Every advantage will, meanwhile, continue to be taken of the general literature of the country, the master reading prose and poetical pieces to the pupils, constantly substituting such readings for the ordinary lesson. When speaking of the Wars of the Roses, he would stop and read Shakespeare's plays, one or more. In the dramas of Tennyson and Sir Henry Taylor, and, perhaps, also Browning and others, we find admirable aids to a vital reproduction of the past. Historical novels, if good, such as Sir Walter Scott's, should be in the school library and freely given out. In the last year of his course, the pupil should read along with the master (not as lessons in the technical sense) a book on the "making of England." The occasional acting also of great historical events by the pupils would do much to give life and meaning to the past. Books written on special periods, of which there are now many, and biographies such as those of Warwick, Wolsey, Clive, Nelson, Cromwell, should be in the school library, and the boys should be encouraged to read them; but I beseech you, do not ask the boys to "get them up." Few will of themselves read, you say. I answer, this largely depends on how you have taught; and also, I would say, it is only a few that ever go beyond the elements of any subject; but these few are worth all the rest put together. Just as in Society; it is a few men, and, I am not sure we may not say, above all, a few women, that maintain the standard of culture and social intercourse and make life worth living.

It is in the secondary stage of education alone that history can be taught as a *rational* sequence; also that the moral instruction suggested by almost every page can be *directly and of set purpose* enforced. At the earlier stages this moral teaching is very much taken for granted by the teacher—adverted to, but not prelected on. "It is the office of historical

science," says Lord Acton, "to maintain morality as the sole impartial criticism of men and things, and the only one on which honest minds can be made to agree."

In classical schools the boys will of course obtain a fair knowledge of the histories of Greece and Rome. These histories should be short and full; that is to say, full in their treatment of a few things, and always free from details not essential to the comprehending of the general course of the story of these nations and the character of the people. Such books as Smith's school histories are models of what a school history ought *not* to be. (Read Smith's *England*, page 29, for example, which page I have selected at random.) Is it not incredible that boys should leave (so-called) Classical schools ignorant of Plutarch's *Lives?*

Towards the end of the secondary period, historical reading, such as the selection edited by Mr Green, should be read, and literary and historical instruction in this way combined. It is only at the University stage that Gibbon, Mommsen, Ranke, Guizot, Milman, Motley, Merivale should be heard of[1].

You will now, I hope, see that history contributes in a very direct way to the ethical purpose of the school, while contributing largely to the acquisition of English, to literary training generally, and to the peculiar "culture" which the study of the past gives.

Before the boys leave school (at the age of 17–18) a course of familiar lectures should be given on the history of the world, with constant reference to a large wall map and a "Stream of Time." These conversational lectures will connect the civilization of the ancient with the modern world. Very general notions only will be conveyed, but the culture and the impulse

[1] I wonder how many youths who have taken "History Honours at our Universities" have read any of these, not to speak of Prescott and Motley, &c. In every subject under the sun, the teacher tends to become petty and pedantic and to lose all perspective, pluming himself on his knowledge of petty points.

to know which are given by general notions are unquestionable. In fact, there is little of real value anywhere save general ideas. I have pointed out (*Institutes of Education*) that each stage of intellectual evolution has its own appropriate teaching, and that, as boys become adolescent, they seek for causal relations and generalized views. To occupy the mind with these is the function of the University rather than the secondary school; but in the last year of secondary school work preparation may be made for the highest work. So strong is the intellectual impulse at this period towards the abstract, the causal and the general, that the boys will do the work for themselves *badly*, if a competent teacher does not afford guidance. Assuredly this is the truth, that a University that does not meet this want of the maturing mind is nothing but an upper secondary school.

Citizenship.—But this is not all: In the secondary stage, and to some extent even in the primary stage, history must be made to teach citizenship, and as much of the Constitution as may be thought necessary to the equipment of a citizen politician. Surely this is important in a democratic country.

Social and civil relations and the forms of our constitutional polity, including local or municipal organization, should be taught in all secondary schools; but only of course in their *general outlines.* We are not educating boys to be constitutional lawyers any more than we are educating them to be experts in any other department of knowledge. It is for the Universities to see to the experts of a nation. The duty of subjects to the State ought to be impressed. But it is quite useless to do this in a formal and text-book way. *All that can be taught with effect must arise out of the history teaching from day to day*, and be in close relation to it, and given orally. Such teachings, if incidental and associated with persons and events, take effect; if formal and detached, they are wholly ineffectual for their purpose. Their great value consists not

in the knowledge they give, but in their deepening the sense of national continuity and social unity, and so preparing the young for patriotic citizenship and for a humane understanding of their social relations.

The amount of instruction aimed at should be studiously restricted in its range: text-books of "civics" should be religiously avoided. But quite at the end of the secondary period, the pupil may be encouraged to write narratives of certain constitutional changes and to draw his own conclusions. Professor Seeley goes so far as to say that history has to do *only* with the "State." This is too narrow a view; although we may concede that the development of the State must be the central interest of the professed historian. By the "State," I presume, is meant the organization of the common life under law written or unwritten; and the story of it is how this came about. Such instruction, in any full and true sense is evidently, like the philosophy of history, the prerogative of the University; but in the later period of the secondary school, the pupils may be introduced to it in the form of familiar conversations on their historical reading in the way we have suggested.

For the masses who do not go to secondary schools, instruction in citizenship must be given in evening continuation schools; but not disjoined from general historical reading. If formal and technical, I repeat, it loses its effect. Even the adult mind, while it loves generalization, rests itself ultimately on the concrete. There is only one interest that is universal, and that is Life.

When we contemplate the close relationship that exists between history, geography, literature, civil relations, and ethics, we see how one subject of study, properly taught, aids and confirms the acquisition of knowledge in other departments—indeed, cannot be taught according to sound method without doing so. All subjects admit of cross-references to each other, and it is by utilizing these that we weave that web of intellectual and moral association which gives unity to education and

measures the education of each of us. It has been often urged against educational reformers, and with some truth, that they desire to teach too much during the school period. But the moment we begin to get a glimpse of method and of the organization and inter-relation of studies, we see that much may be taught with ease and simplicity, if only the teacher himself be properly equipped and understand the scope and purpose of his vocation. We may seem to demand much of him; but not more than the future will demand, if he is to be educator as well as instructor.

In conclusion, as to the equipment of the teacher I would say, let no man pretend to teach history who is not competent, *stans in uno pede*, to give a *vivid* narrative of all world-history with a map of the world in front of him and a few coloured chalks.

NOTE. As to examination papers in history, these should be confined in *schools* to dates and to the calling for the narrative reproduction of events. Although it is true that we have, in the secondary school, been gradually introducing the boy to reasoned history, he can absorb much more than he can give out. If you insist on his dealing with political causes, he will simply get by rote what he has read or been told. To get dates by heart is in accordance with sound psychology; to get generalizations by heart is to flaunt the plainest teachings of psychology. Boys can understand reasonings and gather in this way materials for the future, but to expect them to reason for themselves is to foster premature judgment in immature minds.

XIV.

AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO DISCIPLINE, AND THE DANGERS THAT ATTEND THE DISCIPLINE OF GOOD MASTERS[1].

I DO not propose in this address to speak of incompetent masters—of men, that is to say, who cannot maintain discipline without constant appeal to cane, birch or taws. Such men ought at once to leave the profession; they are naturally disqualified for it. What sight more melancholy than to see a teacher with his book in his hand and the taws hanging under it, hooked over his little finger! What an utter misapprehension of the whole aim of school-life does this indicate! The driving, which is an inevitable result of the Code[2], makes this necessary, we are told; and so far we may admit the apology. The chief objection to the "individual pass and pay" system lies, indeed, in this, that it causes the teacher to drive; and driving too often ends in physical coercion and pain. Even girls are flogged, and the steady progress which Scotland was making in the recognition of the fact that moral power is the only truly educative force, has been put back for a whole generation by the Code.

In this address I have in view only good masters, as you will see from its title—men who regard physical pain

[1] Delivered by request, at the Educational Congress at Edinburgh, 5th January, 1882.

[2] The Code in force in 1882.

as a rare and final resort in discipline, and who honestly endeavour to make moral law supreme. I desire to consider, in a philosophical spirit, the dangers to which the two chief kinds of good masters are exposed, and to guard them against these dangers, which, I think, generally arise from their misinterpretation of the word Authority.

Let me start, then, with the proposition that all sound discipline of the young rests ultimately on authority as its basis, and that authority itself rests on reason. And further, that the ultimate object of school discipline, properly understood, is not to secure obedience to school rules and the doing of the ever-recurring lessons, but to create in the boy self-discipline. The end is an ethical end; it has in view the gradual and slow formation of the character of the pupil, through the inculcation of motives and the strengthening of will by daily *doing* so that the boy may become a self-regulating man. These things being assumed, I would say further that the process of all disciplining of unformed minds by others consists largely in supplying, not so much direct, as collateral, motives to the weak, uncertain will, whereby it may be steadied and borne on to its purpose. This has to be done till habit has been formed; and habit is a tendency automatically to repeat what has been often done. A boy or youth, for example, may have a clear perception of the right in conduct; he may be intensely sensitive to the influence of those sentiments and emotions which urge him to do the right, but yet he may never do it save by accident, or under very favourable circumstances. The tendency of the natural man is like the steady pull of a physical force; it is like gravitation—always there, always certain—dragging the boy's will along without effort on his part, *flumine secundo*. It is the upward tendency we have to establish, and our work is then accomplished[1].

[1] "Jam non consilio bonus, sed *more* eó perductus ut non tantum, recte facere, possim, sed nisi recte facere non possim." (I forget the reference; it is quoted by Wordsworth on his "Ode to Duty").

Now, the most potent of all the collateral aids to the unfashioned will of boyhood is the authority that resides in the parent or master, and is symbolized in their persons; nay, it may be maintained that all true and genuine discipline whatsoever emanates from authority, and that disciplining of the young is simply authority in action according to time and circumstance. If we seek, then, for the source of all sound and healthy discipline of the pupil, we shall find it in the authority of the master. The master is at once the legislative and executive power. His right to legislate and to execute rests in the authority that is vested in him.

Now, by what title does he lay claim to that authority at all? The State and the parent, it may be said, delegate to him their authority. True; but in that very delegation there is something to be investigated. It is not necessary to inquire into the ultimate grounds of the authority exercised by the State in the name of civil order; it suffices here to say that authority, in so far as it is not concerned merely with police, i.e. the driving and coercing of human beings into the observance of law and order, but with the education of a human soul—the bringing about of that self-discipline to which I have referred above as the aim of the school, has no claim to the exercise of might, except in so far as might is based on right; and, therefore, on reason. I will put my point in an extreme way for the purpose of bringing out my meaning:—A father has no right to exercise might in inflicting injustice on his child, simply because that child has the misfortune to be his offspring. Nay, may we not go further, and hold that a father has no right to exercise his might in imposing what is merely unreasonable on his boy—I mean what is in itself, and, apart from the boy's own opinion, unreasonable? Children submit, doubtless, to such inflictions; but why? Because they are too ignorant to understand their rights, and too weak to assert them. The unjust and unreasonable parent takes advantage of this meanly. If these remarks be true of a

parent, how much more, then, are they true of the master of a school?

Authority, then, which is the foundation of all discipline, is not might or force, as masters from time immemorial have presumed, and as many still presume. It is might as based on right; and, in dealing with moral and emotional beings, it must always be able to vindicate itself at the bar of right. Where, then, shall we look for the characteristics of authority which constitute it right in might? I think we shall find them by introspection,—by ascertaining the characteristics of that inner authority of the moral law, that supremacy and rightful might of conscience under which we all as spirits live and work. Now, I find that this inner law of conscience, which is my schoolmaster, which disciplines me to be always just, to be always right and reasonable, to be always the same, to be always loyal to the highest sentiments and aspirations of my nature, condemns only when a real offence has been committed; it recognizes pleas of mercy; is not equally severe with all offences; and finally I find that it exists in my consciousness invested with Divine Authority. Now, all good masters may be placed under one of two classes. (1) Those in whom these characteristics of the inner authority of conscience are conspicuous. They embody in their own character, actions, and manner, the moral law. They are ever exhibiting, consciously or unconsciously, the right of the might of authority. (2) Those who but dimly recognize the moral ground of the authority they exercise. They wield, and consequently embody, the pure might of authority. The former is the just man, and he alone truly educates; the latter is the strong-willed man, who by the exhibition of law and might, with their background of physical force, coerces boys into the doing of certain things, and calls it discipline

The first type of master let us call "The Wise Master"; the second type let us call "the Captain-Master." As the great object of school is the education of a moral being, not the

mere drilling of boys into conformity with certain external rules, it is only the just man who is the wise master, and who really understands the greatness and dignity of his position, and his power as an instrument in human progress. The strong-willed or captain-master may be likened to a head policeman or to the captain of a vessel on the high seas. The best of this type have many merits, which I am very far indeed from ignoring; but, at best, they do not look far enough forward. They are content with the immediate results of orders obeyed. The wise and just master, on the other hand, has for his motto, *Respice finem.* "What am I ultimately aiming at?" is the question he asks himself. And the answer is, "The education of my boys as moral and spiritual beings." All else he will sacrifice to this grand aim. We cannot but accord a certain measure of respect to the captain-master, and we are glad to find him when perfect of his kind; but for the wise master we must have a feeling of veneration. I know no position more exalted than his: I know no man so admirable. Is there any professional worker in the world's work who is to be named with him in the same breath?

Having briefly described the two kinds of masters, let us dwell for a little on the dangers and weaknesses to which these different types of men are exposed. For it is not to be presumed that we find either of them in perfection. What we may, and do, find is honest men striving to be one or the other, and some coming pretty near the goal they are striving to reach.

I.—First, as to the wise master, the true educator, what are his dangers?

1. He is apt to lose sight of the *might* that resides in the right of authority. He is apt to forget that, while the foundation of his authority is a moral one, yet its effectiveness consists in the might which it exhibits. He is in a governing position:

he is a ruler, a monarch. But he may be self-analytic, and so conscious of his own personal short-comings as to have a half misgiving as to the rightfulness of firmly asserting his own authority simply as such. In exercising a firm, though wisely moderate, authority, he may not himself always heartily believe in it. His own sins of omission and commission may be so many, his own failure to lead that perfect life of the wise man up to which he is educating his boys may be so clear to his own secret consciousness, that he half feels himself to be an impostor, and is sometimes disposed to smile at his own assumption of autocratic moral sovereignty. He cannot but be aware how much better in many respects is a fine boy than even a so-called 'good' man. The disturbances of his equanimity caused by petty everyday incidents, the irritability caused by work and anxiety, the sense of failure to discharge his responsibilities, the envies, the jealousies, the uncharitableness, the anger which the conflicts of the world engender, the little vanities which hang on the skirts of his robe of office – all these things, and many more, disturb his daily thoughts, and make him feel less than the least of those to whom he is to be a model, a guardian, and guide. He feels himself to be a sham, for he has to seem what he is not. If, under the influence of such self-analysis, he disrobes himself of the purple of command, he is undone. His estimate of himself and his position are both wrong. He forgets that there is no such thing as the wise man, the perfect character. He has misread the moral teachings of life. He forgets that the highest life of the saint is still a struggle, still a falling and rising again, and that the distinguishing mark of all the wisdom and goodness to which finite man can reach is the continual and continuous *effort* to be wise and good. He ought to remember the failures of the past only in so far as they strengthen him for the present and the future. He must not, therefore, allow his self-knowledge of past failures and present imperfection to weaken his assumption of the authority—the might, of his

position. It will always temper the exercise of that authority, but it ought not to detract from the exhibition of it.

Is not this, however, to maintain relations with the young spirits around him which are not true and honest, and which therefore have in them the element of failure, as all untruth necessarily has? Not so; for, as his estimate of himself is wrong, so is his estimate of his position. He does not stand there, at the head of these youthful spirits, in his personal capacity alone. He is a representative of all that is wise and good, and in that representative and ministerial character he must maintain the dignity of his office. He holds Her Majesty's Commission, so to speak, and is there in the name of the State; he is the minister of the thought and experience of mankind, and is there in the name of humanity; he is the sum of the past, and is there in the cause of the future; he is the representative to the young of the highest spiritual aims and hopes of mankind, and consequently is there in the name of the Most High. Let him think of these things, and whilst he will not thereby lessen his efforts to harmonize his own inner life with his high and sacred calling, he will yet maintain authority, by exhibiting the might and dignity which become his office.

2. Again, the clear perception of the ultimate justification of his own authority—the moral justification of it, may lead him to bring that moral justification so much into the foreground as to weaken the expression of authority as law or might on the one side, and of obligation and obedience to authority, simply as such, on the other. He may resort to explanations, exhortations, appeals, and persuasions, instead of to command. Now, a master must always be able to vindicate, if necessary, every order and every authoritative act in the court of common sense and at the bar of justice, but he is not bound to make this always clear to his subjects. By explanation and persuasion he flatters one kind of boy, and so loses his respect; he weakens another kind of boy, though

retaining his affection—also, however, at the expense of his respect; he wholly undermines the only motive which guides and sustains another, which is the sense of the *power of law*. With the boy of finest temper he does not lose much, for such a boy has already in a half-conscious way penetrated to the secrets of authority and shares the spirit of the master, but even with him he weakens his position. I am very far from saying that a master should not sometimes put himself in the position of a persuader and explainer. On the contrary, he must let all, especially the older boys, see from time to time the ethical reality of the school formalities, and lead them to understand the ethical significance of his authoritative acts and words. But he must not dwell on this: he must act his ideas rather than talk them. There are occasions, or, if there are none, they should be made, when the lesson of the day gives room for the sowing of moral seed by clear analysis of the motives of moral action, or the pointed application of a story, a poem, or historic deed. These opportunities should not only be taken, but sought and created. School life itself, too, will yield, in its ordinary incidents, abundance of material for enforcing the right and honourable in thought and action. In short, he must not rest his authority on explanation and persuasion, but only, as fit occasion arises, support it with these. A glance of the eye, a frown, a smile, a friendly pat, an encouraging word—these are the forms which his moral persuasions must take. In fact, a master who habitually tries to exhibit to his boys the ground of all his actions, and to *persuade* to the right, abdicates his authority as such. He does so with the best intentions, relying on the power of truth and goodness, forgetting that the power of these fails even with himself, how much more, then, with the immature mind, which cannot comprehend them in all their depth! In truth, he calls on the weak and as yet unformed will to do what his own mature will does not always accomplish. But the worst is this, that he forgets that the

vacillating moral nature of boys gladly finds its support and strength in authority and law as embodied in him, and that if he substitute ideas and thoughts and sentiments in room of these, that support is withdrawn.

I have already said that opportunities are numerous for pointing morals, stimulating to virtuous effort, inciting to the disdaining of sloth and the suppression of vicious propensities, and of holding up to the boys the standard at which they should aim. These fit occasions the master will gladly seize for bringing into clear daylight the undercurrent of moral and religious principle which guides his own conduct, and is presumed to animate the school life. The boys will thus not merely learn to act rightly, but will get some vision of the beauty and charm of goodness, and of the dignity of virtue. But with all this, a master must beware of wearing "his heart upon his sleeve for daws to peck at." All talk on his part has to be kept within severe limits, for it has no end save action, and boys must not be led to substitute the dreamy contemplation of the good for the doing of the right. In speaking to boys, moreover, he will avoid dwelling on the sentimental or emotional side of goodness where they themselves are concerned: they very rarely understand this. Sentiment, like humour, comes late, save in exceptional cases. It is the manliness, the heroism, the justice, the wisdom, the nobility of goodness and virtue, which can reach the hearts of boys; and the lowness, the meanness, the unwisdom, the injustice, the weakness, the unworthiness of vice.

3. In the third place, a weakness which besets the wise master is a certain disregard for his own rules and for his own school order. He feels so deeply his own strength in ideas, he is so confident of the justness of his own sentiments, he is so sure of the truth of his own emotions, he is so strong in his spiritual strength, that he is prepared to suspend, set aside, or override the rules of the school, under the persuasion that his moral resources are so great that he can, when he chooses,

restore things to their proper balance. The temptation to do this is great; but it is so detrimental to that settled order which contributes so largely to the promotion of good habits in the young, that a master must be on his guard against the weakness. "That will do for to-day," "Never mind, it is of little consequence," said in impatience, trusting to the power of recovering lost ground, is a blunder. Even the wise master, then, has to be watchful over himself with respect to those vices of management which lean to virtue's side. I speak, of course, of a school; for it may constantly occur in the well-understood relations of a tutor and a single pupil, or of a father and child, that freedom may be taken with rules which both understand. So also, and for the same reasons, such conduct would not affect the boy of finest temper; but a master has to deal with various characters, and with these also in various moods, which it is impossible for him to estimate. In dealing with particular faults, too, he is apt to be lenient, where he is himself well assured that the act of the pupil was well meant, or that the impulse that prompted him had a mixture of good in it. Such treatment of the individual case may be quite safe, so far as the individual is concerned, but its effect on the school, as a whole, is hurtful. It weakens the sense of order and just administration. Morally there may be no fault to find with the treatment of a particular case, in so far as the relations of master and pupil are concerned; but in a school there is such a thing as the universal, as well as the particular, conscience which has to be considered, and which must be, in all doubtful cases, paramount. The master's personal feeling about the particular case, accordingly, ought not to govern; if it does, law is weakened thereby, for the majority of boys can ascribe the course pursued to the arbitrary will of the master alone, and cannot be expected to discriminate and note those finer characteristics of an act or incident which justify exceptional treatment.

It is not merely weak men who break down in the

administration of a school system; nor is it their case that we now are specially considering, but that of the strong man—the man so strong in his own moral convictions and spiritual resources, that he is disposed to treat as of little importance the rules and methods which he has himself in the wisest moments imposed. Such a course of conduct has, moreover, its plausible justification, for it is not desirable to have a hard and fast line of pedantic military rule. There should be some elasticity—some elbow-room—in the school system, just as in the moral code and habits that govern the individual conscience. In this feeling that the organized life of a school should not be wooden and inelastic, there is a sound principle. But this does not justify fitful and capricious administration; this freedom and elasticity should itself be a visible part of the system.

It is essential to good school-keeping, that the boys should feel that there is a living and human moral force at their head—not an iron mechanism, not a Fate; that they are not parts of a machine merely, of which the head-master is only a kind of stoker or driver. A human heart must be felt to be beating everywhere under the outer case of rules and methods—a heart which sympathizes and understands. There must be room left for this heart to beat freely, and this can be secured only by having as few rules as possible. Given a limited number of general rules for the guidance of the day, and all else should flow from the inspiration of the hour. The moral life of the school should start fresh every morning. How else can there be that free movement which is essential to the growth of heart and intellect? With the wise master there can be little or no difficulty in bringing about this kind of life. He proceeds on the assumption that all are aiming with him to realize a high standard, and if he has acquired the confidence of his boys, no word, or act, or gesture of his will be set down to caprice: these things will be too visibly obedience in himself to the best and highest. The boys will recognize

this. The larger the school, of course, the more numerous must be the rules; the more strictness of administration there is, and the more of system, the influence of the central and governing mind is less directly felt. This is the evil attending large schools, and which weakens their influence as moral seminaries. Recognize this: Day by day the master is presumed to give forth the moral power which is to permeate the mass. There is moral freedom on both sides. If under the influence of this free spirit the boys should err, they would, I believe, candidly admit to their master that they had done so; the relations between the two are frank, for are they not both working together to realize the same community of life? So much for the freedom and elasticity which belong to the master and the school, as resting on moral sympathy and livingness, as opposed to mere system, and law, and formalism. Nay, in authority itself there is also to be found an element of elasticity, for it has to regulate much that is in itself neither moral nor immoral, and in this field it has a Papal power of dispensation, which it can occasionally exercise without damage to itself: it can sometimes deliberately suspend a rule or injunction, and by that very act strengthen itself as pure authority.

4. Such are some of the errors against which even the wise master has to guard. There are others not worthy of mention. But it may be well to point out that, as the master we are describing has a moral affection for his boys, which becomes in many cases a personal affection, he is disposed to become too familiar and friendly. Now, pleasing as it is to be on such relations with well-disposed boys, there are dangers attending it. The principle of authority, I again repeat, is the central principle in the relations between a teacher and his pupils, and must not be tampered with. The wise master, however, is not likely to err so far on this virtuous side as seriously to impair the discipline of his school. A vigorous, earnest mind can occasionally take great liberties without serious hurt to any, and with possible advantage to a

few of the more timid and shy natures. But such familiarities are to be avoided; for they are apt to engender in the boyish mind, which we must remember is as yet untrained, inexperienced, undisciplined, immature, and undiscriminating (defects which only time can cure), a sense of equality that does not, cannot, ought not, to exist. The master is so vigorous, so earnest, and so good withal, that there will be no attempt to evade or counteract him, because of his familiar kindnesses, and the discipline will not be seriously, if at all, affected; but the too great equality will deprive the higher natures of the idea of some standard to attain, and will give to all false notions of their relation to mature minds and to authority generally. This, when we consider the tendency of youth to self-assertion and to practising the art of instructing their grandfathers, is not a desirable result; especially in these times.

II.—If dangers attend the administration of the wise master, they are of the nature, as I have indicated, of weaknesses that lean to virtue's side, and arise out of too amiable a view of human and boy-nature, and too mild a sense of personal dignity—in brief, in a deficiency of pure authority simply as such.

On the other hand, the captain-master—who relies solely on authority in the sense of law and might, who distrusts all purely moral motives, who has little faith in the nature of boys, and does not believe that they are capable of receiving ideas of life and action, and relies, therefore, on the maintenance of law as law, and on the preservation of a rigid system—is exposed to dangers much more serious. His duty is (or if this be not his duty, what is?) to train the boy to an independent perception of the truth of moral ideas, of the majesty of the law which resides in them, and to the habit of self-regulation. And yet he abdicates his function altogether when he treats boys simply as parts of a machine; he distrusts the good in

them, and all the possibilities of virtue and religion as *inner* growths.

This man, who rests not merely his claim to rule, but his right to rule and his method of ruling, on authority purely as such, without regard to the ultimate moral basis of all authority whatsoever, who therefore never lets the light of moral ideas shine through the sable mantle of magistracy, must ever fail to attain to all the highest aims of the school; and this, because he does not consciously propose to himself any such aims. In truth, it will be found he does not even propose to himself any such aims as the consummation of his own personal life. He has no hesitations, no self-questionings. His life is like his school, grounded on authority—the authority of Church and State, or of social opinion and convention. He is not a living free soul, he has not attained to the liberty of the Spirit. For be it always remembered that as is the man, so is the master; and in describing the wise master, we are only describing the wise man, whose powers have been set in the particular direction of educating others, just as Quintilian, in describing the good orator, defines him to be *bonus vir peritus dicendi*. He has to find a moral method, but it is educed from his own character.

I know it will here be said by some, "Leave things alone, then; if all depends on the man and the character, he will be a good or a bad master, spite of you and all your criticisms." This is a great error. For, in the first place, a master, who is already a wise man, has, when entering on his great and delicate task, to be encouraged to have faith in the moral method which would naturally suggest itself to his nature, and, on the other hand, to be guarded against the tendency in that method to run to seed. By reflecting on other characters and methods in the course of his studies, moreover, he brings out with distinctness to himself his own, and thereby understands what he is doing. In the second place, it is a superficial view of human nature which classes all

as either good or bad, or in any way that involves a visible and deep line of demarcation. Human nature is a complex thing, and at best we can classify men and masters according to their leading tendencies only. Our duty is accordingly to counteract the evil, and strengthen the good; to oppose and to hold up to aversion the former, and to eliminate what is weak and questionable from the latter. By thus clearing up the conceptions which the young educational aspirant has as to his future work, we confirm the weak and put the strong on their guard, lest they in their strength should fail and fall. Preparation for the work of tuition is thus the preparation of the man himself for life. The aspirant to the teacher's office must himself become the wise man, in order that he may be able to become the wise master. The training-school for teachers, whether in the Universities or out of it, must, in fact, be itself a school for men, in order that it may be a school for schoolmasters.

To return: the captain-master, who relies on authority in its aspect of law and might alone, fails, and must fail, for want of faith in boy nature, to attain the highest ends of school life, which are, as I have said, ethical, always ethical. At the same time, he does not wholly fail; for obedience to law as law is a great virtue, and if the master is perfect of his kind, and holds himself bound within his own rules, and does not overstrain the personal and arbitrary element in authority, the school is orderly, the boys acquire certain good habits, and they pass from the period of tutelage with a sense of the supremacy of rightful authority, which is a great gain. But the dangers to which such a master is exposed are many:—

1. Such a man is very apt to overstrain his authority, and, forgetting that he is working a system, he substitutes for system his own arbitrary will. It is very difficult to resist this tendency. Love of power is a great snare. This captain-master identifies, ere long, the authority which to him is, in truth, only delegated,

and of which he is only the representative and symbol, with his own abstract will: authority passes into arbitrariness, and the school quickly feels this. Now, I would ask—Why should boys, who, after all, are little men, submit to this? Nay even where the authority, though stern, has not yet passed into arbitrariness, why should a boy submit? There is no answer to this save one—that he is afraid to disobey. Why afraid? If he disobeyed, what would happen? The disapprobation of his master, you will say. But, mark, it is only the boy who has already a strong natural tendency to submission and respect who is open to this motive. The weak, approbation-loving boy, again, is sensitive and timid, and he also submits. The self-sufficing boy may, or may not, obey, according to his appreciation of the *ultima ratio regum*. The loyal boy of fine nature may obey, and probably will, not through fear of his master, but because he has in himself and his own perceptions of right, a motive for obedience. But note this, and it is to this I am pointing—the true spiritual life of all these is never reached by the master, and, accordingly, he cannot possibly educate. He is in truth driving, not drawing; and this comes out very clearly if we consider what his *ultima ratio* is. It is physical pain. It does not matter whether it be an imposition, detention in school, deprivation of certain boyish pleasures, or actual flogging—in all alike, physical dis-ease is the essential character of the punishment. A teacher, in answering a question on methods, when asked, "What steps he would take to make an idle or disobedient boy work?" wrote—"Tell him to do it, and if he didn't, lick him!" This is the whole book of discipline with certain masters, summed up in a sentence. If he did not do it after he was licked, I suppose the next step would be to lick him again and harder, and so on, *ad infinitum*. I do not mean to say that the process would not succeed with many boys, but, at most, only in securing outward conformity. It never did, and never can educate, because it does not touch the inner

springs. It is the method whereby slaves are made to toe the line, and bears are taught to dance. And yet it is, in truth, the supreme motive power which lies at the basis of the administration of the arbitrary captain-master. If now the purely authoritative method, even when well administered as a system, has this weakness, that it fails to educate in the true sense, how much is the evil aggravated if the master yields to the tendency, which there must always be, to substitute his arbitrary will for the idea of true authority (might as founded on right), and of which he ought to be only a passionless symbol, and perhaps persuades himself that he is.

2. The next weakness in the captain-master is the identifying of his authority with his own personality. Offences are then no longer offences against the law and system which he represents, but against himself personally. Here passion at once enters; and, with passion, uncertainty and irregularity of action, and consequent injustice. Authority passes first into arbitrary law and then into the mere caprice of despotism. The wise master can afford to exhibit his human emotions of anger and indignation and contempt, so long as he maintains self-control; the captain-master will find these dangerous tools to play with. They raise the former in the estimation of the boys; they lower the latter to an equality with them. Mere authority, as law and might and system, has no right to passions. Wisdom, on the other hand, may be angry and sin not.

3. The third danger to which the captain-master is subject is over-severity in punishment. This danger arises when he has already yielded to the temptation to confound his own personality with the authority which he wields only as a delegate of the moral law. His only means of enforcing discipline being the production of physical pain, there are no limits to the inflictions he may impose, if his personal passions are once aroused. He can become even vindictive.

4. The fourth danger may be found where there is perfect coolness and self-control; it consists in the captain-master becoming the slave of his own rules, mistaking rules for morality, and so confounding all ethical distinctions. This is a common weakness of women when placed in a position of command. All offences become alike heinous, because all are breaches of some rule. It is by this rule that offences are measured. Authority is thus transmuted into pedantry.

I might now go on to describe other kinds of masters, but the two classes with which I have been dealing are the chief classes, of which all others are modifications. The weaknesses, which beset each of these two classes constitute fresh sub-types when they become permanent. Under the first class, for example, falls the sub-type or variety—the sympathetic master, he who merges all authority in sympathy; and this, carried beyond certain limits, gives the anarchical master, who is no master at all. Under the second head, again, we have the tyrant master (like Dr Keate of Eton), who makes a moral desert and calls it peace; the pedantic master; and the drill-sergeant master or martinet, with all of whom external order is the highest and sole result, as it is, indeed, the sole aim. It is enough, however, to indicate these distinctions.

Let us consider now for a little the effect on boys of the defects of different kinds of masters.

To carry out in detail the parallel of the effect which each kind of master has upon different kinds of boys, would be a long, though by no means a tedious or unprofitable work. Many and subtle are the influences which mould character. Nor are these exercises in analytic psychology unworthy of the attention of schoolmasters. They convert the life of the mere teacher into the life of the educator and the student of practical psychology. They deepen, at the same time that they broaden, his conceptions of his task, and invest a subject, otherwise barren, and even to some minds repellent, with the perennial

charm of philosophy. They throw the light of the highest reason, and the warmth of the life of humanity, on the teacher's daily work, which is thus no longer task-work, but, spite of all its drawbacks, the pleasantest as well as the noblest occupation in which a man in these days can be engaged.

Omitting much, then, I would merely at present point out the danger that attends the proper spiritual growth of boys under that species of the wise master who, through the influence of his sympathetic nature, has a disposition to place too great a reliance on the emotions and moral sentiments of his charge. By so doing, as I have said, he obscures the idea of authority, and to that extent weakens his own power, and softens the moral fibre of his pupil. The purely sympathetic master tends to enfeeble all those boys who live by authority, and are supported by it; and all, more or less, are dependent on authority. They have their natures disturbed; an inner anarchy begins to set itself up in their minds; their mainstay—law—is gone, and emotions, sentiments, ideas, on which the sympathetic master relies, are no substitutes for them. Even the boy of finest breed is injured; for he, as well as the boy who depends on praise, is in special need of the discipline which the recognition of mere authority as such gives. When that is relaxed, he is left to himself, and may become moody and isolated; or, if there be too much moralizing and sympathetic appeal on the part of the master, his loyal nature, in the attempt to rise to the moral call made on him, strains itself, and becomes mature before its time; and thus while a boy is yet in his teens, you have the most disagreeable of all spectacles, which is described by Göethe as a mature judgment in an unripe mind. Where there is, at the same time, a tendency to self-sufficingness in the mind of the boy, you have a still more offensive exhibition of the same mental state, accompanied by what is called priggishness.

Now, without entering here on that interesting subject—the moral analysis of a prig—I would merely say that every other

kind of boy has the possible making of a man in him; but the prig has to be unmade and taken to pieces, as it were, and made up afresh, before he can be an example of a man. He is narrow and arid, and the human outcome is not pleasing. He is the true moral Philistine.

What now is the mental attitude of the different kinds of boys to the captain-master, who falls into the sin which most besets him—arbitrariness and its concomitant severity? He rules by fear and pain alone. The self-sufficing boy is quick enough to see the necessity of walking warily, and will probably escape penalties; but in what respect is his moral nature affected? Is it not the case that the exhibition of this arbitrariness and severity strengthens in him his own vice of character? Here before him is the man whom his parents, supported by the action of many other parents, have selected as the guide of his youth, the model of his future manhood. The master has his turn now, but in a few years the pupil's turn will come; and, meanwhile, the little monster repeats among younger boys in the playground and dormitory the lesson which the master himself has already taught.

That other boy, again, who is dependent on affection, sympathy, and praise, leads, in such circumstances, a wretched life; for when not bullied by his master, he is bullied by the bigger boys, who expend on him the latent irritation which the system of the school engenders.

That third boy, again, whose sense of submission to authority is the guiding principle, suffers least in personal comfort; but he tends to become a slave and a sneak, and we all know what a slave is when he is turned inside out—in other words, when the emancipated boy becomes a man.

The loyal boy, the boy of finest breed, if he is by nature strong, adapts himself, as best he may, to the system under which he lives, perceiving in his master, in a half-conscious way (for it does not take the form of speech), all that he him-

self ought not to be. Thereby he is negatively educated. If, however, his inner strength be not great, either because of his tender years or native want of fibre, even he is taught to skulk, evade, and hate. He is at war, in brief, with his master, and his very moral salvation lies in those rebellious feelings which he rightly cherishes against his governor.

Meanwhile, where this arbitrary ruler governs, the whole school is, as a matter of fact, divided into hostile camps—the governor on one side, and the subjects on the other. To deceive a master, to evade him, nay, even to lie to him, to show up forged exercises, to call him names when he is not present, to take it out of him in any way which may suggest itself to the ingenious and irreverent minds of boys, are all recognized as part of the school institution, on the principle that all is fair in love and war. And can we rightly blame the boys? Ought we not rather to see in this passive rebellion—or, if active, active only in separate acts, not in combined resistance—the hope of the salvation of the boys? The youths of a high-spirited nation, like the British, will not, nay, ought not, to submit to arbitrary despotism based on physical coercion. They must find some outlet for their protest, and so long as they do not tell lies—simply keep clear of lies—I for one applaud them. The whole system proceeds on the assumption that there are two codes—a masters' code and a boys' code—of school morality; nay, the more sagacious of the masters, who accept the arbitrary system as the only one they feel their capacity to work, deliberately wink hard at breaches of school order. Nay, they *must* wink hard; and I need not refer you to your Latin to let you know the connection between the mild physical act of winking and the moral offence of conniving. There should, it seems to me, be only one code, one faith, one school.

That the history of school-keeping is not enriched (I say deliberately, enriched) with a greater number of cases of open rebellion is explained by the fact that boys are ignorant and

do not know how far their mere feelings and emotions are justified as opposed to the tyranny above them, partly to the want of power of combination in the young. The practical deduction from what I have just been saying is, that boys are not always wrong, and masters are not always right.

It may appear that in all I have said I have had in view the master of an English public school, where the head is not only teacher but rector and parent—the prophet, priest, and king of a community. So far this is true; but the difference between the head-master of such a school and the master of a day school is not in the ends at which they should respectively aim, the spirit in which they should work, or the methods which they should pursue. Nor are the remarks that have been made less applicable to a parent, with this difference only, that he may lean much more to the sympathetic and the tender than becomes the wise master, because he is the constant source of all the happiness as well as the unhappiness of the family, and has thus a control of the child's emotions and will which it is impossible for the master of many to have. His opportunities, too, of individualizing and of allowing for idiosyncrasies of character are great, and this a master of many can only very partially do.

In conclusion, I would say to the master of a day school or of a class, who doubts the reality of his moral power over those whom he governs for a portion only of every day, "Do not underrate your influence. It is radiating from you on every side, and is simply incalculable in its possible effects. Work on the side of the ethical forces in the spirit of the wise master, and they will declare for you and help you when and where you least expect. Nothing is lost, least of all true moral power."

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